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Abstract 
 
Jana Bacevic 
 
War on universities?  
Neoliberalism, intellectual positioning, and knowledge production in the UK 
 
This thesis contributes to sociological accounts of critique and, more broadly, to 
accounts of the relationship between knowledge and the social conditions of its 
production.  
 
It begins with a theoretical exploration of the tension between Bourdieu’s concept 
of sociological reflexivity and Boltanski’s sociology of critique, including the 
epistemic and political position from which knowledge claims in social sciences 
can be made and justified. This question becomes particularly important when the 
authority of such claims rests on the possibility of a conceptual distinction between 
the subject of knowledge (the ‘knower’) and their object (the ‘social’).  
 
The empirical part of the thesis provides an analysis of this process through the 
case of the critique of neoliberalism in UK higher education and research between 
1997 and 2017. Intellectual interventions (books, articles, and other public 
statements) offering critical accounts of the transformation of universities are 
interpreted as forms of intellectual positioning, speech-acts that assign properties 
to objects and actors in the social realm. Through a qualitative analysis of 
interventions and interviews, the thesis reconstructs ontological assumptions 
entailed in forms of positioning, particularly those pertaining to the justification of 
epistemic authority of academics in the political and historical context of post-
WWII Britain.  
 
The thesis uses these findings to situate the questions of knowledge, critique, and 
the role of social sciences within the longer discussion about the relationship 
between ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’. Focusing on the relationship 
between positionality and positioning, the thesis shows how subject-object 
relationships form a fundamental part of the production of both critique and 
knowledge about its object.  
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Introduction 
 
What is the relationship between critique and the social? At first glance, this may 
seem like too general a question. Any attempt to offer an answer is inevitably going 
to come up against problems in defining both critique and the social (cf. Latour, 
2005, 2004). This does not mean sociology is not critical. Particularly in the UK, 
sociology has a tradition of association with progressive politics, allegedly 
prompting Raymond Aron to observe that “British sociology is essentially an 
attempt to make intellectual sense of the political problems of the Labour Party” 
(Halsey, 2004, p. 70).  
 
21st-century sociology, in this sense, has certainly travelled a long way from 
Weber’s doctrine of axiological neutrality (e.g. Hamati-Ataya, 2018; Hammersley, 
2017). Discussions about the relationship between ideas, identities, and politics of 
those who produce knowledge surface time and again, in tensions surrounding, for 
instance, the movement to decolonize higher education (e.g. Mbembe, 2015; 
Mamdani, 2018), climate change (e.g. Dunlap and Brulle, eds., 2015; Clark, 2011), 
or intersectionality (e.g. Hill Collins, 2009; Hancock, 2016). They engage a variety 
of theoretical resources: from Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, to feminist critique 
of positionality and standpoint epistemologies, Foucault’s work on the 
knowledge/power nexus, and, of course, different forms of critique of ‘ideology’, 
from Frankfurt School to post-structuralism.  
 
As interesting and dynamic as these debates are, one of their key aspects has 
remained significantly undertheorised. It concerns the relationship between 
knowledge and agency, or, more precisely, critique as a form of knowledge of 
social reality, and the way different actors orient themselves towards this reality. 
As a consequence, the potential of critical sociology – and critical social knowledge 
in general – to inform people’s ideas and consequently their actions tends to be 
taken for granted.  
 
This problem is implicit in many forms of critical knowledge of reality. Raymond 
Geuss, for instance, identifies it in both the first and second generations of 
Frankfurt School:  
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A critical theory, then, does not predict that the agents in the society will 
adopt and use the theory to understand themselves and transform their 
society, rather it ‘demands’ that they adopt the critical theory, i.e. it asserts 
that these agents ‘ought’ to adopt and act on the critical theory where the 
‘ought’ is the ‘ought’ of rationality (Geuss, 1981, p. 57).   
 
The starting ambition of this thesis is to examine the relationship between critique 
and the social conditions of its existence and, in particular, their relationship in the 
political and economic context of contemporary UK academia. Rather than the 
normatively inflected discussions inspired by the legacy of the Frankfurt School, 
which would merit an altogether separate investigation, this thesis takes a slightly 
different route. Its starting point is at the intersection between sociology of 
knowledge, sociology of intellectuals, and social theory. In an analogy with ‘the 
social life of methods’ (e.g. Law and Ruppert, 2013), this approach could be 
described as ‘the social life of theory’, or, more specifically, ‘the social life of 
concepts’. It is concerned less with the links between theory and sociopolitical 
change, and more with the relationship between the processes of production of 
concepts and statements about the nature of reality, and the social context of their 
justification. 
 
This is particularly pertinent given the idea that social sciences at the start of the 
21st century are experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. This time, the crisis is brought 
on not by the scrutiny of their own epistemic and ontological foundations, but by 
the introduction of market competition and performance-based funding to 
institutions and practices of knowledge production. Struggles surrounding the 
future of the university – what interventions analysed in this thesis refer to as ‘the 
war on universities’ – are often at the heart of these discussions. The university, 
and its existence as a publicly funded institution dedicated to the pursuit of 
knowledge, are seen to be under threat. The sources of this threat take many forms, 
but they usually entail a mix of governmental control and increased domination by 
economic and financial interests. This combination is oftentimes framed under the 
umbrella term ‘neoliberalism’. Diagnostic narratives related to the transformation 
of the status of knowledge, thus, go together with the critique of the effects of 
neoliberal policies on its production, and, in particular, on ‘the university’ as an 
institution. 
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Given how widely accepted the idea of the sources as well as detrimental effects 
of these changes in contemporary academia seems to be, it may be appealing to 
accept this type of diagnostic at face value, rather than see it as an object of research 
in its own right. Yet, if the university is in crisis, developing critical capacity to 
understand our own assumptions – including those about the crisis – seems 
pertinent. Furthermore, if we accept that critical capacity is one of the sources of 
legitimacy for sociology (and other social sciences), understanding how this 
capacity relates to the social context in which justification takes place has 
important consequences for knowledge production both at present and in the future. 
 
In order to examine the critique of neoliberalism in higher education and research 
as an object, this thesis builds on Luc Boltanski’s sociology of critique (e.g. 
Boltanski, 2011 [2009]). Sociology of critique is an elaboration of the project of 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, developed by Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, Ève 
Chiapello, and others once associated with Groupe de sociologie politique et 
morale in Paris (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007 
[1999]). Pragmatic sociology of critique developed precisely as a form of 
considering the relationship between critique (including that practiced by social 
sciences) and the conditions of its production as internally related, rather than 
assuming critique exists outside the conditions it addresses. Boltanski and his 
collaborators emphasized critical capacity as, in principle, available to all social 
actors, and thus an essential part of the production of the social, rather than an 
exceptional practice activated only in moments of ‘crisis’.  
 
This angle was, in part, motivated by desire to move away from Bourdieu’s 
characterization of human agency as driven by internalized dispositions and, in 
part, to account for the reproduction of capitalism under conditions of political 
plurality. Early summary of the research programme, Boltanski and Thévenot’s On 
Justification (originally published in 1991, in English translation 2006) analyses 
the repertoire of justifications – narrative frames of reasoning, including the 
invocation of overarching moral or ethical frameworks – actors use in situations of 
‘dispute’, or any situation where differing interpretations and thus different courses 
of action are possible. In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello 
(English translation 2005, originally published in 1999) attempt to explain the 
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transformation and reproduction of capitalist ‘ethos’ in the 1980s and 1990s 
through the appropriation of the type of critique associated with the ‘spirit of 1968’ 
into managerial and organizational discourse. In addition to presenting one of the 
precursors to studies of neoliberal ideology in the context of production and 
transmission of knowledge, New Spirit of Capitalism was instrumental in drawing 
attention to the fact that critique can serve to reinforce rather than just to challenge 
social and political order. Finally, Boltanski’s On Critique (2011, originally 
published in 2009) engages in more detail with epistemological implications of the 
relationship between critique – both in the sense of Bourdieu’s critical sociology, 
and in pragmatic sociology of critique – and social reality. More specifically, it 
queries the constitution of ‘complex exteriority’ which, Boltanski claims, is key to 
the constitution of critical stance of social sciences.  
 
Despite somewhat limited reception in Anglo-American contexts, pragmatic 
sociology of critique has been highly influential in France and in some other 
continental European contexts. Like any other school of thought, it is not devoid 
of internal contradictions, not least those generated by the evolution of its own 
theoretical and ontological postulates. This thesis does not aim to provide a 
theoretical exegesis of these arguments (good overviews are available in Susen & 
Turner eds. 2014; Blokker, 2011); rather, its objective is to use some of the question 
opened by this research programme – in particular the relationship between 
epistemic position and forms of justification entailed in the distinction between 
simple and complex exteriority – to query the constitution of critique of 
neoliberalism in the case of UK higher education and research. 
 
This thesis starts from the following positions. First, it moves beyond the popular 
perception of critique as primarily a form of contention towards seeing critique as 
a constitutive part of social and political order. In this sense, it reframes critique as 
a topic for, primarily, social theory1, and, secondarily, sociology of knowledge2. 
 
1While there are many interpretations of ‘social theory’, in this thesis the concept refers to the labour 
of defining, discussing, and clarifying the meaning of terms used by academics (usually, but not 
exclusively, in the social sciences and humanities) to describe, interpret, and explain objects, 
mechanisms, and relations commonly agreed to belong to the ‘social’ domain. See e.g. Abend, 
2008; Swedberg, 2016).  
2Sociology of knowledge’ can refer to a number of approaches and paradigms: from Mannheim’s 
phenomenologically-influenced historical sociology, to sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) of 
the ‘Edinburgh School’ (e.g. Bloor, 1976) and actor-network theory (e.g. Latour, 2005, also for the 
summary of these distinctions), to ‘New Sociology of Ideas’ (e.g. Camic, Gross and Lamont, 2011). 
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Second, by focusing on how critique is produced by those who do it 
‘professionally’ – that is, intellectuals, or academic intellectuals more specifically 
– it shares pragmatic sociology of critique’s refusal to invest any particular group 
of actors (including social scientists) with a priori epistemic privilege in producing 
critique, but ‘flips’ it from seeing common-people-as-experts to considering 
experts-as-common-people. In this, it takes a step beyond the postulate of sociology 
of critique that ‘ordinary’ people have the same critical capacity as social scientists, 
towards assuming that ‘professional’ production of critique must, in the final 
instance, be subject to the same regularities and mechanisms as apply to any 
‘ordinary’ member of society. This does not mean there are no elements specific 
to critique as a form of social practice; however, these elements have to be subject 
to the same set of explanatory criteria as other practices, lest we end up reproducing 
the assumption that critique somehow stands ‘outside’ of the social context. Last, 
rather than seeing critique as independent from the conditions that it aims to 
describe (for instance, capitalism and/or neoliberalism), it asks what it would mean 
to say that critique is mutually constitutive with conditions that are its object.  
 
In this, the intention of this thesis is to engage productively with one of the key 
questions left open in sociology of critique – that is, the relationship between 
knowledge of social reality and acting in social reality. The main challenge it 
approaches, thus, is to think the relationship between the current conditions of 
knowledge production in the academia, and their critique, without back- or 
foregrounding either. In this, its goal is not to affirm or deny the critical potential 
of sociology and other social sciences, but rather to ‘unpick’ the nexus between 
knowledge, critique, and action, and to consider how it relates to present 
conditions. 
 
Social and historical framing 
 
This thesis was written in the political context of post-Brexit-referendum Britain 
and Donald Trump, where effects of rampant climate change have only begun to 
gain coverage in mainstream media, and where ‘post-truth’ was Oxford 
Dictionary’s ‘word of the year’ in 2016. In such a world, it may be tempting to 
 
Here, ‘sociology of knowledge’ is used in the most general sense, as the study of social factors and 
processes influencing the production of human knowledge. 
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revert to principled assertions of epistemic authority and value of academic 
knowledge (cf. Latour, 2013, 2004). Social sciences, in particular, are prone to what 
Mike Savage (2009) dubbed ‘epochalism’: the tendency to frame political or 
historical events as calling for disciplinary (re)orientation. This, for instance, has 
been a frequent mark of recent work on the ‘crisis of expertise’ (Nichols, 2017; 
Cruickshank and Sassower, 2017), which invariably ends up reasserting the 
relevance of academic inquiry, particularly for its critical potential (see also 
Bacevic, 2017). However, this position lends itself easily to a somewhat circular 
argumentation where the diagnosis of a specific historical moment is used to justify 
the need to maintain the position that enables precisely that kind of diagnosis to 
persist. Academic critique of neoliberalism in universities is a case in point: it uses 
a diagnosis of a particular set of conditions – the neoliberal ‘onslaught’ on teaching 
and research – in order to justify the need for more research and teaching, including 
about the phenomenon it diagnoses.  
 
This, of course, is not to say that neoliberalism is ‘not real’ or that its effects are 
‘only in people’s heads’. While there is a longer debate on the exact meaning, 
validity, or usefulness of the term (e.g. Rodgers, 2018; Venugopal, 2015; Springer, 
2016, 2015), political technologies associated with neoliberalism have visible and 
material corollaries as well as experienced, and embodied consequences, both of 
which would probably be there even if it were not for consistently growing 
scholarship on the matter. Yet, this does draw attention to the need to carefully 
consider the relationship between the transformation of economic and political 
conditions of teaching and research and critical scholarship about this 
transformation. This is not very likely to ensue from ‘epochalist’ narratives, in part 
because they prefigure the reality of the perceived threat and, as the ‘war’ metaphor 
suggests, focus on the defence. In contrast, this thesis sets out to think about the 
relationship between this sort of diagnosis and its effects – that is to say, the link 
between diagnostic and performative parts of critique in their particular social and 
political environment – and, rather than seeing critique as a ‘reaction’ to the 
changing conditions of knowledge production, to theorise how the two are related. 
 
The relationship between neoliberalism and critique has to be thought in the 
context of broader transformation of social and cultural conditions of knowledge 
production at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. This 
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transformation is often linked to the problematization of the legacy of the 
Enlightenment and the project of Western rationality as a whole. While 
postmodernism is credited (rarely laudably) as the ‘source’ of this 
problematization, the relationship between knowledge, critique, and political 
power has been a concern for social theory at least since Adorno and Horkheimer, 
if not Marx (see e.g. discussion in Bernstein, 1989). In this sense, critique can 
neither disavow its Enlightenment legacy nor its relationship to the question of 
reason. In Foucault’s poignant summary, “[c]ritique is, in a sense, the handbook of 
reason that has grown up in the Enlightenment; and, conversely, the Enlightenment 
is the age of critique” (1984, p. 38). 
 
The historical constitution of critique as a distinct social practice is coextensive 
with the emergence of the public sphere. As Hohendahl argued,  
 
[i]n the Age of Enlightenment, criticism cannot be separated from the 
institution of the public sphere. Every judgement is designed to be directed 
towards a public; communication with the reader is an integral part of the 
system (1982, p. 52).  
 
This has particular bearing on the constitution of critique in the UK. Habermas 
(1989) situated the origins of the modern public sphere in the specific context of 
the constitution of mercantile bourgeoisie as the carrier of the political order in the 
British Isles. While the function of the public sphere in other European countries 
was to present a counterweight to the absolutist state, in England this opposition 
was mediated by what Terry Eagleton (1988) dubbed “intimacy of cultural, 
political, and economic preoccupations” (p. 11) between gentry and aristocracy on 
one, and emergent mercantile class on the other side. This intimacy will continue 
to mark the relationship between the political class and intellectuals:  
 
The currency of this realm is neither title nor property but rationality…but 
because that rationality is not the possession of a single class within the 
hegemonic social bloc – because it is a product of an intensive conversation 
between those dominant classes…it is possible to view it as universal 
(Eagleton, 1988, p. 26).  
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In this sense, debates related to what the cultural critic Henry Giroux dubbed 
“neoliberalism’s war on higher education” (Giroux, 2014) may focus on neoliberal 
policies, but the values, assumptions, and ideas different sides draw on are older 
than neoliberal ideology. They include the sources and status of knowledge, the 
role of institutions that produce it, the relationship between those who do 
(intellectuals) and the knowledge produced. From this point of view, while 
arguments invoked in this dispute may concern the relationship between 
universities, markets, and governments at the end of the 20th and the beginning of 
21st centuries, they relate to the broader questions of the role and status of 
knowledge in, and its relation to, society. 
 
At this point, cynics (or political/IR realists) might be tempted to assert that, in 
accordance with what is known as ‘Sayre's Law’ (alternatively attributed to Henry 
Kissinger), academic politics is nasty precisely because nothing is at stake. The key 
conflicts of the 21st century are more likely to concern oil fields in the Middle East 
and water wells in Misrah than university campuses in the Midlands. Similarly, the 
future of universities will more likely be decided in boardrooms of policy institutes 
and think-tanks than in intellectuals’ books and blog posts. There is both a trivial 
and a non-trivial sense in which this is true. In relation to the first, the role of 
critique has to include understanding its own limits: it is, in part, a heuristic. From 
this perspective, studying the relationship (or lack thereof) between academic 
critique and sociopolitical change has obvious bearings on how we understand 
both. Boltanski and Chiapello make a similar point in the preface to New Spirit of 
Capitalism: 
 
Stressing historical structures, laws and forces tends to minimize the role of 
intentional action. Things are what they are. Yet the critical approach 
becomes meaningless if one does not believe that it can serve to inflect 
human beings’ action, and that this action can itself help to change the course 
of things in the direction of further ‘liberation’...But if, in the final analysis, 
all relations are reducible to conflict of interest and relations of force, and 
this is a ‘law’ immanent in the order of the ‘social’, what is the point of 
unmasking them in the indignant tones of critique, as opposed to registering 
them with a dispassion of the entomologist studying ant societies? (2007, p. 
x) 
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In a non-trivial sense, the question of limits of critique may point to another longer-
lasting feature: separation between the world of ‘thinking’ and the world of 
‘politics’. This topic, which Hannah Arendt explored at length (Arendt, 1981, 1989, 
2005), finds contemporary expression in the bifurcation of technical and critical 
forms of knowledge and expertise (Davies and McGoey, 2012). The flipside of its 
Enlightenment legacy, therefore, is that critique can become part of 
‘epistemologies of ignorance’ (McGoey, 2012a, b) not only revealing but also, even 
if unwittingly, obscuring the relationship between knowledge and forms of political 
power.  
 
This is not necessarily to suggest that critique might have “run out of steam” 
(Latour, 2004) or that it had ‘sold out’ to neoliberal capitalism. Understanding the 
limits of critique and framing critique as part and parcel of social processes means, 
very simply, that we have to focus not only on what it says but also on what it does. 
The return of the popularity of Marxism in social theory, in particular, means it 
would be easy to write off critique as a form of ‘superstructure’. Yet, as this thesis 
hopes to demonstrate, framing critique as an epiphenomenon of ‘real’ social 
processes – as well as, conversely, their cause – is unnecessarily reductive. It is 
precisely the relationship between the two that needs to be explored.   
 
The starting question of this thesis, therefore, is what the critique of neoliberalism 
in UK higher education and research can tell us about the social processes of 
production of knowledge, their organization, transformation, and contestation in 
the political domain. From this, the thesis opens into the broader theoretical 
consideration of critique as concept and practice – and the related question of 
effects, that is, how critique acts. This is used to interrogate some of the 
assumptions of social sciences as the site of production of authoritative knowledge, 
with emphasis on the role and possibility of self-knowledge, or reflexivity, in this 
context. 
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Outline 
 
The first chapter begins with the theoretical framing of critique of neoliberalism in 
higher education and different ways to approach it as an object of study. It 
elaborates why it is useful to move beyond reductive framings of critique (or 
intellectual interventions more generally) that see it as either foundational or 
epiphenomenal and explores the theoretical and methodological implications of 
seeing critique as co-constitutive with the social. It puts sociology of critique in 
conversation with Foucault’s concept of discourse, Bourdieu’s concepts of field 
and intellectuals as the ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’, and 
performativity of concepts that draws on the work of Austin, Butler, and Searle, as 
well as sociological conceptualisations of reflexivity. Last, it shows how sociology 
of critique can help bridge the structuralism of realist accounts, on the one hand, 
and the constructivism of pragmatist accounts, on the other. 
 
The second chapter proceeds to outline how these concerns translate to the design 
of this research project. It outlines methodological approaches that guided data 
collection and analysis, specifies limitations and constraints, as well as objectives. 
Specifically, it discusses the double bind of positionality and positioning in the 
context of research, and its epistemological implications. 
 
The ensuing three chapters are primarily concerned with the presentation, 
exposition, and analysis of the collected material. Chapter 3 presents the historical 
and political background of transformations that are the object of critique analysed 
in the thesis. This chapter focuses on the changing relationship between 
universities and political authority throughout the 20th century and in the early 
decades of the 21st century. Most critical discourses place the origin of the trends 
identified as neoliberal in the years of the government of Margaret Thatcher. 
However, given the scope and political origin of the changes, it offers a summary 
of the early history of higher education in the UK before moving on to post-WWII 
developments, up to the most recent events – that is, discussions concerning the 
role of universities, knowledge, and intellectuals (experts) in the context of 
‘Brexit’.  
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Chapter 4 introduces the main topics in the critique of the ‘war’ on universities. It 
analyses the evolution of ideas, the shifting framing of critique, as well as changes 
in the portrayal of specific entities (or actors) in the context of UK higher education 
and research. It shows how critique evolved, from an early predominantly Marxist 
analysis of the university as a site of class struggle, to ‘culture wars’ in the 
aftermath of the Brexit referendum.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of these forms of critique through interviews with 
a selected group of academics. While Chapter 4 focuses on the discursive content 
of critique, Chapter 5 analyses the narrative strategies and reflection on intellectual 
positioning as the frame for critique. 
 
These threads are brought together in Chapter 6, which shows how forms of 
justification – qua speech acts – define the position of different ‘speakers’ and other 
entities in the field. However, they go beyond that: they also define the field itself, 
thus reflecting the conditions that allowed it to be created in the first place. It is at 
this point that they encounter the tension between speaking and acting inherent in 
critique. This chapter therefore redescribes the ‘war on universities’ as a form of 
conflict. Despite the fact it rarely claims actual lives or results in large-scale 
destruction of physical environment, it is equally concerned with questions of 
ontology – or the “whatness of what is” (Boltanski, 2011, p. 35 et passim). At the 
end of the day, this struggle to define (or have privileged epistemic access to) 
‘whatness’ of stuff shapes trajectories, stakes, and strategies of different human 
actors involved in this particular set of relations.  
 
The concluding chapter examines the implications of this analysis for how we 
understand the nature of academic knowledge and its role in contemporary 
societies. In this sense, the thesis aims to provide a meta-theoretical yet empirically 
informed narrative that seeks to understand how critique, as a form of practice, 
works to constitute relations and categories in the social domain.  
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Chapter 1: Literature review and theoretical framing 
 
 Introduction 
 
This chapter elaborates entry points in the Introduction by situating the critique of 
neoliberalism in higher education and research as a topic of inquiry. In order to do 
this, it frames it as an intellectual intervention, a form of speech-act that combines 
descriptive and normative elements. This provides an opening for putting the 
postulates of sociology of critique in conversation with four major theoretical 
concepts: discourse, performativity, fields, and reflexivity. The chapter shows how 
these concepts help further refine questions opened by framing of critique of 
neoliberalism as an object of sociological inquiry. The methodological tenets of 
this inquiry are further elaborated in Chapter 2.  
 
 Situating the object 
 
 There is a war on for the future of the university worldwide. The stakes are 
high, and they reach deep into our social condition. On one side are self-
proclaimed modernisers who view the institution as vital to national 
economic success. Here the university is a servant of the national economy 
in the context of globalization, its driving principles of private and personal 
enrichment necessary conditions of ‘progress’ and modernity. Others see this 
as a radical impoverishment of the university’s capacities to extend human 
possibilities and freedoms, to seek earnestly for social justice, and to 
participate in the endless need for the extension of democracy.  
(…) 
Choose sides3. 
 
The blurb for Thomas Docherty’s Universities at War (Docherty, 2015) is perhaps 
the most succinct summary of the predicament of UK higher education. Docherty, 
Professor of English Literature at the University of Warwick, was at the centre of 
a dispute widely reported in the national media the previous year, when he had 
been suspended from the university for, alllegedly, “undermining the authority” of 
 
3 https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/universities-at-war/book244608 
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a senior member of the management (Gardner, 2014). However, critics claimed the 
real cause was Docherty’s sustained critical attitude towards university reforms in 
higher education in the UK, some of which he had also addressed in his previous 
book, For the University (Docherty, 2011). 
 
While the reaction they provoked certainly makes Docherty’s books exceptional, 
their diagnostic framing is not unique. Since mid-2000s, there has been a veritable 
boom of literature critical of the transformation of university sector and its 
relationship with the state. Titles include Killing Thinking: Death of the 
Universities, (Evans, 2004); The Assault on Universities (Bailey and Freedman 
eds., 2011); A Manifesto for the Public University (Holmwood, ed., 2011); What 
are Universities for? (Collini, 2012); The Great University Gamble (McGettigan, 
2013); Death of the Public University? (Wright and Shore, eds., 2017), What’s 
Happened to the University? (Furedi, 2017); Speaking of Universities (Collini, 
2017), and A University Education (Willetts, 2017), to name just those published 
in the UK.  
 
The diagnosis also appears in articles (in e.g. Times Higher Education Supplement 
or The Guardian) and blog posts. In a piece published in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education in 2015, distinguished Marxist critic Terry Eagleton wrote: 
 
From Cape Town to Reykjavik, Sydney to São Paulo, an event as momentous 
in its own way as the Cuban revolution or the invasion of Iraq is steadily 
under way: the slow death of the university as a center of humane critique. 
Universities, which in Britain have an 800-year history, have traditionally 
been derided as ivory towers, and there was always some truth in the 
accusation. Yet the distance they established between themselves and society 
at large could prove enabling as well as disabling, allowing them to reflect 
on the values, goals, and interests of a social order too frenetically bound up 
in its own short-term practical pursuits to be capable of much self-criticism. 
Across the globe, that critical distance is now being diminished almost to 
nothing, as the institutions that produced Erasmus and John Milton, Einstein 
and Monty Python, capitulate to the hard-faced priorities of global capitalism 
(Eagleton, 2015, my emphasis). 
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Besides propensity towards metaphors of disaster, war, or conflict, these books, 
articles and blogs share other characteristics. While their authors are usually 
academics, their tone is, in most cases, relatively popular; that is, they address the 
general, albeit educated, reader. They rarely, if ever, engage in systematic 
collection and presentation of data: though some of these will use numbers and 
figures for illustrative purposes, the onus is usually on the author, as the witness, 
narrator, and analyst of the trends that these books, articles, and blog posts describe. 
In this sense, despite the fact that their authors usually occupy academic positions, 
the type of epistemic authority they perform through these forms of critique is 
closer to that usually associated with “public intellectuals” rather than with 
“specific experts” (Baert, 2012).  
 
These narratives have a common structure. They begin by identifying a crisis in 
the university. They locate the origins of this crisis in the transformation of the 
governing principles of the university, associated with the changes in the ‘social 
contract’ between the universities and the state. This transformation is framed as 
part of the broader ideological shift concerning the provision of public services, 
usually identified with neoliberalism. They proceed to explain how this 
transformation poses significant dangers to a particular concept of the university 
(public, critical), to the point of representing a serious attack – or ‘war’ – on its 
very essence. They argue for defending or reinstating the public university, usually 
by reference to its contribution to critical inquiry, democracy, modernity, or even 
the Western civilization or the legacy of the Enlightenment as a whole. 
 
Neoliberalism, in this sense, is taken as an overarching term for the ideology or 
modes of governance responsible for the transformation of the relationship 
between universities, as institutions of knowledge production, and the state. This 
transformation is primarily associated with the withdrawal of the state from direct 
provision of public services, and reorientation towards private, or ‘market-based’ 
models of allocation of resources. Yet, as the metaphor of ‘war’ suggests, critique 
of neoliberalism in universities – or, more broadly, knowledge production 
(comprising both higher education and research) – often frames this process as the 
final stage of ‘decline’ of the status of knowledge (and those who produce it) in 
society. 
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In this sense, the ‘war on universities’ can be seen as part of a longer narrative 
concerning changes in status and the role of intellectuals, something Baert and 
Shipman (2012) dubbed the ‘declinist thesis’. As a genre of critique, the declinist 
thesis holds that, in Western societies, intellectuals – defined as those who have 
monopoly on the production of authoritative knowledge – are losing power and 
influence. In its contemporary form, this loss of influence is usually defined in 
relation to two spheres: politics and economics. On the one hand, intellectuals are 
‘losing ground’ to politicians and managers, whose actions betray an interest in the 
accumulation of power and prestige. On the other hand, intellectuals – as much as 
the values they embody – are retreating in front of the unstoppable advance of the 
forces of the market. Combined, this portends the ‘capitulation’ of universities in 
front of neoliberalism. 
 
The combination of descriptive (or diagnostic) and normative (or prescriptive) 
elements suggests these forms of critique can be identified as intellectual 
interventions. Eyal and Bucholz (2010) proposed this term as a way of refocusing 
the study of intellectual life from the emphasis on a fixed role or identity (‘the 
intellectual’), towards a more contingent or processual emphasis on the relational 
nature and effects of the production of authoritative statements (intervention): 
 
The difference between sociology of intellectuals and the sociology of 
interventions is that the former takes as its unit of analysis a particular social 
type and is preoccupied with showing how the social characteristics of this 
type explain where its allegiances lie, whereas the latter takes as its unit of 
analysis the movement of intervention itself and is therefore interested in 
how forms of expertise can acquire value as public interventions (Eyal and 
Bucholz, 2010, p. 120).  
 
Rather than importing the ‘declinist’ narrative, and trying to show to what degree 
and why intellectuals (in this case, those working in universities) are losing their 
standing, we should look at how these narratives are created and disseminated, how 
they are recognized and valued in public as well as, not less importantly, what they 
aim to achieve.   
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Theory of intellectual positioning (Baert, 2015, 2012; Baert and Morgan, 2018) 
builds on the concept of interventions to posit that intellectual products serve to 
position their authors (and others) in the intellectual and political arena. In this 
sense, critique is not only ‘reflective’ but also performative; intellectual 
interventions create effects in and for both actors and the field. They achieve this 
by attributing specific characteristics to differently defined actors, objects, and 
institutions. Succinctly, intellectual interventions are performative because they 
establish a link between how things are (description) and how they should be 
(prescription). Their effects, in this sense, derive primarily from the possibility to 
assert a version of this link that is acceptable and influential at a particular place 
and time, and with specific people.  
 
The concept of social life as defined by competing forms of definition and 
justification is also the cornerstone of pragmatic sociology of critique (Boltanski, 
2011; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). Boltanski 
and Thévenot argued social situations are characterised by a relatively fixed set of 
rules (‘grammars’), vocabularies, and forms of valuation that actors resort to in 
order to justify their own, as well as qualify the identity and conduct of others. 
These underlying structures of thought become visible not only in situations of 
dispute (i.e., when there is an actual conflict), but whenever actors need to justify 
different courses of action.  
 
In On Justification, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) demonstrate that seemingly 
different normative (or ethical) frameworks these forms of justification invoke 
nonetheless coalesce around a finite number of arrangements4 of reasons, objects, 
and persons. These arrangements can be further categorized as orders of worth, 
polities5, and worlds. Orders of worth define the overarching moral principle 
according to which persons and objects are placed within categories; these logics 
of justification are called ‘polities’. Six polities are established at first – civic, 
inspired, domestic, industrial, market, and reputational6; Boltanski and Chiapello 
 
4 Or ‘assemblages’; early sociology of critique makes quite explicit its shared theoretical 
background with Latour’s and Callon’s actor-network theory. 
5 Expression in French is cités, which in English translations appears as both ‘city’ (e.g. Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2007) and ‘polity’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006, Boltanski, 2011). I find the latter 
closer to the original meaning, so this term will be used throughout the thesis.   
6 Previously translated as ‘fame’, but appears as ‘reputation’ in the 2007 edition of New Spirit of 
Capitalism. 
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(2007) will go on to add a seventh, the ‘projective’ polity. Briefly, the civic polity 
entails judgments of value on the basis of contribution to the common good of all 
its citizens; the inspired, built on the model of St. Augustine’s ‘City of God’, on 
asceticism and divine inspiration; the domestic, on the basis of contribution to the 
‘household’ (one could say, maintenance of patriarchal order); the industrial, on 
the basis of hard work and cooperation; the market, on the basis of commerce; and 
the reputational, on the basis of fame; and projective, on the basis of future-
generativity. The application of these polities to ‘reality’ – everything that is 
constructed – is what gives rise to ‘worlds’, that is, different conceivable 
arrangements and relations between elements positioned in either. 
 
This theoretical framework may at times appear too specific or complex, not least 
because of the shifts in the meaning and use of specific terms between early and 
later framings (cf. Stones, 2014). However, given the key objective of the thesis is 
not to offer an exegesis of its theoretical or ontological postulates, these terms will 
be used to the degree to which they are useful in illuminating the present 
discussion.  From this perspective, the core constitutive operation for ‘orders of 
worth’, ‘polities’, and ‘worlds’ is positioning: by placing objects and actors in 
specific domains, those who formulate critique simultaneously introduce a 
diagnostic (‘what is something’) and a normative dimension (‘where should it 
belong/where it shouldn’t belong’). Critique (or, more broadly, any kind of 
discursive justification) rests on an ontology that is fundamentally positional, or, 
in broader terms, relational.  
 
In this sense, the sociology of critique is compatible with the theory of intellectual 
positioning (Baert, 2015, 2012) and shares ontological postulates of Bourdieu’s 
genetic structuralism (cf. Susen, 2014b, c; Nachi, 2014) (as well as, in the broader 
sense, Chomsky’s generative grammar). However, while it is possible to claim that 
relationality is ‘generic’, what is brought into relation is not. Differently put, the 
cognitive operation of classification may be a common human capacity and thus 
relatively equally distributed among actors, but the persuasiveness, success and 
durability of those forms of association are not. Similarly to intellectual 
interventions, then, critique rests on the capacity to assert an authoritative 
interpretation of the relationship between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be done about 
it’.  
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This brings into sharper relief the relationship between access to knowledge of 
social reality and the position from which these claims can be made. As Boltanski 
points out, this epistemic position is not simple: 
 
Critical theories…necessarily rely on descriptive social science to paint a 
picture of the reality subject to critique. But compared with sociological 
descriptions that seek to conform to the vulgate of neutrality, the specificity 
of critical theories is that they contain critical judgements on the social order 
which the analyst assumes responsibility for in her own name, thus 
abandoning any pretention to neutrality (Boltanski, 2011, p. 4). 
 
 On Critique engages with the relationship between knowledge of social reality of 
‘ordinary actors’ and that reliant on reflexivity derived from scientific instruments. 
This, in part, comes from pragmatic sociology’s qualification of ‘metacritical 
theories of domination’ – in particular Bourdieu’s critical sociology – as prone to 
posit a distinction between critical awareness of sociologists, on the one hand, and 
‘ordinary’ actors, on the other: 
 
Metacritical theories of domination tackle these asymmetries [of power] 
from a particular angle – that of the miscognition by the actors themselves of 
the exploitation to which they are subject and, above all, of the social 
conditions that make this exploitation possible and also, as a result, of the 
means by which they could stop it. That is why they present themselves 
indivisibly as theories of power, theories of exploitation and theories of 
knowledge. By this token, they encounter in an especially vexed fashion the 
issue of the relationship between the knowledge of social reality which is that 
of ordinary actors, reflexively engaged in practice, and the knowledge of 
social reality conceived from a reflexivity reliant on forms and instruments 
of totalization – an issue which is itself at the heart of the tensions out of 
which the possibility of a social science must be created. (Boltanski, 2011, 
p. 9).  
 
The tension between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ position is particularly pronounced in the 
critique of neoliberalism in higher education. Namely, those engaging in critique 
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‘sit’ uneasily between the two categories. On the one hand, their authority is 
derived from their position within the system of knowledge production, that is, 
their access to the ‘instruments of totalisation’ that Boltanski refers to as part of the 
vocabulary of social sciences. On the other, their critique addresses this very 
system: this means they simultaneously occupy the position of ‘ordinary actors’. 
This is particularly interesting since most critics in the case of critique of 
transformation of universities are not ‘experts’ in higher education in the strict 
sense of the term. While their academic backgrounds vary – some, like Thomas 
Docherty and Stefan Collini, are literary scholars; some, like John Holmwood or 
Steve Fuller, are sociologists – none have higher education, let alone higher 
education policy, as their primary field of scholarly expertise.   
 
This suggests forms and logics of justification involved in academic critique of 
neoliberalism can provide particularly useful insights for the delineation of ‘lay’ 
and ‘expert’ epistemic positions, and the negotiation of this boundary. This is 
compatible with the shift in the study of knowledge production from precisely 
defined individuals, groups, or fields, towards distributed, networked agency and 
‘interstitial’ domains – precisely what Eyal and Bucholz emphasised in arguing for 
moving away from 'intellectuals' and towards intellectual interventions (2010, pp. 
129–133). This thesis, therefore, will treat these as positions on an ontological 
continuum, which is why it is interested in the dynamics generated by the internal 
tension between different actors’ occupation of any of these positions at a specific 
point in time.   
 
Philosophy of social sciences is no stranger to the question of the relationship 
between position – that is, a person’s role and identity within a particular social 
setting – and knowledge, including epistemic authority. The concept of 
positionality (Smith, 2000; Alcoff and Potter eds., 1993; Kukla, 2006; Rose, 1997) 
engages specifically with the epistemic implications of gendered, raced, and other 
identities; perspectivism elevates this to the level of philosophical doctrine (cf. 
Graeber, 2015; Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017; Danowski and Viveiros de Castro, 
2017). While generating numerous discussions and interesting research 
programmes, these perspectives nonetheless privilege the question of knowledge. 
This account, on the other hand, through the combined lens of sociology of critique 
and the sociology of interventions, has to address both the question of knowledge 
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and the question of practice; in other words, not only the content of interventions, 
but also their effects – intended or unintended.  
 
In a formal-logical sense, intellectual interventions are a form of a Russell paradox: 
a set that simultaneously is, and is not, a member of itself. Every intellectual 
intervention that describes the state of UK higher education qualifies for 
membership in the set ‘state of higher education in the UK’, but also aims to be 
outside of that set, by encompassing it as a totality. This self-referentiality of 
critique has important implications for how we can go about studying it. It also 
makes the ‘war on universities’ a particularly interesting case through which to 
explore the relationship between truth claims, contexts in which they are made, and 
the agency and identity of those who make them. It is to this relationship we turn 
next.  
 
Sociology of critique and sociology of knowledge 
 
Framing critique as a problem of knowledge suggests we need to engage with the 
question concerning the relationship between the social (or social structure) and 
the production of knowledge. Sociology of knowledge7, especially in its early days, 
developed on the assumption it is possible to distinguish knowledge claims from 
their social context. This provided the ground for the analysis of their relationship, 
in most cases assumed to flow in one direction (Camic, Gross and Lamont, 2011, 
p. 9). In Marx’s German Ideology (1977 [1932]), for instance, material relations 
and conditions of production give rise to ideologies. Mannheim’s Ideology and 
Utopia (1936) posited that the degree of distance from material conditions gave 
intellectuals a critical ‘edge’ in terms of knowing the social. Even when the link 
was assumed to run in the opposite direction, from ideas to material conditions – 
as in Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2003 [1905]) – the 
possibility of ontological separation between social context (or 'background'), ideas 
(or intellectual products), and those who make them (intellectuals) was taken to 
represent at least a possibility.   
 
7 Sociological approaches to studying knowledge production vary in scope (from ‘folk’ knowledge 
to scientific knowledge), methods (from focus on written texts to production in the ‘laboratory’), as 
well as ontological status ascribed to different elements (from naturalism to constructivism). More 
specific interpretations of the term, including its relationship to the sociology of intellectuals and 
the sociology of critique, are developed further in this chapter and in the thesis.  
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In contemporary societies, critique involves at least three elements. One is the 
author – that is, someone who ‘produces’ critique by uttering a specific form of 
propositional statement. Of course, there is no need to reappropriate the mythology, 
together with terminology, of the ‘lone hero’/‘genius’ of the Enlightenment 
(Collins, 1998): critique is clearly not only a product of a single author, locked 
away in his (for it must be his) proverbial ivory tower. Yet, despite instances of 
collective writing (manifestos, petitions, etc.) intellectual interventions are still, to 
a great degree, treated as an outcome of the work of a single person. Similarly, 
‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ of interventions – from negative repercussions to financial, 
status, and other awards – are also, though not exclusively, individual. Secondly, 
critique involves the act itself – the writing, or uttering, as well as the outcome of 
it – the ‘product’. Intellectual interventions can take the form of spoken word – a 
public lecture, an appearance on TV or the radio, a YouTube video – but, more 
often, they are written. Historically, this had to do with reproducibility and 
‘portability’ of intellectual products, but it remains the case despite the fact that 
technology blurs the boundaries between ‘traditional’ and new forms of 
interventions. Similarly, written interventions range in form from longer pieces, 
articles, and books, to blogs and posts on social media. Clearly, not all of these 
have the same relevance; while some examples suggest a single Tweet can have 
serious consequences (Bacevic, 2018), more often than not written interventions 
are longer and their influence tends to increase with the degree to which they are 
subject to ‘gatekeeping’ – that is, editorial and publication – practices.   
 
This brings into focus the third component: the context, that is, the network of 
social relations in which interventions are made. Much like ‘society’, this term can 
be extended to encompass everything from the historical context of interventions, 
to institutional and political-economic infrastructures which enable them (cf. 
Latour, 2005). Yet the possibility of distinguishing knowledge claims from the 
social context in which they are made is particularly questionable when there is a 
close overlap between context, on the one hand, and critique that rests on the 
knowledge of that context, on the other.  
 
Rom Harré pointed out some of these challenges:  
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Knowing is a complex relational concept. There is one who knows, the 
knowledge he or she possesses and that about which the knower has 
knowledge…in the context of this discussion, the three entities in play can 
be seen as ‘persons’, ‘representations’ and ‘societies’, the last decomposed 
into institutions, structures and practices. But then we realize that forming 
representations of social matters is itself a social practice (1998, p.38).  
 
The challenge, therefore, is to theorise the interaction between context, 
intellectuals, and critique, without postulating any of these as foundational, and 
others as epiphenomenal8. Accounts of social action are not immune to 
epiphenomenalism, elision, or conflation (cf. Archer, 1995, p. 81–85). Downward 
conflation refers to accounts that see social structures as entirely or at least 
predominantly deterministic, and individual behaviour determined through the 
force of norms or socialization. An example would be seeking to explain the 
critique of the transformation of higher education as a consequence of authors’ 
class, or, more broadly, position in social structure. Gramsci’s concept of 
‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ intellectuals (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1972) can be 
seen as an instance of this downward-conflationary view, in which class acts as the 
determinant of an individual’s oeuvre. While more sociologically nuanced, 
Mannheim’s view – in which intellectuals have a privileged access to truth by the 
virtue of being relatively independent, or unattached, to a particular class – follows 
the same logic: that of intellectual production as grounded in, or flowing from, a 
particular position in social structure. An analogous position here would be to say 
that the critique of neoliberalism is a reaction to large-scale structural changes, 
such as massification or internationalization of higher education.     
 
Upwards conflation, or ‘microreductionism’ (Archer, 1995) works in the opposite 
direction, by framing social structure as an epiphenomenon of human action. This 
type of account tends to place an emphasis on the role of individual intellectuals 
 
8 ‘Epiphenomenalism’ refers to the tendency to treat one element of social explanation as a product 
(or, more precisely, byproduct – epiphenomenon) of another, which is in turn designated as 
‘fundamental’– for instance, to treat agency as an epiphenomenon of structure. Archer argued such 
forms of elision or conflation are the main sources of confusion in social theory: “(...) [w]hen 
discussing ‘structure’ or ‘culture’ in relation to agency I am talking about a relationship between 
two aspects of social life. However intimately they are intertwined, these are none the less 
analytically distinct...The basic reason for avoiding this is that the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’ are not 
co-existent through time and therefore any approach which amalgamates them wrongly foregoes 
the possibility of examining the interplay between them over time” (1995, p. xiv). 
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(or groups) in the creation of durable cultural or structural properties. A number of 
influential accounts after 2008, for instance, suggested that ascendance of 
neoliberalism can be explained by the influence of a specific intellectuals or 
epistemic communities. In Masters of the Universe, Daniel Stedman Jones argues 
that “[n]eoliberal ideas had been generated slowly over fifty years or so by 
‘academic scribblers’ in Europe and the United States” (2012, p. 2). Mirowski and 
Plehwe’s The Road from Mont Pelerin (2009) similarly locates the origin of 
neoliberal policies in a ‘thought collective’ of economists. While such accounts 
can offer compelling explanations for the success of specific ideologies, they fail 
to specify reasons why one type of ideology would be adopted over another. Ideas, 
in this sense, are assumed to have agency of their own, a sort of ‘lure’ they exercise 
over hapless actors (see particularly discussion in Thompson, 1991).  
 
Both forms of conflation have serious limitations in terms of understanding the 
relationship between critique and the social. Critique cannot stand ‘outside’ 
society, because, in itself, it is a practice of forming representations about the 
society; these representations are not just reflections but are always already part 
and parcel of the society in question. Critique is thus necessarily reliant on 
instruments, procedures, and institutions of validating knowledge of ‘the world’. 
Boltanski emphasizes this point when he writes that “critical theories of domination 
necessarily rely on descriptive social science to paint a picture of the reality subject 
to critique” (2011, p. 4). Of course, the link does not have to be straightforward: 
critique can aim to evaluate dominant discourses generated by a specific scientific 
discipline – for instance, claims about ‘racial’ differences in intelligence. This 
means critique cannot be analysed without engaging the question of procedures for 
the production and validation of knowledge – procedures that are discursive in 
nature.  
 
 Critique as discourse: the problem of power/knowledge 
 
It is relatively unproblematic to assert that critique is discursive. Obviously, 
critique can involve other media – e.g. drawings, cartoons, memes – but most of 
the time it is composed of verbal statements. Equally, some acts can in themselves 
represent a form of critique: for instance, not standing up in court can convey lack 
of acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the judiciary; raising one’s fist in a salute 
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can convey identification with a social movement’s critique of racism and 
inequality. But even these acts require a verbal interpretative framework in order 
to be effective; in other words, their existence and utilisation depends on a 
linguistic universe in which words have an important role in the constitution of 
human society.  
 
The concept of justification is equally embedded in language. While it may involve 
elements of affect and materiality (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999), justification is 
fundamentally discursive: it consists of social/political actors asserting the claim 
that a particular situation should be evaluated or judged in accordance with a 
specific set of moral principles. While it is possible to argue orders of violence, 
love, or familiarity represent partial exceptions (ibid.), reasons for action are 
inevitably grounded in discourse. This focus, of course, is in line with the 
pragmatist lineage of the sociology of critique, in common with most of the late 
20th century accounts such as Habermas’ and Honneth’s (Basaure, 2014). Yet, what 
is interesting is not so much the ‘wordiness’ of critique as what this wordiness 
implies.  
 
Koch writes that “Critique only exists in relation to something else, as a means for 
a future it will not know nor happen to be” (2002, p. 524). This, Koch argues, is 
the root of its epistemological modesty and iconoclastic immodesty: critique may 
be reticent about its claims to knowledge, but it is hardly reticent in its claims to 
truth. It needs authoritative access to ‘how things really are’. In this sense, critique 
needs to have recourse an order that is extra-discursive, or in Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s terms, metapragmatic. Yet, where does this order come from? If we are 
not to accept the idea of divine confirmation, it makes sense to look at the historical 
constitution of the order of discourse – and, in particular, how it was intertwined 
with political power.  
  
Probably the most influential theoretical account of historical constitution of 
discourse comes from Michel Foucault. Foucault’s work has been steadily gaining 
popularity, particularly following the translation of his 1978–9 Collège de France 
lectures on the birth of biopolitics (Foucault, 2008), now considered foundational 
for the study of neoliberalism. From this perspective, it is easy to forget how radical 
the emphasis on disciplinary production of bounded ways of knowing and talking 
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about the world would have been in a context where the Althusserian concept of 
‘ideology’ as supervenient on material conditions exerted enormous influence. Of 
course, the fact Foucault’s early work focused on sexuality and mental illness – 
where the nexus of knowledge, discourse and power was particularly pronounced 
– probably helped: even the most materialist among historians (or historical among 
materialists) would have found it hard to deny that linguistic framing and 
classification of these cases is at least, if not more, important as their ‘material’, or 
physical base. Yet, the production of disciplinary power was quite obviously not 
limited to asylums, nor, for that matter, to issues of classification. The broader point 
was simple: concepts we use to think about the world fundamentally define and 
limit the ways in which we can act in it.  
 
The cunning of disciplinary power is exactly in the fact that through discourse – 
or, more precisely, the knowledge/power nexus – it makes people want to do things 
that contribute to its reproduction. This probably helps explain why Foucault’s 
work has been so influential in the critique of neoliberalism: the notion of the 
intersection of disciplinary power and surveillance as the origin of subjects’ 
compliance sits well with the inability of different forms of resistance to fully 
capture, let alone to subvert, the logic behind it. This puts in sharper focus the 
relationship between knowledge, power and critique. In Foucault’s view, on the 
whole, subjects remain ignorant of the form of exploitation they are subject to. This 
is in line with Boltanski’s qualification of metacritical theories of domination, 
which “tackle asymmetries from a particular angle... of the miscognition by the 
actors themselves of the exploitation to which they are subject and, above all, of 
the social conditions that make this exploitation possible and also, as a result, of 
the means by which they could stop it” (2011, p. 9, my emphasis). This, of course, 
does not mean that subjects cannot produce knowledge; but this kind of knowledge 
would not be immune to the power/knowledge dynamic. This means that critique 
should not be seen only as a form of Polanyian ‘double movement’ to economic 
and political transformations. It also needs to be understood as part and parcel of 
those transformations, integrated rather than outside of the networks and power 
relations that it focuses on. In other words, one has to look at the critique of 
neoliberalism in order to understand neoliberalism. 
 
Foucault seems to have suggested something similar:  
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The way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, more 
empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and one that implies 
more relations between theory and practice…consists in taking the forms of 
resistance against different forms of power as a starting point (…) Rather 
than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it 
consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies 
(2000, p. 329).  
 
This is not to claim that critique is complicit in the neoliberal transformation of 
higher education and research. Nor is it to uncritically endorse what STS and the 
Strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge of the Edinburgh 
school (SSK) have dubbed the ‘symmetry principle’ (e.g. Bloor, 1976), which 
assumes all forms of knowledge can be studied in the same way, regardless of 
procedures of verification. It is simply to state – and draw theoretical and 
methodological implications of the statement – that critique is not exempt from 
operations of power that constitute it. This translates into the following question: 
 
 Given that critique is discursive, and discourses reflect as well as are 
productive of power relations, what forms of power are embedded in and 
reproduced through critique of neoliberalism in higher education? 
 
Yet the most interesting implication of the discursivity of critique is, at the same 
time, one that Foucault never got around to engaging with in detail: how discourse 
works. Discourse analysis can, at best, establish a correlation or correspondence 
between the ways of generating knowledge and talking about the world, and the 
reproduction of power relations, but it doesn’t tell us how this happens. This 
problem is present in both New Spirit of Capitalism and On Justification, which 
focus on the analysis of discourses in textbooks and professional guidebooks: while 
they offer excellent accounts of the ‘ideology’ of management, the question of their 
effects on society and/or actors remains somewhat unclear. Discourse, therefore, 
can explain how critique is constituted, but not necessarily what it does – nor, even 
more importantly, how it does it. For this, we turn to the concept of speech acts and 
theories of performativity.    
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 Critique as performativity: the problem of effects 
 
Pragmatic sociology of critique and theory of intellectual positioning have 
common philosophical grounding in theories of performativity, insofar as both 
critique and intellectual interventions can be theorized as speech acts. J.L. Austin 
(1961, 1975) developed the concept to consider the philosophical nature of the 
relationship between spoken language and its effects. A speech act is a form of 
utterance that was meant to produce an effect by the mere fact of being said – the 
paradigmatic case being saying “I do” in a marriage ceremony. Every utterance, 
Austin claimed, has three facets: the locutionary, which refers to what is being said; 
the illocutionary, which refers to the intended effects of what is being said; and the 
perlocutionary, which refers to the actual (produced) effects of saying it.  
 
John Searle (2010) extended the concept of speech acts to one of the formative 
principles of society as a whole, by emphasising their role in the constitution of 
what he dubbed institutional facts. For Searle, institutional facts are any kind of 
fact (that is, ontological statement) that depend for their existence on human 
societies; thus, they are fundamentally social. In the introduction to The 
Construction of Social Reality, Searle states: “With the important exception of 
language itself, all of institutional reality, and therefore, in a sense, all of human 
civilization, is created by speech acts that have the same logical form as 
Declarations” (2010, pp. 12–13). Declarations pertain to any statement that has the 
form “X counts as Y in C” whereas C is the community (linguistic or social) in 
which this holds true, X is the referent, and Y the sign. This frames language, and, 
more specifically, speech-acts, as the key building block of human reality.   
 
It bears mentioning that this primacy of speech (i.e. human language) in the 
constitution of society may seem to position the theory of speech acts, and 
performativity more broadly, among highly constructionist social theories (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967). Yet, the theory of speech acts does not posit that 
illocutionary acts do not have durability once performed, on the contrary; whilst 
marriage may be a social convention, performing a marriage ritual by saying “I 
now pronounce you husband and wife9” has actual consequences, which go beyond 
 
9 Or husband and husband, or wife and wife, obviously.  
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the speech-act itself – which is precisely why Searle dubs these facts ‘institutional’. 
Similarly, speech-acts are, in this view, primarily oriented towards the social: they 
do not presuppose that, for instance, the natural world is constituted in the same 
sort of way (Lawson, 2016).  
 
This type of relationship between language and reality is the foundation of theories 
of performativity. Judith Butler (2010) defined performativity as the capacity of 
language (that is, speech-acts) to create durable effects in the ‘real world’: in this 
view, social reality is maintained through repeated performances – e.g. of gender 
identity, nationhood, or authority. The ‘performative turn’ in social sciences traces 
its lineage to American pragmatism and ethnomethodological approaches of 
Garfinkel and Goffman, in postulating that reality (or at least ‘social’ reality) is 
instituted through a series of verbal and non-verbal acts. However, it also goes 
beyond that, in ways that have important implications for analysing critique as a 
form of speech-act.    
 
Muniesa identifies three distinct meanings of performativity: the narrow – 
reflected, for instance, in Lyotard’s use of ‘performative knowledge’ in The 
Postmodern Condition (1979) – with emphasis on uses, or practical purposeability; 
the mid-range, which brings together approaches such as Callon’s (e.g. 2007) and 
Latour’s (e.g. 1993), on the one, and Butler’s (e.g. 1990), on the other hand; and 
the ‘expressive’, which he associates with ethnomethodology (Muniesa, 2014, pp. 
9–12). Yet Muniesa also identifies the ‘stronger’ philosophical undercurrent of the 
idea of performativity: that reality is real only when it is realized, or, in other words, 
that speech-acts do not only organize reality, but can actually create things 
(objects), as it were, ex nihilo. That means that descriptions “add to the world” 
(2014, p. 19): as soon as something is stated, it is effectuated.  
 
This ‘strong’ notion of performativity informs most versions of the critique of 
economics as ‘performative’, in the sense in which economic discourses are said 
to create and institute objects and value-relations. Neoliberalism, in this sense, is 
seen as a form of governance that gives primacy to this type of discourse, allowing 
it to ‘colonise’ other forms of relations and practices, all of which become 
commodified. Unlike, however, Marxist critique, according to which commodity 
obscures the relation between labour and capital, in this version of performativity 
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there is no reality behind; objects are indeed fashioned, as it were, out of ‘thin air’, 
‘provoked’, or ‘realised’ in the Deleuzian sense, which Muniesa claims is closest 
to the original American pragmatist meaning of the term (2014, pp. 21–27). 
 
Theory of intellectual positioning (Baert 2015, 2012; Baert and Morgan, 2018) 
builds explicitly on the concept of performativity. It interprets intellectuals’ public 
performances as particular instances of positioning – that is, acts whose effect is to 
define both the speakers and their intended audiences or opponents. Positioning, in 
this sense, defines speakers in a social context, and thus produces effects – both for 
the speaker herself, and for the context in which the act is performed. Intellectual 
interventions are seen as performative in that “they bring something into being – 
they do something” (Baert and Morgan, 2018, p. 5, original emphasis). 
 
Yet, does this make them performative in the same way in which economics is held 
to be performative? Namely, if economic discourse is performative – that is, if 
speech-acts that can be classified as ‘neoclassical economics’ have the power to 
institute objects and relations (e.g. Mackenzie, Muniesa, and Siu, eds., 2007) – 
then, by definition, the critique of those discourses must be performative in the 
same vein. In other words, intellectual interventions that seek to challenge the 
transformation of higher education and research have, in principle, the same power 
as those that are enacting those changes; which means that critique should have the 
power to ‘subvert’ the dominant discourse of neoliberalism. The challenge, 
therefore, is to explain why it does not (or, if we accept performative anti-realism, 
what makes certain discourses more performative than others). This leads to the 
following question: 
 
 If critique is a speech act, and speech acts are performative, what are the 
effects of the critique of neoliberalism in higher education?  
 
This should not suggest ‘effects’ should be equated with intentions. Performativity, 
after all, does not postulate it is necessary for agents to have full knowledge or 
awareness of what they are doing. However, it does emphasise the relationship 
between different ways in which we can conceive of possible effects and the 
concept of ‘the social’. This is perhaps most obvious in critique as a practice of 
intellectual positioning: in order for the practice to exist, there needs to be a context 
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in which the positioning is performed. Questions of context concern the 
configuration of political space, or, more specifically, the space for interventions. 
For this, we turn to questions of strategy, and the concept of fields.  
 
 Critique as strategy: the problem of fields 
 
The idea of intellectuals as strategic actors is not particularly new. This view can 
be traced back to the Dreyfus affair, arguably the public début of intellectuals as a 
group with specific political interests, distinct from those of other classes (Jennings 
and Kemp-Welch, 1997). Similarly, Julien Benda’s famous treatise on the 
‘betrayal’ of intellectuals (Benda, 1928) is an early example of the position that 
intellectuals who become affiliated with particular political interests or parties ‘sell 
out’ to less elevated concerns. The contrast between the world of intellect as one 
of ‘pure’, ‘objective’ speculation, and the world of politics as one of the pursuit of 
self-interest, runs through the study of intellectual life, in particular in the first half 
of the 20th century. As Hannah Arendt (1981) argued, this dichotomy can be traced 
to ancient Greece: in this sense, the idea of separation between the ‘life of the mind’ 
and the life of the polis was constitutive of the very idea of ‘intellectuals’ as a 
distinct class or category.  
 
The relationship between intellectuals, institutions of knowledge production, and 
social reproduction was one of central pieces of Bourdieu’s œuvre. In contrast to 
Marx’s view of the primacy of economic capital (ownership over means of 
production) in structuring relations of inequality, Bourdieu posited different forms 
of capital: social, cultural, and, later, symbolic and intellectual. Social life, in this 
view, is defined by the struggle within and over different ‘fields’: structured spaces 
of interaction between different actors that entail the production, circulation, and 
valuation of different forms of capital. The state acts at the final arbiter of relative 
weighting/power and influence of fields, each of which retains a distinctive logic. 
Intellectuals, in Bourdieu’s world, are engaged in a battle on, as it were, two fronts: 
for dominance within a specific field, and for the position (or dominance) in 
relation to other fields.  
 
Bourdieu initially developed work on the education system (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977) in order to explain the reproduction of social 
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inequalities in and through French education institutions at the time, but his later 
work repeatedly engaged with the question of intellectuals, their role and relation 
to society (e.g. Bourdieu, 1996, 2000). Crucially, in this process, Bourdieu broke 
with the assumption that intellectuals were by definition ‘outside’ of power 
relations, which enabled them to observe them in a detached manner, or, worse, 
that they automatically belonged to ‘the oppressed’ within social structures. In his 
famous coinage, intellectuals were the “dominated part of the dominant class” 
(Bourdieu, 1990): marked by possession of relatively high amounts of cultural and 
social capital, but ultimately subordinated to elites whose power derived from 
control and ownership of economic, and consequently political, forms of capital.   
 
This means speech acts could be re-interpreted as a form of strategic action meant 
to produce effects both in the field of cultural production and in the broader public 
sphere. Intuitively, this seems right: intellectual interventions have consequences 
both in the academic arena (publishing, promotions, research grants) and in one’s 
social environment (recognition, prestige, but also, particularly in repressive 
regimes, threats to material security, violence, imprisonment, or even death). 
However, there are a few complicating factors. To begin with, it is difficult to a 
priori define the ‘field’ that critique of neoliberalism operates in. While in some 
cases it can yield benefits in a specific professional field, being (too) publicly 
engaged can also be seen as a sign of ‘poor’ scholarship or insufficient dedication 
to the virtues of scientific inquiry, reflected in the pejorative meaning of phrases 
such as ‘academic celebrities’, ‘superstar academics’, and so on (Bacevic, 2016). 
Even more problematically, as the Docherty case suggests, engaging in critique 
could have negative results, in the sense of suspension or even loss of job. On the 
other hand, it is possible to claim that capital travels in the other direction: 
intellectuals use symbolic capital accrued within a specific (disciplinary) field to 
boost their public profile (as in the case of Foucault’s ‘specific’ intellectual, who 
uses their expertise in order to comment on matters of broader public significance). 
In the UK, the blurring of fields is particularly pronounced with the introduction 
of impact as an element of research assessment, which aims to measure the 
influence of particular (social-scientific) ideas on policy and the broader public. 
Yet this also hinges on a predefined notion that assumes it is possible to isolate 
effects of specific interventions within fields.  
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As Doreen Massey argued, tying the consequences of action (or, more specifically, 
of strategies and tactics) too closely within a field produces the reification of space 
(2005, p. 26). Obviously, this does not mean we need to adopt a ‘butterfly-effect’ 
approach to interventions, but rather to state that there need not be a clear, let alone 
one-to-one relationship between an act and its effect. When, how and whether this 
happens is an empirical question, but one that hinges on how we define fields and 
those who inhabit them (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Rather than assuming that 
interventions fall neatly within a field, it makes more sense to study their effects 
on the delineation of fields (Lamont, 2012; Lamont & Molnàr, 2012; see also 
Gieryn, 1983). This allows an engagement with critique as both a productive and 
relational practice, that is, a form of action that involves both a representation of 
and engagement with different elements of the social.  
 
This also allows to forge a clearer link between pragmatic sociology of critique and 
Bourdieu’s field theory (cf. Susen, 2014b; Nachi, 2014). Assigning properties to 
specific ‘beings’ serves to define boundaries between ‘worlds’, that is, different 
normative spheres (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). In this sense, the way that 
interventions specify the properties and qualities of different objects can shed an 
insight on the broader context in which these ‘entities’ are situated, as well as the 
practice of justification itself. In this sense, remaining agnostic about the number 
and relation of fields avoids the trap of infinite regress – finding smaller and 
smaller contexts in which interventions make sense – whilst equally refusing to 
assert a major, top-down framing (e.g. the state as the final arbiter between fields). 
This means that fields are not ‘out there’ in the sense of being independent from 
individual (and collective) forms of agency, but rather that they are constituted (and 
reconstituted) by and through forms of interaction; and, further, that actors’ ideas 
about the field play a decisive (though not determining) role in the structuring of 
the social space – ‘the context’ – in which interventions take place. This allows to 
further specify the question of effects: 
 
 What kind of field effects does critique of neoliberalism in higher education 
have, and, especially what kind of effects on delineation between academic 
and other fields?  
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This also makes possible to account for what Butler (2010) emphasised as the 
possibility of ‘performative breakdown’ – the inability of speech-acts to produce 
desired effects. ‘Strategic action’, in this sense, has to be understood in relation to 
the ideas that specific actors have both about the ‘field’ (that is, the context and 
constraints under which they operate) and about their own possibility to influence 
it. Rather than taking strategic action as a given – that is, rather than assuming that 
intellectual interventions occur in a pre-ordered, already stratified system of fields 
– this allows to look at it as an achievement at least in part activated through actors’ 
knowledge of, or ideas concerning, the possible effects and the structure of fields. 
This brings us to the problem of self-knowledge, and the concept of reflexivity.   
 
 Critique as reflexivity: the problem of self-knowledge 
 
Like discourse, performativity, and fields, the notion of reflexivity has a longer 
history in social sciences. At the end of the 20th century, Anthony Giddens and 
other theorists of ‘late’ or ‘second’ modernity emphasized the ‘reflexive’ nature of 
post-industrial societies, arguing that they entail an imperative to engage in a 
cognitively recursive way with both the self and the world. Beck, Giddens, and 
Lash (1994) dubbed this ‘reflexive modernization’ as a way of indexing the self-
referentiality of contemporary modernization projects. In this view, late modernity 
entails the revision of categories that constituted ‘first’ modernity, its predecessor 
– such as class, progress, nature, and society – simultaneously the key categories 
of sociology itself.     
 
The concept of ‘double hermeneutic’ is of particular interest here. Giddens asserted 
that the distinctive characteristic of social sciences’ style of inquiry was the 
inevitably reflexive nature; that is, the porousness of the boundary between ‘lay’ 
and ‘scientific’ concepts. In late modernity, in other words, it is no longer possible 
to draw a clear demarcation line between the observer and the observed: those we 
study utilize our concepts and ‘talk back’. This observation, of course, is not unique 
to Giddens: anthropologists, for instance, were already well acquainted the 
problem of informants ‘talking back’ as an epistemic and political implication of 
the discipline’s involvement in the colonial project. However, double hermeneutic 
emphasised the ethical and theoretical questions opened by the fact the tools, 
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methods and vocabularies of social sciences were no longer exclusive domain of 
social scientists (cf. Pleasants, 1999).  
 
In this context, Giddens claimed that the role of sociological knowledge, or social 
theory, is to correct for the always partial knowledge actors have of the 
implications of their own actions. In other words, Giddens assumes that, although 
they can act strategically, actors immersed in practice by definition cannot grasp 
the unintended consequences of their actions. The role of sociologists (and other 
social scientists, in this sense) is thus to rectify actors’ fallible perception of their 
own circumstances, by injecting a degree of sociological distance: 
 
The critical activities in which social scientists engage as the core of that they 
do have direct implication for the beliefs which agents hold, in so far as those 
beliefs can be shown to be invalid or inadequately grounded. But such 
implications are especially important where the beliefs in question are 
incorporated into the reasons actors have for what they do…when these are 
subjected to critique in the light of claims or findings of social science, the 
social observer is seeking to demonstrate that those reasons are not good 
reasons (Giddens, 1984, p. 338). 
 
The role of sociological narratives, thus, is to act as a sort of ‘external’ corrective. 
Yet, this begs the question where the position of ‘exteriority’ comes from in 
situations where production of knowledge itself constitutes a form of practice. 
When intellectuals are immersed in the context they are writing about, what is the 
epistemic status of critique they produce? From what position can critique provide 
a corrective if boundaries between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ are not clear-cut? In 
other words, how does reflexivity work if the social practices of knowledge 
production are equally the subject and the object of critique? 
 
Bourdieu’s elaboration of the concept of reflexivity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 
Bourdieu, 1990) aimed, in part, to address this problem. While always to some 
degree implicated in the reproduction of the structures they criticize, sociologists10, 
 
10 Bourdieu’s own disciplinary background was split between philosophy, sociology, and 
anthropology (or ethnography), so despite his later tendency towards discipline-specific 
positioning, it makes sense to assume he would not restrict this epistemic ‘hack’ to those trained 
in sociology departments (or would he?) 
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he argued, can become aware of this loop. Sociological reflexivity, in this view, 
entails a ‘double bind’ by both providing an awareness of the conditions of one’s 
existence and one’s own contribution to these conditions. This is not the same as 
‘commonplace’, everyday reflexivity; Bourdieu recognized that common people 
also engage in deliberation about their course of action. Yet, Bourdieu drew a clear 
distinction line between reflexive burdens of ‘ordinary’ actors and those whose 
profession entails the creation of knowledge about those actors. Intellectuals are 
subject to a triple bias: the bias of social background – equivalent to those of 
‘ordinary’ actors; the bias ensuing from the peculiarities of the academic field; and 
the ‘intellectualist’ bias, the tendency to objectify social relations and treat the 
society as a form of ‘spectacle’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 39) – what, in 
Pascalian Meditations, will be diagnosed as raison scolastique (Bourdieu, 2000). 
Sociological reflexivity is meant to engage with all three, simultaneously providing 
the knowledge of the dynamics and mechanisms of social relations one is 
embedded in and a degree of distance from them. 
 
Bourdieu suggested that critique is both improved and further legitimised by 
making analysis itself subject to the tools of sociological analysis. On this account, 
sociological methods are a superior tool for the construction of critique, as they 
unmask the ideological assumptions of epistemic systems, their own included 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 38). Sociologists are justified in their claim to a 
privileged epistemic position as they are in the position to comprehend both the 
dynamics of particular interactions that give rise to unequal power relationships, 
and the way in which their own position in social structure influences their 
accounts. Sociological reflexivity, in this sense, provides a form of exit from the 
‘interiority/exteriority’ conundrum.  
 
Bourdieu’s own ‘double bind’ of simultaneously inhabiting the roles of an 
empirical sociologist and a critic comes to the fore: he wants to emphasise the 
inextricability of the categories sociologists (and other intellectuals) use to 
comprehend the world from the world itself, but he also wants to maintain the 
possibility of critique as a form of (even if temporary) detachment from that world, 
which requires him to reach, again, into the delineation of ‘interiority’ and 
‘exteriority’. Yet this brings us squarely back to the problem that Boltanski 
identified in metacritical theories of domination. They hinge on a distinction 
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between forms of reflexivity, or the potential for the knowledge of social reality, 
exercised by ‘lay’ actors, on the one side, and sociologists – or academics more 
broadly – on the other. This distinction is reliant on a particular gesture of 
distancing: 
 
The project of taking society as an object and describing the components of 
social life or, if you like, its framework, appeals to a thought experiment that 
consists in positioning oneself outside this framework in order to consider it 
as a whole. In fact, a framework cannot be grasped from within. From an 
internal perspective, the framework coincides with reality in its imperious 
necessity (2011, p. 7).  
 
What Boltanski emphasizes is that this form of (self-)reflexivity relies on a 
particular set of techniques, as well as forms of validating them. He analyses the 
construction of this position of ‘complex exteriority’ in relation to distance from 
one’s object of research: 
 
In the case of sociology, which at this level of generality can be regarded as 
a history of the present, with the result that the observer is part of what she 
intends to describe, adopting a position of exteriority is far from self-evident. 
The fact that its possibility even poses a problem in a sense leads the move 
to externalization to become self-conscious. This imaginary exit from the 
viscosity of the real initially assumes stripping reality of its character of 
implicit necessity and proceeding as if it were arbitrary (as if it could be other 
than it is or even not be); and then, in a second phase, restoring to it the 
necessity it had initially been divested of, but on which this operation of 
displacement has conferred a reflexive, general character, in the sense that 
the forms of necessity identified locally are related to a universe of 
possibilities. (2011, p. 7). 
 
 
Further, Boltanski notes the key role that institutions of knowledge production play 
in separating social-scientific forms of knowledge from those available to ‘lay’ 
actors: 
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In sociology the possibility of this externalization rests on the existence of a 
laboratory – that is to say, the employment of protocols and instructions 
respect for which must constrain the sociologist to control her desires 
(conscious or unconscious). It is thus that descriptive social sciences can 
claim that they sustain a discourse of truth. It must be added that this truth 
claim, which is bound up with a description carried out by occupying a more 
or less extra- territorial post vis-a-vis the society being described, generally 
gives the social sciences, whatever they are, a critical edge (and this even, 
albeit in highly limited fashion, in the case of expertise). For, if the very 
substance of their object was constantly in full view of everyone, the social 
sciences would simply have no reason to exist (2011, p. 8). 
 
Presumably, in order to practice reflexivity (or, in Boltanski’s terms, 
metareflexivity) critics need to stand outside of their social context. Yet, this 
‘standing outside’ will be subject to the same conditions as any form of epistemic 
positioning: that is, it will be a product of social, academic, and intellectualist 
biases, or, in other words, power relations. How to avoid the conceptual trap of 
infinite regress? 
 
An element of Margaret Archer’s concept of reflexivity (Archer, 2012, 2010, 2007) 
can help clarify the perspective. Archer conceives of reflexivity as a form of 
‘internal conversation’ that renders visible the relationship between structure and 
agency. Rather than positing that structure is always inherently and inextricably 
present, manifested, and recreated through acts of reflection – or speech-acts in 
general – people’s agency proceeds through narrative positioning in relation to 
their knowledge of the world, which is discursively exercised. This knowledge is 
always imperfect; yet, it is precisely through the possibility of a critical stance 
towards – and, simultaneously, distance from – that the contours of this world 
become tangible. This is particularly relevant in relation to Boltanski’s concept of 
‘complex exteriority’:  
 
In the case of theories of domination, the exteriority on which critique is 
based can be called complex, in the sense that it is established at two different 
levels. It must first of all be based on an exteriority of the first [simple, J.B.] 
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kind to equip itself with the requisite data to create the picture of the social 
order that will be submitted to critique. A metacritical theory is in fact 
necessarily reliant on a descriptive sociology or anthropology. But to be 
critical, such a theory also needs to furnish itself, in ways that can be explicit 
to very different degrees, with the means of passing a judgement on the value 
of the social order being described (2011, p. 8). 
 
Pragmatic sociology of critique thus can bridge different accounts of reflexivity. 
Forms of ‘internal conversation’ actors use in order to construct the position of 
complex exteriority, thus, provide an insight how they conceptualise self in society 
and, by extension, the distance between themselves and society. Given the 
relevance of this ‘distance’, critique inevitably relies on positioning. Positioning 
occurs not only in relation to other actors, but also in relation to ‘the world’ in the 
broadest possible sense. This ‘world’ includes things that are the object of critique: 
other humans as actors, certainly, but also structures, ideas, institutions, events, and 
other assemblages of different forms. In this sense, for our inquiry here, the 
ontological status of objects that positioning involves is less relevant than the fact 
that they are used in order to define the coordinates of the space in which acts of 
positioning can happen.  
 
Critique entails a picture – a diagnosis – of reality that is seemingly irreducible to 
the subject, even when critique is substantially informed by the author’s 
subjectivity. In these cases as well – e.g. anti-racist movements, or some forms of 
feminist epistemology – critique as a form of social practice aims to insert a degree 
of distance between the immediate, lived experience, and the narrative it produces, 
even if by the mere fact of engaging in the descriptive (and normative) rendering 
of that reality. Reflexivity, in this sense, works a bit like GPS: it determines ‘end 
points’ – that is, parameters of the coordinative system – in order to be able to 
perform a meaningful act.  
 
As Simon Susen argued, “[c]ritique can be regarded as a reflexive force that 
permits us to distance ourselves from three worlds of experience: ‘the’ external 
world (objective realm), ‘our’ external world (normative realm), and ‘my’ internal 
world (subjective realm)” (2014a, p. 174). This provides the framing for the last 
question: 
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 What kind of knowledge of and relationship between the world (object) and 
of the self (subject) is produced through critique of neoliberalism in higher 
education?  
 
Rather than a Bourdieusian game of ‘chasing after’ biases, reflexivity in this key 
can be seen as the discursive game of producing a position in the sense of relation 
to ‘external reality’ and its multiple manifestations (cf. Pleasants, 1999). From this 
perspective, critique is performative not because it brings about a certain reality, 
but because it contributes to the reproduction of a social space where speech-acts 
can be performed. The relationship between this space and speech-acts, thus, is 
what this thesis hopes to explore.  
 
 Summary of research questions 
 
Rather than assuming a direct link or conduit between critique and elements of the 
social, the present study aims to understand how they are related. In this, it moves 
beyond earlier tendencies in sociology of knowledge, and social theory more 
broadly, to posit specific elements as foundational and others as epiphenomenal. 
In this sense, it retains the methodological separation between critique (as a form 
of discourse), the author (intellectual), and social context (both the setting and the 
object of critique), but refuses to assert the ontological (as opposed to historical) 
primacy of any of these.  
 
Critique is defined as a form of discursive practice that combines descriptive and 
normative claims. These claims take the form of intellectual intervention, a speech-
act that addresses the nature of reality and the ways in which it could be improved. 
These claims are based on specific vocabularies of justification, that is, assertion 
of truthfulness and/or the validity of claims in relation to the difference between 
knowledge of social reality available to ordinary, ‘lay’ actors, and those available 
to social scientists, including those who engage in critique. This boundary, 
however, is particularly tenuous in cases in which critics are at the same time 
participants and observers in the context in which they are making claims. This 
thesis offers an account of how ideas about reality (ontology) and ideas concerning 
the knowledge of that reality (epistemology) shape and are shaped by the 
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negotiation of this context. Critique of neoliberalism in higher education and 
research provides a salient case for the empirical investigation of how this tension 
operates and is negotiated in practice.      
 
Building on these assumptions, the thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
 
• What are the social, historical and political conditions under which the 
critique of neoliberalism takes place? Given that critique does not ‘invent’ 
the world from scratch, but rather addresses a set of ‘pre-existing’ 
conditions – some of which govern how it can be performed – what are 
these conditions and how do they influence the production of critique?  
• If we accept critique is a form of discourse, how does it describe the world? 
What kind of ‘beings’ (agents, objects, and their mutual relations) are 
posited? How is the knowledge of these asserted and legitimated? 
• What kind of ideas concerning social ‘space’ or field(s) are implied in 
critique as a form of positioning? What kind of ideas about other actors?  
• What is the relationship between professional (i.e. reliant on sociological 
vocabulary and/or theoretical concepts) knowledge and knowledge of 
social world related to practice? How do actors reflect on the relationship 
between the two in the context of their own work?  
• What are the implications for thinking about critique as a form of social 
practice? 
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Chapter 2: Description of study and methods 
 
     Introduction 
 
Building on theoretical framing developed in the previous chapter, this chapter 
specifies the parameters of the study. It provides contextual framing of the critique 
of neoliberalism in higher education and research, describes methods and 
techniques of data collection, modes of analysis and interpretation, and discusses 
some of the implications as well as limitations and constraints of this case.  
 
It makes sense to start from the assumption that the critique of neoliberalism 
develops in parallel with its object. In the UK, ‘neoliberalism’ is strongly 
associated with the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and, later, 
John Major (e.g. Ledger, 2018). Thatcher’s austerity measures were aimed at 
reducing public spending, stimulating private investment, and limiting the power 
of organised labour. This was reflected in the introduction of mode of governance 
known as New Public Management, with public services subject to periodic 
assessment and performance targets. As a diagnostic, however, ‘neoliberalism’ 
only started gathering traction around the turn of the century (Boas and Gans-
Morse, 2009). Some authors attribute its growing popularity to the 2008 economic 
crisis, which rendered visible the imbrication of financial and political power in 
global capitalism. However, ‘neoliberalism’ can also be a way to describe what for 
intellectuals on the Left must have been a surprising continuity between Thatcher’s 
policies, on the one hand, and those introduced by the Labour governments of Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown – including in higher education.  
 
In UK universities, neoliberalism can primarily be linked to two strands of policies: 
the introduction of tuition fees, and the introduction of performance-based research 
funding. However, the label could also be applied to a host of other policy 
developments, including the abolishment of tenure by the Education Reform Act 
of 1988 (Tight, 2009). Initially, ‘neoliberalism’ sometimes appeared as a synonym 
for, and sometimes as the broader theoretical framing of, ‘audit culture’, denoting 
ideological shift to forms of assessment. While the latter has slowly been going out 
of fashion in the last decade, the popularity of neoliberalism as a diagnostic mot du 
jour shows no intention of subsiding. This led some authors to suggest it is now 
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emptied of all diagnostic or analytical power and has become a rather vague catch-
all term for a host of contemporaneous, though not always linked, developments 
(Springer, 2016, 2015; Venugopal, 2015; Peck, 2010). 
 
While the intellectual history of ‘neoliberalism’ as a term would warrant its own 
exploration (e.g. Eagleton-Pierce, 2016), in the present study neoliberalism is 
primarily used as shorthand for the diagnosis of ‘economisation’, ‘privatisation’ or 
‘marketisation’ of different spheres of social life. ‘Economization’ (which William 
Davies (2014) succinctly defined as the “disenchantment of politics by 
economics”), in turn, has been the subject of a substantial and growing body of 
scholarship, focusing in particular on the role of economics (and economists) in 
shaping modes of governance (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010, 2009; Callon, 2007; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu, eds., 2007). In the context of higher education, 
however, it most often takes the form of a denouncement of the ‘incursion’ of 
economics into a domain that should be protected from it, such as education (or 
knowledge production more broadly). While not all examples of this type of 
critique deploy neoliberalism as a dominant diagnostic term, they tend to converge 
around the idea that economization, privatisation, or marketisation of knowledge 
are (1) happening, (2) undesirable, and (3) something to be opposed, or resisted.  
 
While policies they address often go back to the ‘early days’ of Thatcher’s reforms 
at the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, the majority of interventions 
analysed in this thesis were published between 1997 and 2017. The rapid expansion 
of critique in the past decade, to some degree, has to do with the proliferation of 
digital platforms, particularly social media (e.g. Dahlgren, 2012). In addition, 
‘traditional’ media have become increasingly reliant on social media not only for 
disseminating but, increasingly, generating content. However, the proliferation of 
critique should also be seen in relation to changes in the political environment. 
Between 2010 and 2017, the UK saw the introduction of at least eleven pieces of 
primary legislation (acts and amendments) pertaining to higher education, some 
vehemently opposed but still passed in the Parliament, White Papers and policy 
reports. It witnessed its possibly greatest wave of student protests in recent history, 
in 2010 and 2011. The results of the referendum concerning membership in the 
European Union (‘Brexit’) in June 2016 sent a particularly strong shock through 
universities, many reliant on EU research funding and EU nationals as staff. 
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Finally, universities found themselves at the centre of a number of ‘culture wars’, 
concerning their alleged ‘left-wing bias’, free speech and the Prevent legislation. 
In line with the metaphor in the title, it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
new fronts are opening on an almost monthly basis.  
 
From this perspective, it may appear strange that this study places an emphasis on 
the critique of neoliberalism, rather than on neoliberalism itself. Surely, one could 
say, every war has at least two sides: thus, in the war on universities, it would make 
sense to devote equal attention to those who attack as to those who defend them. 
There are, however, a few strong reasons to prioritise critique of neoliberalism over 
neoliberalism as a research object. To begin with, as noted, there is a substantial – 
and steadily growing – amount of scholarship that does the latter. However, there 
have been, to date, literally no attempts to analyse these forms of critique as a 
distinct genre or mode of intellectual production. Secondly, and more interestingly, 
few intellectual interventions explicitly engage in promoting or supporting 
neoliberalism in higher education. One notable example is Conservative politician 
David Willetts, former Minister of State for Universities, whom many see as 
responsible for the introduction of Research Excellence Framework (REF) and the 
removal of tuition fee caps. Yet even Willetts is reluctant to use the term 
‘neoliberalism’ in a positive sense: in fact, in an event described in Chapter 4, he 
goes as far as to accuse his critics of espousing neoliberal ideology.  
 
Of course, Marxists would be quick to point out ideology works in part because it 
is invisible. Peck (2010) noted that hardly anyone self-identifies as a neoliberal. 
This has somewhat changed recently, with e.g. the Adam Smith Institute ‘coming 
out’ as neoliberals (Slobodian, 2018, p. 3), but on the whole, the concept is still 
used predominantly as a derogatory term (Venugopal, 2015; Boas and Gans-
Morse, 2009).  In this sense, relative scarcity of contemporary intellectual 
interventions that endorse or visibly propagate the neoliberal model could be taken 
as evidence of its total victory: neoliberalism has become common sense. While 
there is merit in this interpretation, the question is not whether it is true, but rather 
how (and if) intellectual interventions aim to change this. This is why it makes 
sense to ‘unpack’ the assumptions on which the critique of neoliberalism is 
predicated. Otherwise, critique becomes reduced to the resigned reproduction of 
“the rhetoric of gloom and doom” (Belfiore, 2013), which, despite possibly 
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benefitting the careers of its authors, leaves the broader question of the relationship 
between critique and social conditions of its production unproblematised.  
 
This thesis analyses the critique of neoliberalism in UK higher education and 
research on three levels. The first concerns the political – that is, the level of 
policies and antecedent historical events that are the object of interventions and 
shape the social and political context in which they are made. The second is 
discursive, which concerns the content of actual intellectual interventions, as well 
as contexts in which they are made. The third is the reflexive, which concerns 
actors’ narratives about interventions, including reflections on the relationship 
between the political context and their own agency.   
 
Building on Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), and Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), 
the study interprets each of these levels as positing a specific ‘world’, that is, a set 
of beings/objects and their relations. The interpretative part aims to show how these 
three worlds are related, that is, brought into alignment or conflict through 
interventions. The explanatory component aims to show how these connections – 
or forms of justification – depend on relatively stable ideas about the nature of 
reality, forms of agency exercised through speech-acts, and, in particular, the 
relevance of epistemic access to reality for the validity of claims. This expands the 
pragmatic account of critique to show not only types of beings and relations 
invoked through forms of justification, but also assumptions about the fabric of the 
social world that play a role in the constitution of space for interventions, and in 
actors’ own reflections on the course of action. Finally, the study discusses the 
implications of this framing for thinking about the relationship between critique 
and the social.   
 
Historical and political context 
 
Critique of UK universities has a longer (one could say, venerable) history. Texts 
now considered ‘classic’, and often incorporated or referred to in the contemporary 
critique, such as Cardinal Newman’s The Idea of a University (1852), frequently 
started as a critique of ideological tendencies in higher education combined with 
ideas how to correct them (cf. Collini, 2012, p. 39-60). For instance, Virginia 
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas (Woolf, 1992 [1932, 1929]) 
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used the absence of women from universities, in particular Oxford and Cambridge, 
to reflect on women’s general position in society. After WWII, F.R. Leavis’ 
Education and the University took the teaching of literature at universities to be 
indicative of the overall standard of literacy and humanist culture (Leavis, 1948).  
 
Yet, until the second half of the 20th century, both the target and the intended 
audience of this type of critique were overwhelmingly academic. Halsey notes that  
 
(D)iscussion did not break out of narrowly academic circles until Robbins 
reported in 1963. Up to that time the journalistic portrayal of university life 
was confined to the staid pages of Universities Quarterly and the reporting 
of appointments, deaths, boat races, and rugby football results from Oxford 
and Cambridge on the appropriate page of The Times (1992, p. v).  
 
With few notable exceptions, critique was thus mostly an ‘in-house sport’; when it 
ventured beyond the walls of the academia, as in Woolf’s case, it was in part by 
taking universities as indicative of the society – or, more precisely, of its educated 
classes: Three Guineas, it is worth remembering, talks about the difference in the 
importance (and financing) of education between girls and boys – of wealthy 
families. These early forms of critique were characterised by relatively 
unfavourable evaluations of the state of universities at the time. Frequently framed 
as polemics, they took issue with many of the problems embedded in universities: 
sectarianism, disciplinary enclosure, elitism, and exclusion of the less privileged. 
Education, in this sense, was seen as an expression of everything that was wrong 
with the English society as a whole. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the discourse began to shift. Intellectual 
interventions increasingly started focusing on governmental policy towards 
universities. Correspondingly, the object of critique changed from the university to 
the government and its policies. This overlapped with the growing public interest 
in higher education:  
 
Meanwhile, and signalling full acceptance of higher education into the higher 
and middle journalism, the Times Higher Education Supplement published 
its first number in October 1971. Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
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discussion became more widely shared. The growing number of graduates 
swelled that branch of the mass media industry which supplies more or less 
entertaining and informative ephemera to itself in the 'up-market' weeklies 
and supplements. The discussion also became more explicitly political, partly 
because higher education developed into an avid consumer of the financial 
patronage of the state, partly because universities and polytechnics came to 
vie with the hustings and the workplace in bids to displace parliament as the 
forum of political argument... (Halsey, 1992, v.).  
 
The shift from seeing the university as, in a manner of speaking, a culprit, to seeing 
it as a victim, is thus coextensive with the mainstreaming of higher education as a 
topic of concern. There is possibly no better way to convey this than the difference 
(and similarity) between two seminal volumes published thirty-five years apart. 
Moberly’s The Crisis in the University (1949) squarely eschews financial matters 
and diagnoses a lack of spiritual purpose as the source of the crisis. By contrast, 
the title of Peter Scott’s The Crisis of the University (1984) reflects widespread 
agreement – at least on the Left, in the broadest sense of the term – that the task of 
critique is to defend, rather than attack, the University. 
 
What changed? One explanation has to do with massification of higher education. 
As a growing proportion of commentators and journalists started coming from the 
academia, it is plausible they saw fit to put universities at the heart of political 
issues, as well as do that in a more laudatory manner. On the other hand, it could 
also have to do with what some authors have dubbed the ‘institutionalisation’ of 
critique. Russell Jacoby (1984), for instance, argued that from the 1960s onwards, 
intellectuals increasingly abandoned the bohemian lifestyle of cities and relocated 
to university campuses. Obviously, this to some degree has to do with the specific 
spatial and geographical organisation of higher education in the US, but it reflects 
a broader trend: for about two decades after the end of the 1960s, an increasing 
number of intellectuals became permanently (or semi-permanently) employed at 
universities. In the UK, the institutionalisation of critique was particularly 
prominent in the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at 
Birmingham (cf. Rojek and Turner, 2000). As Chapter 4 will argue, this means 
their concerns became increasingly mediated through the environment of the 
university, giving rise to what Bourdieu (2000) has referred to as the ‘scholastic’ 
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disposition: that is, the tendency for scholarship to, even if unwittingly, reflect the 
specific condition of being embedded within the institutions of knowledge 
production.      
 
Neither of these factors, however, should detract from the fact that in the second 
half of the 20th century national governments indeed became more interested in 
higher education. In this sense, the rise of critical commentary on changes in the 
relationship of the state towards universities cannot be explained solely in terms of 
the changing characteristics of the academic or, for that matter, journalistic 
profession. This is particularly relevant given that intellectual interventions at the 
end of the 20th century overwhelmingly take the form of critique of policies, framed 
or supported by philosophical or sociological arguments. This, of course, does not 
mean all writing about universities can be reduced to critical commentary on higher 
education legislation. However, crucially, it also means that the context in which 
these intellectual interventions occur cannot be understood without paying 
attention to the structure and dynamics of the relationship between universities and 
the state.  
 
Of course, in the context of UK higher education, ‘the state’ takes a rather 
particular form. Educational legislation is devolved to Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales, and universities in these parts of the UK are, in this sense, subject to 
different regulatory regimes than those in England – reflected, among other things, 
in different tuition fees. However, Scottish and Welsh universities as well as 
Queen’s University in Belfast are still part of the UK political and policymaking 
landscape: some are members of the Russell Group, their student unions are 
represented in the National Union of Students, and their academic staff are 
members of the University and College Union (UCU). Devolution, thus, should be 
seen as a factor in the overall political, rather than a reason to presume interventions 
would necessarily relate only or primarily to England.  
 
Data 
 
The reconstruction of the context in which interventions take place provides an 
overview of the development of UK higher education, in particular the relationship 
between universities and the state. It provides a summary of the developments 
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preceding World War II, but is mostly concerned with the ensuing period, 
particularly the expansion of higher education in the 1960s and the 1970s, followed 
by changes introduced to the systems of funding and audit in the 1980s and the 
1990s. It continues with policies introduced by New Labour government between 
1997 and 2010, and the subsequent Coalition (2010–5) and Conservative 
governments (2015–present).  
 
While the history of these policies, at least in broad brush strokes, will probably be 
known to those familiar with higher education in the UK, this reconstruction is not 
meant only as a historical ‘refresher’. Rather, its main goal is to identify the 
relevant actors and documents, as well as place them in a social and political 
context. Understanding intellectual interventions is impossible without knowing 
what they address. A systematic overview of the political and policymaking 
landscape of the ‘war on universities’, thus, is vital for understanding the object of 
critique. However, as noted earlier, this political and policy framework is not only 
relevant because it constitutes the object of critique analysed here. It 
simultaneously shapes its context, in the sense in which it enables and constrains 
certain forms of intervention.  
 
In order to reconstruct the evolution of the relationship between universities and 
the state, this part relies on approaches in historical and political sociology (e.g. 
Hay, 2002), drawing on a combination of primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources include Parliamentary minutes, legal texts (Acts, Bills, White Papers), as 
well as other forms of political documents not necessarily included or referenced 
in legislation, such as alternative White Papers, texts of politicians’ speeches etc., 
most of which are in the public domain. Secondary sources include sociological 
and historical studies of UK higher education and research; most of these were 
written between 1980 and 2010.  
 
While there is a wealth of literature dealing with changes in higher education at the 
end of the 20th and the beginning of 21st centuries, the majority of these texts are 
more easily classified as interventions, rather than sources. This doesn’t mean 
sources included in this part of the analysis never take a position on the processes 
they are describing. However, they can be distinguished from interventions in the 
strict sense inasmuch as their focus is on data or analysis, rather than commentary 
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or critique. Of course, it is possible to question overall reliability or epistemic status 
of resources: obviously, even authors who claim to provide an ‘objective’ analysis 
of a particular context – say, the transformation of employment patterns in UK 
higher education and research – are not exempt from its effects. For practical 
purposes, however, it is possible to establish a provisional boundary between 
genres. For instance, while interventions often rely on secondary or primary data 
in order to strengthen an argument, this form of knowledge is almost always used 
as illustrative of a broader critical point they are trying to make. In this sense, they 
are rarely presented in a way that would permit discussion about sources of data: 
references are incomplete or absent, major theoretical works are brought up in 
passing without delving into the intricacies of their argument, and evidence is 
almost always anecdotal. Additionally, interventions often rely on authors’ first-
hand experience, but rarely in conjunction with methodological or theoretical 
caveats that tend to precede its use in genres like auto-ethnography (cf. Sparkes, 
2007). Thus, while interventions can draw on what Boltanski dubbed ‘instruments 
of totalization’, only exceptionally do they make the process by which these 
instruments are put to use open to scrutiny. Sources, by contrast, perform their 
academic authority by putting ‘data’ upfront and keeping commentary – especially 
if critical – to the minimum.   
 
Analysis 
 
The analysis of policies and legislation focuses on how relevant actors – the 
universities, the state, intermediary and regulatory bodies – were established and 
transformed during the course of the 20th and 21st century. The third ‘actor’ that 
plays a prominent role in critique, the market, only enters the political landscape 
through governmental policies, i.e. via the state. In this sense, ‘the market’ cannot 
be treated as a political actor in its own right. This, of course, does not mean that 
markets do not play an important part in intellectual interventions: but these 
markets have more to do with publishing and platforms than governmental policies.  
 
The opening question for the analysis was simple: who calls the shots? Who has 
the power to influence what goes on at universities? This question is further placed 
in the context of historical and social situation in the UK at the time – how did this 
come about? What was (at least intended) purpose of these changes? How did 
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different actors react? Last, but not least, this is used to develop the analysis of the 
relative powers of relevant actors: who is agentified through these policies? What 
(and whom) do they enable, or conversely, proscribe?   
 
Policies, in this sense, are treated as both discursive and performative. On the one 
hand, they encode different forms of power relations between different agents. 
They are also ‘ideological’, in the sense in which they promote specific values or 
goals, rather than others. This doesn’t mean that their implementation directly 
translates these values or goals into actors’, as it were, hydraulically (cf. Archer, 
1995, 2003). However, it does define, prescribe, and incentivise specific ways of 
acting or going about, what Foucault referred to as ‘conduct’. They are 
performative because they make certain venues for action available or more likely, 
whilst minimising or circumscribing others. Keeping in mind that critique operates 
within, rather than outside this framework, also means that its production is 
inevitably bound up in the configuration of political power and the venues in which 
it can be exercised.  
 
The main contribution of this layer of analysis, therefore, is to reconstruct the 
political and social ‘world’ in which interventions take place, and to which they 
refer to. It provides a historical view on how some of the social processes that are 
key in understanding the transformation of UK higher education and research (for 
instance, massification after World War II, or the abolishment of difference 
between universities and polytechnics in 1992) came about; it introduces the main 
political actors (or agents) that entered the field in this period (for instance, funding 
councils), as well as the main policy instruments (for instance, tuition fees); and it 
specifies some of the relevant political dynamics that happened in relation to these 
(for instance, the election victory of New Labour in 1997, or the student protests 
in 2010–11). From there, we move on to the analysis of intellectual interventions 
that make up the critique of UK higher education and research between that time 
and the present.  
 
Interventions 
 
The second part of the thesis analyses intellectual interventions. Following Eyal 
and Bucholz (2010), intellectual interventions are defined as discursive forms, or 
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speech-acts, that contain a combination of descriptive, or diagnostic, and 
prescriptive, or normative, statements. In intellectual interventions these tend to be 
logically dependent on each other: the authority of the prescriptive is predicated on 
the authority of the descriptive. Intellectual interventions, in this sense, are 
discursive devices: they tell us how the world is, but also have effects on how it 
becomes.  
 
Theory of intellectual positioning takes the effects of interventions to flow from 
their capacity to position people (in this case, intellectuals) in the context of the 
overall social and political environment of their time. Positioning, in this sense, 
involves the attribution of certain characteristics to a person, group or situation (for 
instance, the World War II). This attribution, performed via speech acts, has effects 
both for the positioned actor (‘object’ of positioning), and for the actor doing the 
positioning (‘subject’ of positioning). The relationship between subject and object 
is mutually constitutive: the position of the subject hinges on their capacity to 
position the object.  
 
This is equivalent to the attribution of characteristics to ‘beings’ (entities) involved 
in Boltanski and Thévenot’s account of justification. Whereas theory of intellectual 
positioning primarily follows the acts of attribution that are personal (or inter-
personal) – such as an intellectual ascribing certain characteristics to another 
intellectual, or to group of authors – this study, following Boltanski and Thévenot, 
does not assume that objects of positioning are limited to humans. In this sense, 
ascribing agency to ‘neoliberalism’ is not the same as ascribing agency to a 
particular vice-chancellor, or a civil servant, but both are relevant. Without delving 
into the question of which is more relevant (and why), it makes sense to start from 
a ‘flat ontology’: that is, from the assumption that, if we are studying positioning, 
we should be interested in all objects it involves and applies to (cf. Latour, 2005). 
This means abandoning the assumption – even if temporarily – that ‘entities’ 
positioned via intellectual interventions are necessarily the same as the entities 
identified in the first part of the study. “The University” as an object of an 
intellectual intervention is not necessarily the same thing as a particular university 
in the ‘real world’. Leaving temporarily aside the question of whether this means 
that there is such a thing as the ‘real world’, this part of the study focuses on the 
type of objects posited through interventions; the attributes, characteristics, and 
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forms of agency ascribed to these objects; and, last but not least, the characteristics, 
tendencies, and forms of agency (self-)ascribed – or implied – to subjects of 
interventions, that is, their authors. 
 
Data 
 
The corpus for the analysis predominantly consists of written texts, though some 
‘live’ interventions – e.g. in public debates or book launches – were also included. 
The authors of these interventions could all be said to fall under the category 
‘public intellectual’. While, as Eyal and Bucholz noted, the category is slightly too 
self-referential to be uncritically applied in the analysis, some (though, obviously, 
men more frequently than women) are referred to as such in public contexts. 
Almost all authors of these interventions are academics, in the sense in which 
academic labour constitutes (or constituted, for those who are retired) a major 
source of their livelihood. However, a similar caveat in relation to classification 
applies: increasing precarity of academic careers means that some people will go 
in and out of the academia, and/or may be engaged in temporary contracts that will 
not necessarily present their main occupation (or source of income). On the other 
end, some of the influential intellectuals may have retired, gone into civil service, 
or other occupations.  
 
The total corpus of surveyed interventions included fifteen monographs and edited 
volumes, seventy-two articles, and fifty forms of online content, including web 
pages and blog posts. Due to the volume of collected interventions, not all of these 
are cited in the text, which focuses on the most representative illustrations of the 
genre. All of the books were written so as to address general, albeit educated, 
readership. Some clearly state that they are not intended for a purely academic 
audience: only one was published by a university press. This is also why no 
academic article in the strict sense of the term was included: intellectual 
interventions are distinguished by aiming to engage with the general public, despite 
the fact that what is construed as ‘the general public’ may not necessarily 
correspond to the general demographics of the population of the British Isles. 
Articles were published between 2000 and 2017. The most frequent outlet is the 
Times Higher Education Supplement, followed by The Guardian (sometimes its 
Education pages, and sometimes Opinion), The London Review of Books, and The 
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Independent. Other interventions were published on authors’ own, or their 
organisations’ web pages or blogs; some of these were subsequently published in 
outlets listed above. While some were shared and promoted on Twitter and other 
social media, very few of these count as standalone intellectual interventions. This 
was complemented by participant observation in different public events where 
some of these intellectuals were invited to speak.  
 
Analysis 
 
Following from theoretical exegesis in Chapter 1, the first level of analysis 
approaches these interventions as forms of discourse. In order to analyse them, the 
study draws on the application of discourse analysis in positioning theory (e.g. 
Slocum-Bradley, 2010). This means identifying narrative practices whereby 
entities in the social domain are established, given certain properties, and attributed 
specific forms of agency. Wilkinson and Kitzinger identify three such practices: 
“(a) naming or indexing a category; (b) invoking categorical membership; and (c) 
invoking attributes” (2003, p. 174). The concept of ‘position’, in this sense, extends 
beyond rights, duties and obligations (cf. Lawson, 2016). Positions come with an 
implied set of characteristics, though this does not mean that they are exhausted by 
these characteristics, nor that the characteristics neatly overlap with any particular 
position.  
 
The second step, following Boltanski and Thévenot, relates these practices of 
positioning to specific ‘worlds’. The analysis focuses on entities such as 
“university”, “Government”, “academics”, “management”, and how they are 
defined, situated, and related. Particular attention is paid to those objects (or 
persons) that do not ‘fit’, and ontological assumptions invoked in justifications of 
the degree to which they do (or do not). This aspect of the analysis aims to highlight 
the relevance of practices of positioning for the construction – and delineation – of 
domains (or ‘worlds’), especially in relation to the ‘world’ of markets.  
 
The third level of analysis treats interventions not only as discourses positioning 
other objects, but also as objects or intellectual products themselves. This means 
situating them in relation to the environment in which they are produced, and 
possible effects they can have. For instance, where have they been published (and 
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by whom)? How did the process come about? How are they circulated? What kind 
of impact did they have – for their authors, but also for the field as a whole? The 
last part of the analysis turns to actors to see how they reflect on the relationship 
between the two.  
 
 Interviews  
 
The third part emphasises (human) actors and the role of reflexivity in the process 
of positioning. This part therefore engages with ideas, reasons and narratives of 
authors of interventions, primarily collected through interviews.  
 
Data 
 
Given the volume of interventions, not all of their authors were contacted for 
interviews. Priority was given to those who were particularly prominent, 
influential, or have engaged in interventions closer to the time of fieldwork. Some 
of the analysed interventions could reasonably be interpreted as a ‘one-off’; in this 
case, priority was given to authors who had a longer, and recurrent, history of 
engaging in critical commentary on higher education.  
 
Fourteen potential interviewees were approached, and ten in-depth interviews 
collected and analysed. The process of arranging interviews involved getting in 
touch with prospective participants, usually via email, sending information about 
the research project, and inquiring about their willingness or ability to be 
interviewed. Two potential participants declined; one never responded; and one 
interview proved logistically difficult to organise. On the whole, however, they 
usually responded quickly, enthusiastically, and showed willingness to meet.  
 
Interviews took place between January 2017 and January 2018. The length of 
interviews ranged from 75 to 140 minutes, usually taking place at the participants’ 
places of work – in this case, London, Cambridge, University of Warwick, and 
Oxford. One interview was conducted via Skype. This was often combined with 
attending events where participants were speaking or taking part. While this does 
not amount to ethnographic fieldwork in the strict sense of the term – that is, I did 
not systematically inhabit participants’ social milieu for an extended period of time 
 68 
– it helped anchor the process of data collection in a physical/material, rather than 
just ‘ideational’ space.  
 
This is particularly relevant as the sociology of intellectuals traditionally 
conceived, as well as intellectual history, sometimes place an emphasis on the 
‘intellectual’ space of interventions to the extent of excluding all other forms of 
data. Interventions are related to other interventions, or, at best, to broad sketches 
of the social and intellectual ‘milieu’ in which they were created. Obviously, to 
some degree this is an effect of historical distance – in some cases we can only rely 
on reconstructions, or, at best, witness accounts of particular social and historical 
setting. An alternative approach, particularly prominent in social studies of science, 
places an emphasis on the day-to-day processes of ‘creation’ of knowledge and 
facts, usually through ethnographic research at sites of knowledge production – 
universities, laboratories, but also think tanks, multilateral and governmental 
agencies and institutes (Latour, 1993; Collins, 1981). While this yields useful 
insights, it is very difficult to apply in the case of intellectual interventions, which, 
as a ‘boundary category’, do not fit easily into a particular spatial or social context. 
In other words, there is no pre-defined social space in which interventions are 
routinely produced. They, in most cases, happen ‘on the side’ of participants’ day 
jobs. While spaces of social interaction in which interventions happen are 
important – which is why events such as public debates or book launches were part 
of fieldwork – interviews still provide the best, though necessarily incomplete, 
insight into the process of their creation.  
 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format. While questions were adapted 
to specific participants and to the flow of conversation, they usually revolved 
around three elements: point of entry (that is, how intellectual interventions came 
about); process and effects of engagement (that is, how participants described their 
involvement, and how they perceived its consequences); and their views on the 
state of higher education in the UK more generally. Some examples of specific 
questions include: (1) How participants became interested in higher education and 
research as an object; (2) What prompted their initial involvement, that is, led to 
their first intervention (many, obviously, had published more than one); (3) How 
this process came about (i.e. whether they were contacted by publishers or editors 
or initiated it themselves); (4) How the interventions were received; (5) How 
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interventions related to their careers and/or personal lives; (6) What they thought 
about the possibility to influence people and events via interventions; (7) How they 
thought universities, or higher education and research in the UK, were going to 
develop in the future.  
 
While the objective of this approach was to allow for a participant-centred 
narration – that is, one that puts interviewees at the centre of ‘the story’ – this set 
of questions was also meant to elicit their views on the context, that is, how they 
perceived the environment in which interventions were taking place.  
 
 Analysis 
 
The analysis concentrates on the way participants narrate their interventions in 
relation to two main parameters. One concerns their overall professional and 
personal biographies or trajectories – that is, how they conceptualise their own 
identity and agency. The other is in relation to the social and political context in 
which positioning is taking place – that is, ‘the world’. The objective of this layer 
of analysis, therefore, is to identify what objects exist in the participants’ social 
worlds and how they define the form, meaning and purpose of intellectual 
interventions participants engage in. The secondary layer of analysis consisted of 
reconstructing different characteristics and forms of agency ascribed to these 
entities, as well as causal relations assumed to obtain between them. The final step 
entailed reconstructing the ‘practical order’ operating in participants’ social 
worlds, that is, the way in which they construct and narrate their own agency in 
relation to it. This allows positioning to emerge from participants’ recounting of 
strategies for negotiating, and possibly transgressing, different social spaces. As 
noted earlier, not framing this context as ‘the field’ serves to avoid pre-emptively 
postulating the existence of specific and clearly demarcated fields. In this way, it 
becomes possible to reconstruct the ‘landscape’ of interventions from the ground 
up, in the sense in which fields become demarcated through and by specific acts of 
positioning.  
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Ethical considerations 
 
Prior to commencing fieldwork, the project underwent the ethical approval 
procedure required by the University of Cambridge and the Department of 
Sociology (form included in the Appendix). Given interviews deal with human 
subjects and handle potentially sensitive data, particular care was taken to ensure 
participants will have sufficient information about the research project, as well as 
understand how the data generated in interviews would be used. Approaching 
(contacting) potential participants was accompanied by a short note describing the 
research project and its main questions, followed by a consent form. The consent 
form specified that the data generated will be used only for the purposes of the 
present research project, that it will be kept in a secure location in anonymous form, 
and that the author was the only person who would have access to recordings and 
transcripts. Interviews were transcribed using an online transcription software 
(Trint), which works on the basis of voice recognition aided by manual correction, 
which means no other person was involved in transcription.  
 
The presentation of interview data in the text aimed to avoid the possibility of 
attributing specific quotes to any of the authors cited in Chapter 4. To this end, 
identifying characteristics, such as place-names, unambiguous references to 
disciplines or institutions, as well as, of course, other persons, were avoided or 
altered. This is also why participants’ demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, 
location, or occupation save for academic) were not revealed; the only 
characteristic left unaltered was gender, in part because it provided for grammatical 
coherence of sentences, and in part to prevent incidentally erasing potential gender 
differences in positioning. While this ‘minimalist’ approach to the presentation of 
interview data could make interviews sound ‘anonymous’ or devoid of 
ethnographic detail, it was necessary in order to ensure the anonymity of 
participants. A very careful reader would probably be able to make conjectures 
concerning the provenance of specific interview excerpts; however, there is no way 
for anyone who had not been present in the interview to decisively establish this 
link. 
 
Another potential ethical issue concerns the epistemic status of interpretation and 
explanation in contexts when those who are ‘objects’ of research themselves have 
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recourse to the vocabulary, and in some case methodological apparatus, of social 
sciences.  
 
Raymond Geuss offered a particularly pertinent description of this problem: 
 
There is on the one side the standpoint of the ‘anthropologist’ or the 
‘ethnologist’ who is a (theoretically inclined) observer trying to give good 
descriptions of the concepts, beliefs, convictions, and the characteristic 
theoretical views of an odd tribe, the members of contemporary ‘liberal’ 
societies. As such an ethnologist I have special interest in the views of 
medicine men, warlocks, archimandrites, faith healers, and shamans of this 
tribe, among them ‘analytic philosophers’. These philosophers, however, are 
both an object of study and, to some degree, a pool of informants (…) It is 
true that my attitude towards witch doctors like Rawls and Nozick is 
characterized by the same ambiguity that sometimes inflects the ethnologist’s 
relation to an informant (…) The witch doctor has his ‘theory’ of what us 
going on, just as Rawls has his, but also just as I have mine (2016, p. 14–15).  
 
Delineating levels of interpretation is both a relational (and thus ethical) and an 
epistemological issue. This was a serious concern, especially given the relatively 
small social space of UK academia, which meant there was a possibility of 
encountering participants in future professional contexts. As the interview 
information sheet contained relatively little on theoretical or interpretative 
frameworks of the project, I explained to participants that I was happy to discuss 
these, providing the discussion could take place after the interview, so as to 
minimise the likelihood of ‘theoretical transfer’. Most participants seemed very 
happy with this and showed relatively little inclination to discuss these aspects of 
the project. I also made sure to keep a field diary and record on any thoughts 
emerging directly from interviews; an excerpt from this diary that helps illuminate 
some of the conclusions is included in Chapter 5. Relational concerns are revisited 
at the end of the same chapter, which talks about ambiguity and ambivalence when 
it comes to describing human conduct.  
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Positioning and positionality  
 
Interview situations inevitably encode relations of power and authority, as well as 
displays of knowledge related to them. In qualitative research methods literature, 
these questions are primarily investigated in the framework of elite interviewing 
(e.g. Petkov and Kaoullas, 2016; Harvey, 2011; McDowell, 1998). In broader 
theoretical literature that deals with questions of epistemology, they are primarily 
investigated from the perspective of positionality. Both perspectives are relevant 
here.  
 
While the definition of ‘elites’ is relatively fluid (Wedel, 2017), it makes sense to 
identify participants as at least in principle belonging to a privileged stratum. 
Bourdieu (1990) framed intellectuals as the “dominated part of the dominant 
class”: while in British sociology (as well as in participants’ narratives) the former 
interpretation tends to bear more weight than the latter, it is worth remembering 
that almost all the interviewees were (or had been) permanently employed at some 
of the most prestigious Russell Group universities. Similarly, while their class of 
origin varies – some openly reflected on their ‘modest’ background – all seemed 
to be in a financially comfortable position, often with additional income coming 
from royalties, speaking engagements, etc. Last, but certainly not least, the fact 
they all had access to an often elaborate network of public platforms means most 
could be designated as ‘influencers’ within the taxonomy of elites in global 
capitalism.     
 
Given the public profile of participants, it was expected that at least some of them 
would treat interviews as semi-public events. Some steps were taken to minimise 
the effects of this: the consent form as well as the opening conversation 
communicated clearly that anonymity was guaranteed, and that, even if they chose 
to waive it, no interview data would be attributed to specific individuals. It is 
possible to view this, in a manner of speaking, ‘enforced’ anonymity as a way of 
balancing or reversing power inequalities involved in interviewing elites. In this 
case, however, it was used to ensure participants would feel comfortable reflecting 
on their public profile from a more personal or private perspective, rather than just 
‘perform’ the role of public intellectual. 
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This does not mean inequalities in power or status can be swept aside. Most 
research on elite interviewing assumes a relatively clear imbalance of power 
between interviewer and the interviewed, in which the former has to vie for access 
to and time of the presumably very busy interviewee. Obviously, I signalled 
willingness to travel to interview participants at their place of work, as well as 
remained flexible concerning timing, but on the whole the interviews were not 
difficult to arrange. It is quite possible that my affiliation with the University of 
Cambridge greatly helped in this. On the other hand, other elements of my identity 
– gender, (perceived) age, status, or ethnicity – also played a role in some of the 
rejected requests, and certainly in the way interviews proceeded.  
 
Given the majority of participants were white, male and Anglo-American, and 
given I am a woman of Central Eastern European background, it makes sense to 
assume these characteristics would have placed me in a lower status category than 
research participants. Professional status was a bit more complicated: while I was 
doing interviews as part of research for my PhD, I did not neatly fit the concept of 
a ‘PhD student’. I have another doctorate in anthropology and prior to coming to 
Cambridge, had held permanent academic positions, including a relatively 
prestigious Marie Curie fellowship in Denmark within which I was researching 
public engagement in universities in the UK and in New Zealand (e.g. Bacevic, 
2017). Therefore, not only had I spent significant portions of time in the UK 
academic and social context (including a year of my first PhD as a Chevening 
fellow at Oxford); I actually had relatively detailed knowledge of the UK academic 
context, both historically and in relation to the political developments at the time 
of research.  
 
In some cases, being identified as naïve or unknowledgeable (PhD student, woman, 
and foreigner) can be seen as an advantage as it tends to make participants narrate 
at length, assuming the interviewer has no prior knowledge of context, and thus 
provide a very detailed insight into how they see the world (cf. Mason-Bish, 2018, 
p. 28). On the other hand, this needs to be balanced against at least two concerns: 
one is the imperative of honesty with participants, and the other is the need to create 
an atmosphere that at least mimics the dynamics of ‘normal’ conversation. In this 
case, this was particularly important, as I wanted the participants to be able to 
engage in reflection at length on their own positioning as well as positionality – 
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that is, how they go about making their way through the world, and how they think 
their specific epistemic position, mediated or not through their institutional or 
professional position – plays a role in this. The third constraint, obviously, was 
time: while most participants were generous with it, in all cases interviews had a 
time limit. 
 
This created an interesting conundrum. On the one hand, I wanted to avoid 
participants narrating at too great a length about the ‘objective’ characteristics of 
the context (i.e. ‘explaining’ UK politics, higher education, or social structure to 
me), as this would leave little time for actual reflections. On the other, the way they 
perceived the context in which their interventions were made (and were about) – 
i.e. ‘the world’ – was an integral part of the study. This meant I occasionally 
signalled agreement with ways in which they framed issues: for instance, nodding, 
or saying “mhm” when they would mention specific policies or dates (e.g. the 
REF). This was meant to signify acquaintance (I knew what they were referring to) 
and encouragement (they were welcome to go on) while, at the same time, retaining 
neutrality in terms of my own opinion – so neither approving nor disapproving 
what they said. 
 
This is also why my own ‘public engagement’ remained relatively low during the 
period of data collection. Having previously been active in public contexts, I was 
interested in getting involved in discussions concerning higher education in the UK 
as well. However, given that communicating my opinion publicly could possibly 
shape or influence rapport with the participants, I kept it to a minimum. I did, 
however, start a blog, and maintained my Twitter profile – though withholding 
from commenting on anything I thought may obviously clash with the opinion of 
those research participants who were active on Twitter at the time. Obviously, 
during the interviews, participants occasionally asked what I thought about 
different things, or asked for agreement (“don’t you think so” or “wouldn’t you 
agree”). In these cases, I would usually try to answer the specific question as 
succinctly and honestly as possible, particularly in order to invite their further 
reflections.  
 
Positionality, however, is not only a question of how the researcher is perceived in 
a specific context, or how this influences relations in the field. It is also an 
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epistemological question, in the sense in which it affects the type of knowledge 
produced. As a woman, I was keenly aware of differences in gender and how it is 
perceived, both in the specific way women I interviewed performed the role of 
‘public intellectual’, and in the way in which it influenced my own positioning. As 
a foreigner, I am prone to paying attention to the classed nature of both English 
higher education and its public sphere. Some of these impressions were formed 
during my stay at Oxford, and it is very likely that they influenced my subsequent 
engagement with the sector, as well as with research participants. At the same time, 
affiliation with both Oxford and Cambridge, as well as the fact that I come from 
an educated middle-class background, helped navigate the social environment in 
which fieldwork took place. Again, this should not be seen as unanimously a ‘good’ 
thing: during the course of the study, it occasionally became clear that some of the 
participants were seeing, addressing, and, finally, ‘positioning’ me as a 
representative of, or shorthand for, the institution I came from – with all the values 
it usually connotes, including elitism and exclusivity.  
 
In the context of epistemic distance, it is quite possible that the form of epistemic 
‘distancing’ that this thesis performs, in the sense in which takes an evaluative 
stance towards other modes of knowledge rather than taking them at face value, 
can in part be attributed to the specific position of Oxford and Cambridge, as 
institutions traditionally thought to have preserved the greatest degree of the 
scholarly disposition that Bourdieu (2000) associated with the leisurely pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake. While the objective of the thesis was not to remain 
outside of the sphere of critique but, rather, to render its assumptions clearer and 
thus, hopefully, enable a more powerful and efficient political engagement, this 
epistemic position itself draws on the possibility of temporarily stepping ‘outside’ 
day-to-day experience of academic knowledge production under neoliberalism. 
This certainly played a role in my decision to write the thesis as a second PhD 
(rather than, say, applying for shorter-term research funding). Whether a similar 
narrative would have emerged from a different institutional, political, and 
economic position remains, obviously, in the realm of speculation. 
 
Interpretation and explanation 
 
Qualitative research privileges the processes of meaning-making over establishing 
fixed relations between different types of data. Rather than Humean ‘constant 
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conjunctions’ concerning the nature of events, accounts of social reality developed 
in the post-positivist tradition give priority to actors reflexively producing their 
lived environments. This, however, does not mean that the logics of ‘explanation’ 
and ‘interpretation’ are mutually exclusive (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; see also 
Apel, 1984, Outhwaite, 1986). Even research programmes usually associated with 
a strong constructivist bend, such as the Edinburgh programme in Strong sociology 
of knowledge, allow for causal inference. Bloor, for instance, admits that any 
account that focuses on the reconstruction of social conditions for knowledge 
would be “causal, that is, concerned with the conditions that bring about belief or 
states of knowledge. Naturally, there will be other types of causes apart from social 
ones which will co-operate in bringing about belief” (1976, pp. 4–5).  
 
Critique is fundamentally a process of meaning-making, not only because it is 
rooted in language, but because it literally consists of naming elements of social 
reality and assigning value to them. Yet, these elements of reality are not exhausted 
by the meaning and values assigned to them through intellectual interventions: for 
instance, ‘the university’ as an object is not only what is described and framed in 
participants’ interventions, nor in interview narratives. Intellectual interventions do 
not ‘create’ worlds from scratch. Therefore, the task of this study is to first establish 
convergences, differences and commonalities between objects in relation to which 
positioning is performed, and then try to offer an explanation for why these acts 
take the form they do, as well as what their effects are.  
 
While questions of ontology are traditionally more readily associated with realist 
than intepretativist approaches to understanding social processes, it is quite 
obvious that the way humans ‘make their way in the world’ entails specific ideas 
what ‘the world’ is composed of (cf. Latour, 2005). This starting point, for instance, 
informs the ‘ontological turn’ in philosophy, anthropology, and social studies of 
science and technology (e.g. Graeber, 2015; Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017). While 
differences between ontological turns are interesting in their own right, what they 
share is the overarching belief that the existence and properties of objects – in this 
case, social objects – is a fundamental element in both understanding and 
explaining why social interaction takes a specific form.  
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This is what Boltanski (2011, pp. 56–99) has in mind when he refers to social 
disputes as concerning the “whatness of what is”: fundamentally, acts of 
positioning occur in relation to specific objects and their properties. Instead of pre-
defining the space in which positioning occurs – as, for instance, the concept of 
‘field’ – this thesis, however, uses acts of positioning in order to re-trace the 
configuration of this space. It should be noted that ‘space’ in this sense does not 
denote any specific extension or configuration of objects in physical space: it 
primarily relates to the set of trajectories relations between fields, relations of 
power, and actors who constitute them.  
 
The interpretative part begins by summarising and comparing different elements 
entailed in acts of positioning. The research data gives an insight into three layers 
relevant for critique. The first layer entails the objects and relations usually 
associated with the political field: policies, Parliamentary committees, regulatory 
agencies, etc. All of these can act in specific ways, enabling or constraining the 
agency of others. In this sense, however, this ‘field’ – or layer – also includes 
academics, as it defines the ways in which they can act. This doesn’t mean it 
exhausts it, of course; but it does incentivise or, conversely, proscribe certain 
behaviours.  
 
The second layer concerns the discursive ‘worlds’ constructed through intellectual 
interventions. Equally, these posit a number of objects and relations (usually 
relations of power) that obtain between them: academics, universities, government 
and its agencies, but also disciplines, departments, and more general forces 
(capitalism or neoliberalism). All of these, again, can act in specific ways, and are 
assigned specific moral properties. These properties are not purely ‘adjectival’: 
they do not only ascribe fixed characteristics, but also (and more importantly), a 
tendency to act. For instance: vice-chancellors have a tendency to act in ways that 
harm their staff, or: economic forces have a tendency to act in ways harmful to 
universities. This ontological fixing, or, in Boltanski and Thévenot’s terms, 
establishment of worth narrows down the meaning of the range of ‘values’ by 
appending an ethical or normative interpretation to the existence of specific 
objects. 
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Interview data provides an insight into this space as it appears to authors of 
interventions. It focuses on the lived experience of ‘making their way’ through it, 
as well as epistemology – that is, how they frame and position themselves as 
epistemic subjects. Much like the previous two, this world also entails a set of 
objects, and their relations. Most of these will be the same objects as those that 
appear in previous two worlds: universities, governments, colleagues, managers, 
etc. Yet, their meaning – i.e. range of values – may not be the same across these 
worlds. ‘The university’, in this sense, denotes both a place ‘under attack’ by forces 
of neoliberalism and a dreary place for long committee meetings on Tuesday 
mornings.  
 
This serves to highlight the role of ambiguity and ambivalence in human conduct 
(e.g. Berliner, 2016; see also Merton, 1976, Bauman, 1991). This is particularly 
relevant in order to avoid another form of ‘authenticity bias’ (cf. Baert, 2012): 
assuming that authors’ ideas about social space will neatly conform to those 
presented in intellectual interventions, as well as, more broadly, in order to 
underscore the fact that people’s presentations of knowledge about a certain 
domain are not necessarily identical nor even compatible with the knowledge they 
apply when navigating that domain.  
 
The second part of the synthesis accounts for specific acts of positioning within 
this space. In this, it draws on retroduction as a mode of social analysis (e.g. Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007). Retroduction assumes that the work of social science is, 
primarily, to establish mechanisms that contribute to specific sociocultural 
manifestations. Such mechanisms can be said to include, on the one hand, factors 
associated with ‘reductionist’ modes of explanation  – for instance, class, 
background, institutional position, etc. – and, on the other, more 
complex/intersectional factors, such as, for instance, interaction between 
institutional incentives (e.g. REF) and personal motivations (e.g. wanting to get a 
promotion in order to secure a loan for a house). The third step is identifying, 
among these mechanisms, those that make a particular outcome more likely: that 
is, those that offer a more persuasive explanation for the specific configuration of 
critique of neoliberalism in higher education. 
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The challenge, in this sense, is how to include individuals without resorting to 
either methodological individualism, which would see critique as an outcome of 
individual strategies or decisions, or social reductionism, which would identify it 
as a reflection of authors’ class, status, or biographical effects of large-scale social 
processes. In order to do this, we need to understand the relative weight attributed 
to different factors that inform acts of positioning, from the standpoint of actors 
themselves. This is where reflexivity comes in.  
 
This allows us to replace the last step of retroduction – asking ‘What must reality 
be like in order for this to hold true?’ with a related question: ‘What must 
participants assume reality is like in order for this to be true?’ Rather than 
necessarily ‘importing’ participants’ views of the world, asking what the world 
must be like for critique to be possible, instead, recognizes the relational and 
reflexive nature of intellectual interventions. This shift is primarily 
methodological, rather than philosophical; it is to ask not what entities are, but what 
they must be to make anthropological sense (e.g. Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017, p. 
4). This brings the focus back onto positioning as a practice of achieving a social 
world – or, at least, a social world in which positioning can happen. The revision 
of this question allows to re-socialise and de-naturalise critique as a form of 
practice. Instead of trying to assess what reality must be like, we ask what 
ontological assumptions participants must hold in order to engage in intellectual 
positioning; and, secondly, what the way these acts work tells us about the nature 
of social reality.  
 
This also allows us to construct a bridge between pragmatist and (critical) realist 
ontologies. The double identity of speech acts – the fact that they are about 
something, but also the fact that they are something – is what allows them to be 
performative in the first instance. This, however, is not a question of effectiveness 
in the narrow sense: it isn’t necessarily the case that speech acts that are a better 
‘fit’ with reality succeed, while others do not. Neither, however, is it the type of 
performativity in the sense in which intellectuals can just say things in order for 
them to become ‘real’; if this were indeed the case, we would have a multiplicity 
of parallel and possibly incommensurable universes floating about. We do not, at 
least in the strict sense of the term, and establishing the parameters of possible 
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universes as well as what they have in common is a fundamental step in explaining 
why the one we inhabit looks the way it does.   
 
 Limitations and constraints 
 
The greatest asset of retroduction as a mode of analysis is simultaneously its 
greatest weakness: it can explain how things came to be in a certain way, but it 
cannot predict how they will develop in the future. Of course, most social sciences 
have by now abandoned the idea of the possibility of predicting the course of 
events. However, when it comes to processes very much in flux – as is certainly 
the case with the transformation of higher education and research in the UK – it is 
almost inevitable to raise the question of applicability of the analysis to events in 
the future. A related challenge is to avoid the appeal of ‘retro-fitting’: that is, 
adapting the interpretative model so as to ‘fit’ the events that took place after the 
period of data collection.    
 
In the context of this question, two events that occurred in the process of writing 
of the thesis are of primary significance. The UK referendum on membership in 
the European Union, where a slight majority voted in favour of leaving – ‘Brexit’ 
– took place at the end of the first year of this project. It was expected (and turned 
out to be the case) that there was going to be an upsurge in intellectual 
interventions, given the relevance of European Union funding for research and the 
generally cosmopolitan nature of the academia. This opened the option of 
refocusing the study on intellectual interventions concerning the implications of 
Brexit for higher education. Despite political appeal, the idea was abandoned as 
the number of interventions eventually waned, while the political process itself 
remained too obscure to allow for meaningful analysis. Instead, the implications of 
Brexit were included in the political and policy framework in the first part of the 
study. Similarly, the second event – the series of strikes of members of University 
and College Union (UCU) in response to changes proposed to pensions within the 
Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) – took place after the conclusion of 
data collection, so there was no possibility to include them in the scope of the study. 
However, the strikes provided an interesting ‘sounding board’ for some of the ideas 
and concepts developed here.   
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Like other explanatory accounts, this one is necessarily fallible, in the sense in 
which its conclusions can turn out to be wrong. Similarly, the mechanisms whose 
existence it hypothetises may work very differently in practice. For instance, it is 
possible to claim that ontological assumptions play no role in the practice of 
positioning, or that fields or ‘worlds’ exist completely independently of positioning 
practices. In the concluding part, the arguments presented here will, to a degree, be 
examined in relation to these claims. 
 
Last, but not least, this case poses important questions in terms of extendability, 
that is, the degree to which its findings can be applied to contexts other than the 
UK, or beyond the present moment. While the analysis here certainly aims to show 
how historical and political configuration of UK higher education influences and 
informs the specific form of interventions grouped under the critique of 
neoliberalism in the academia, it clearly has broader implications. These 
implications concern understanding the social production of knowledge, and, in 
particular, critique as a specific form of knowledge about, and intervention in, 
social reality.   
 
Contribution to literature 
 
On these premises, it is possible to specify levels on which this study aims to make 
a contribution.  
 
On the first level, this study contributes an empirical account of the construction of 
a specific genre of intellectual interventions, here defined as critique of 
neoliberalism in UK higher education and research. While both the origins and 
primary referents of this genre of critique reside within the UK intellectual context, 
similarly to a number of other concepts in ‘metropolitan science’ (Connell 1998), 
it can and has been applied beyond the British Isles In part because of this, there is 
intellectual value in showing how this form of critique comes about, that is, how it 
is constructed through specific forms of agency in a specific social, political, and 
cultural context. In this sense, this study shares an agenda with other detailed 
reconstructions of paradigms or intellectual movements sometimes labelled the 
‘new sociology of ideas’, whose notable proponents include Charles Camic and 
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Neil Gross (see Camic and Gross, 2002; Gross, 2002, 2008; Camic, 1992). Yet, it 
also departs from these in a number of ways.  
 
To begin with, rather than specifying an author or intellectual ‘movement’, it 
focuses on a specific genre of critique, as a combination of diagnostic and 
normative components. In this way, it grounds its analysis in the concept of 
‘intellectual interventions’ and away from the concept of ‘intellectuals’ that 
characterises a number of other approaches to studying knowledge production 
(Eyal and Bucholz, 2010). Secondly, rather than focusing on the influence of 
different structural factors on the work of particular authors, it shifts attention to 
the way in which authors reflect on and frame these structural factors, including in, 
but not limited to, their work. In this sense, this study follows Baert’s analysis of 
the rise of Sartre as, in part, a consequence of his successful reinterpretation of the 
question of wartime collaboration as an issue for Existentialist philosophy (Baert, 
2015). However, it also differs from this approach in the sense in which it aims to 
capture, to the degree possible, how critical positions are articulated in ‘real time’. 
Obviously, given time lag between the publication dates of various interventions 
and the time of interviews, some effects related to reconstruction from memory and 
retrospective interpretation are inevitable. Yet, the study aims, whenever possible, 
to ‘capture’ critique in the process of development.  
 
Methodologically, the study applies a similar approach to the pragmatic sociology 
of critique, which aims to reconstruct positions taken by different social actors in 
situations of dispute. However, despite Boltanski’s identification of the tension 
between the ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ forms of critique as the key theoretical issue for the 
sociology of critique, empirical work in this tradition has not explicitly focused on 
the specific epistemic position of those who mobilise knowledge through 
intellectual interventions. This tension, by contrast, is exactly what this study aims 
to bring to the fore. The second level of contribution, thus, concerns epistemic 
implications of the position intellectuals occupy when they critically intervene in a 
context that simultaneously constitutes the conditions of possibility for their 
intervention. Critique of neoliberalism in universities is produced within the 
context of neoliberal universities and its authority is in part derived from the same 
conditions that sustain this context. ‘Disentangling’ intellectual interventions (as, 
in part, a form of production of knowledge) from the conditions of the production 
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of this knowledge therefore offers an important insight into both the possibilities 
and limits of self-knowledge, in the context in which the knowledge of one’s own 
situation is an integral part of the critical position.   
 
Of course, to some degree this holds true for all forms of knowledge: critics of 
capitalism are not exempt from operations of the capitalist economy; critics of 
gender oppression do not live in a genderless universe; the consequences of climate 
change equally impact climate scientists as the rest of us. Yet, the specific nature 
of academic knowledge production puts a particularly sharp emphasis on the 
tenuous boundary between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ perspectives: given that intellectuals 
whose interventions are analysed in this study occupy an unclear position on the 
continuum between ‘expert’ and ‘layperson’, analysing the discursive and reflexive 
tools they deploy in, conditionally speaking, ‘stabilising’ or ‘fixing’ an epistemic 
position from which speech-acts become possible provides a novel angle on the 
question of the role of identity and subjectivity in the production of knowledge, 
especially when they cannot be reduced to, nor retroduced from, categories such as 
gender, age, race, class, or the intersection of any of these.     
 
Of course, the question of the subject-position and the construction of epistemic 
authority is not new in the philosophy of social science, sociology of knowledge, 
or STS. The social construction of expertise, in particular, has become more central 
with the rise of ‘contentious’ issues such as climate change or artificial intelligence. 
This study, however, represents a slightly different case. Unlike in contexts of 
‘contestation’, where scientific knowledge can be (and is) put on a trial (e.g. 
Brandmayr, 2017) – both metaphorically and literally – the epistemic space of the 
‘war on universities’ is more uneven and fragmented. There are no trials or expert 
committees where intellectuals are invited to give evidence that neoliberalism is, 
indeed, destroying higher education. On one side – that of critique – the diagnosis 
seems to be universally accepted, at least in broad terms. On the other – where 
policy discourses are generated – neoliberalism is hardly even mentioned. Rather 
than assuming that the lack of overlap between these discussions speaks to the 
existence of different ‘fields’ or, alternatively, to the ultimate victory of neoliberal 
ideology, this thesis will aim to explain why they keep talking at cross-purposes – 
and, indeed, what sort of purpose the very talking at cross-purposes may serve. 
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On the third level, this study engages specifically with theorisation of the form of 
social action that intellectual interventions represent. By simultaneously asking 
what is it that interventions are, and what is it that they do, the thesis hopes to 
provide an account that bridges the gap between pragmatist and critical realist 
approaches to the relationship between knowledge and social action. For critical 
realists, speech-acts are effective because they encode reality in a certain way; if 
they fail, this, at least in part, can be because reality ‘pushes back’. For pragmatists, 
linguistic constructions of reality are all there is, at least as far as social objects are 
concerned. This would make the successful performance of speech acts dependent 
on consensus or persuasiveness, but not on reality ‘as such’, given that the latter 
cannot be held to exist independently of its representations. While most accounts 
of knowledge production decide a priori on the type of approach, the assumption 
of this thesis is that examining critique as a form of social practice requires to 
simultaneously engage with both. Furthermore, it assumes that examining the 
relationship, similarities and differences between these two approaches can 
illuminate some of the assumptions implied in the production of all forms of social 
knowledge (e.g. Lohse, 2017) that also have implications for the relationship 
between critique and the social world.  
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Chapter 3: Political and policy framework  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter situates intellectual interventions in historical and political context. 
While no historical account can claim to be ‘neutral’ or distinct from theoretical 
and political concerns, situating speech acts in a social context requires 
understanding specific political configurations they respond to. This, of course, 
does not mean intellectual interventions should be seen as simply (or only) 
reactions to political developments of the day. Both policies and interventions 
should be understood as parts of broader social and political dynamics. The chapter 
therefore intends to show how policies aimed at regulating higher education and 
research, and the politics of knowledge production more broadly, evolved in 
relationship with demographic, geopolitical, and historical trends that influenced 
Britain in the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century, in order to pave the way 
for showing how critique of neoliberalism in higher education relates to this 
context in subsequent chapters.   
 
The chapter builds on existing material related to the history of higher education 
and research in the UK, placing an emphasis on the constitution of actors and 
dynamics that would come to play a major role in the ‘war on universities’. It starts 
with an overview of the early history of universities in Britain and their place in 
the world. After that, it moves to the 20th century and more specifically the post-
war period of educational expansion. It revisits some of the crucial points in the 
history of British higher education – the 1963 Robbins report, the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, the abolition of distinction between universities and polytechnics in 
1992 – before focusing on the recent period, which started with the election of 
1997, and lasts to this day.   
 
 
 Two elites: a history of conflict? 
 
 
The relationship between universities and their political environment was only 
exceptionally, if ever, a smooth one. There is possibly no better case to illustrate 
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this than the establishment of the University of Berlin, the blueprint for the famed 
Humboldtian university of the critical imagination. Its development was to a great 
degree stimulated by the industrial expansion of the Prussian Empire, and the need 
to educate statesmen and intellectuals capable of advancing, administering, and 
leading such a political construct. For this reason, and with the ambition of using 
this knowledge to advance the interests of the new state, Emperor Friedrich 
Wilhelm gave mandate to Wilhelm Von Humboldt to develop an institution that 
would bring together scholarship (still greatly influenced by mediaeval model of 
reading, rereading and commentary of texts) and research (the latter understood, at 
the time, as a venture into the unknown, not unlike the exploits of Alexander, the 
other Von Humboldt). Having exposure to both sides of academic enterprise was 
seen to combine the best elements of tradition and innovation: ensure progress by 
maintaining order; and ensure order by maintaining the rate of progress.  
 
In this sense, the ‘modern’ research university was not only coextensive with, but 
essentially co-dependent on, the development of the modern nation-state. Models 
most frequently invoked in contemporary discussions – the German research 
university and the American public university – are a case in point (Ash, 2006). 
American ‘founding fathers’ replicated the Humboldtian model not only for its 
capacity to harness innovation, but also for its capacity to foster the idea of a nation. 
The third formative influence, French ‘Napoleonic’ university, was equally, if not 
more, dependent on the state: its elite institutions (Grandes Écoles) were developed 
to provide training for public administration and other professions vital for the 
maintenance of the state apparatus, such as doctors, engineers, teachers and 
lawyers (Bourdieu, 1996; Ruegg, 2011).   
 
The coevolution of universities as institutions, and nation states in the modern, 
Westphalian sense of the term, is one of the reasons why universities so readily 
become sites of political contestation. As Jaspers (1959) argued, the ‘idea of the 
university’ is not independent from the idea of who constitutes the (relevant) 
political community, and thus who should be included in and excluded from it. The 
idea of an intimate connection between universities and the body politic was 
reflected in practices such as numerus clausus – restricting the number of available 
places on the whole or in specific degree programmes for members of specific 
groups, historically most often applied to Jews (e.g. Karady and Nagy eds., 2012) 
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– as well as, of course, principled or structural exclusion of women, ethnic 
minorities, or political dissidents from universities. Its echoes can be heard in 
contemporary debates about immigration, where migrants’ exceptional educational 
or scientific achievements are often used to argue against UK’s immigration 
policies as well as specific ways of monitoring migration (for instance, including 
students in overall migration figures). This brings us to the relationship between 
the universities and the state in the UK.    
 
One of peculiarities of the history of higher education in the UK is that the 
establishment of universities in England and Scotland predates the establishment 
of the nation state. As there was no nation in the modern, ‘Westphalian’ sense of 
the term, there was no drive to develop academia in ways that would foster its 
solidification. Instead, the early history of universities in the UK was marked by 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in relation to both secular and religious 
authority: on the one hand, the feudal state and the King; and, on the other, the 
Church. Their later history, in the 19th and into the 20th century, is marked by the 
dual dynamics of the development of Empire, on the one hand, and the provision 
of knowledge, ideas, and workforce necessary to support its expansion, 
contraction, and dissolution, on the other.   
 
Oxford, the oldest university in England (and in the English-speaking world), was 
initially established as a small centre of scholarship after Henry II temporarily 
forbade English students from attending the University in Paris (Paris had provided 
asylum to Thomas Beckett). The founding of the University of Cambridge is traced 
to the dispute (read: violent conflict) between scholars and townspeople in Oxford, 
leading a few of the former to escape and establish a separate institution in 
Cambridge. Early conflicts between ‘Town’ and ‘Gown’ resulted in the privileged 
status of the latter through penalties that Henry II imposed on townsfolk, including 
the obligation to attend annual Mass at the University Church.  
 
Oxford and Cambridge, in this sense, combined intellectual and ecclesiastic 
authority, though not always without friction. Papal bulls issued in the 13th and 14th 
centuries granted graduates ius ubique docendi (the right to teach throughout 
Christendom) and ecclesiastic independence. The Act of Supremacy in 1534, 
which separated England from Papal authority and confirmed Henry VIII as the 
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Head of the Church of England, as well as ensuing dissolution of the monasteries 
(1539-1541), brought changes to Oxford’s and Cambridge’s material fortunes – 
including the buildings and funds they had access to – but, more importantly, 
strengthened the interest of royalty in how they were run. With Protestantism and 
the Reformation came interest in humanism and Italian Renaissance, though 
scholasticism continued to thrive. More importantly, however, the social base from 
which students were recruited shifted away from clergy and towards the sons of 
gentry and rich merchants. Of course, Oxford and Cambridge have always to some 
degree drawn men from different social strata; with the solidification of the gentry 
and the rise of the mercantile class, however, their financial patronage – and thus 
their influence – became more prominent (Green, 1974, pp. 21–29).  
 
This does not mean clerical affairs were no longer of interest. Oxford and 
Cambridge remained deeply embroiled in religious disputes. John Henry (later 
Cardinal) Newman, author of The Idea of the University, was at the forefront of the 
Catholic revival at Oxford in the 19th century. While parts of this treatise most often 
cited concern the value of ‘knowledge for its own sake’, most of it is, in fact, 
devoted to the relationship of theology to (scientific) knowledge, and the position 
of Christianity in the context of university education (which he sought to affirm) 
(Newman, 1907 [1858]). Colleges, in this sense, were usually agglomerates of 
scholars with similar religious inclinations. During the 17th and 18th centuries, they 
alternated between growing and losing in fondness for the ruling ideology of the 
day; Green, for instance, describes the period between 1650 and 1800 as “decline” 
(1974, p. 28), owing particularly to the fact that Oxford and Cambridge were 
content to stick to the education of ministers in order to minimize friction with the 
state.  
 
This period is also marked by the flourishing of universities in Scotland, as well as 
in Dublin. While the first colleges in St. Andrews opened in 15th century, real 
expansion is tied to the period of the Scottish Enlightenment, with the opening of 
colleges in Glasgow and Aberdeen, and the Medical School (later Royal College 
of Physicians) in Edinburgh. Adam Smith did not pass on the opportunity to refer 
to the older universities as “sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete 
prejudices found shelter and protection” (Smith, cited in Green, 1974, p. 50). 
Owing in part to a broader (and more diverse) social base, less regulatory control, 
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and eventual abolishment of the college residency requirement, Scottish 
institutions acquired the reputation as more liberal, open, and democratic than the 
conservative and exclusionary institutions in England – adjectives that, though 
certainly disconnected from their initial context, would continue to be used to 
describe the difference between English and Scottish higher education well into the 
21st century.  
 
 Universities and the state 
 
By the beginning of the 19th century it was clear that higher learning in England 
was ripe for reform. The reform would become both extensive – in the sense of 
expanding the number of institutions of higher education – and intensive, in the 
sense of transforming the way universities were run. The main direction of reforms 
can be gleaned from Sir William Hamilton’s letter in the Edinburgh Review: “It is 
from the State only, and the Crown in particular, that we can reasonably hope for 
an academical reformation worthy of the name” (cited in Green, 1974, p. 64).  
 
The first Royal Commission to examine the state of universities was set up in 1850. 
Unsurprisingly, it encountered decisive opposition in both Oxford and Cambridge. 
In response to the commissioners’ inquiry, the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, a 
certain Dr Corrie, wrote: “I feel obliged by a sense of public duty to decline 
answering any of the questions which I had the honour to receive from you a short 
time ago” (ibid, p. 65). While Corrie – like other Oxbridge dons – eventually 
assented to the inquiry and the reforms proposed in the Parliament came to pass, 
notable in his interpretation of ‘public duty’ is the idea that ‘the public’ is not 
necessarily best represented by the Parliament, despite it being the formal 
institution established to represent public interests.  
 
Royal Commissions’ university reforms of 1854 and 1877 are commonly regarded 
as having instituted ‘seismic’ changes (cf. Bogdanor, 2010). However, they were 
performed on the explicit recognition that they should cause minimal disturbance 
to both Oxford and Cambridge. One side of this was practical: reforms needed 
donnish assent in order to work, and their direction was to a great degree an 
outcome of negotiation between the more modern elements of the universities and 
the commissioners. The other, however, was social: despite potential differences 
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in political leanings or careers, both the reformers and the reformed came out of 
same educational institutions.  
 
Vernon elaborates on the sensitivity of instituting reforms in Oxbridge: 
 
Over the centuries, Oxford and Cambridge Universities had become 
integrated with religious, social and political elites. Yet, constitutionally, 
these Universities and colleges were autonomous corporations with legal 
privileges, and the accumulated wealth to maintain their independence. What 
might induce a government to interfere with what were effectively arms of 
its own authority? Their very intimacy with the establishment, however, 
meant that the universities constituted a political issue that could not easily 
be ignored. Similarly, their wealth and privileges, and oligopoly in the 
educational world, meant that they could not be regarded simply as private 
concerns. Thus, if it was felt that the universities were failing to fulfil their 
functions as national institutions, governments had a responsibility at least to 
encourage them to do so. Even so, state intervention sat uneasily with early 
nineteenth century governments, especially when dealing with institutions of 
such long-standing status … Building on internal pressure, state activity was 
primarily devoted to providing a framework within which reform could take 
place (2004, p.10).  
 
Some of the defining characteristics of the configuration of higher education in 
England were therefore already in place at the start of the Victorian Era. Oxford 
and Cambridge had begun to turn away from the insular, monastic model of 
scholarship that sought to reduce or minimize contact with the society that 
surrounded them. They were, much like other social institutions, embracing ‘public 
good’ as the framework for justification and main source of legitimacy. However, 
the academic oligarchy that presided over England’s oldest universities reserved 
the right to know or define for themselves what ‘the greatest good of the greatest 
number’ was supposed to mean. This, in addition to the high degree of 
intermingling between intellectual and political elites, meant that state-driven 
reforms could only proceed slowly and with a great degree of deference towards 
universities. From this perspective, it is not particularly surprising that the main 
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route for the transformation of English higher education led not through Oxford 
and Cambridge, but around them.  
 
The University of Durham, based on the Oxbridge collegiate model, was 
established in 1832 and awarded a Royal Charter in 1837. The University of 
London was created through the incorporation of University and King’s Colleges 
in 1836. Its establishment was beset with controversy, not only because of their 
different take on religious matters (University College was non-denominational, 
King’s fervently Anglican), but also because its purpose was not entirely clear. 
Initially, the University of London was set up only in order to administer 
examinations: in other words, it was providing a much-needed centralized service 
of certification and awarding of qualifications to the burgeoning stratum of middle-
class professionals. By mid-19th century, however, the pressure on the University 
of London to teach its own programmes had increased, reflecting the growing 
demand for higher qualifications delivered away from Oxford and Cambridge. 
Discussions and negotiations on how best to organize this went on for years, 
without reaching conclusion; multiple royal commissions were set up. The last, 
Cowper Commission, managed to combine dual needs: a teaching institution for 
London, and an examining one for the expanding Empire (Vernon 2004, p. 79). It 
took a concerted push from two prominent intellectuals at the time, however, to 
implement the reform: one was R.B. Haldane; the other was Sydney Webb.  
 
Haldane and Webb combined some of the most prominent characteristics of the 
nascent middle class at the time. Haldane was a Liberal, educated at Göttingen, 
from which he took a fascination with Humboldtian approach to higher education. 
The influence of the Humboldtian concepts of autonomy and academic freedom is 
reflected in the ‘Haldane principle’ (1918), which proposed that funding decisions 
related to academic research should be made by academics. Webb was a Fabian 
socialist, primarily interested in education as a means of improving the condition 
of the working class and alleviating poverty, who also went on to establish the 
London School of Economics (LSE). The University of London reflected both; an 
influence of idealism and ‘higher learning’ in philosophy and the arts, and more 
practical, utilitarian orientation adapted to the needs of the developing society in 
fields such as economics or engineering: 
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The move towards industrialization and a society based more upon 
machinery than crops meant that those engaged in this work required some 
kind of training, no matter how elementary, to operate in this new sphere (…) 
skills had to be learnt, at worst by recruitment to the exploited work force, at 
best by instruction and examination…there was an upsurge of the new 
professions, new ventures through joint stock companies, new careers and 
fortunes to be made, for which an education at the ancient universities, or no 
education at all, was unsuited (Shinn, 1986, p. 19).   
 
The 19th century thus brought profound change on several fronts. The French 
Revolution left a belief in the importance of enfranchisement and extension of 
political rights to ‘the masses’ – not least, in order to secure order – and education 
was a means of inculcating basic skills, such as reading and writing, needed to 
exercise these rights. Reading and writing also enabled participation in the 
developing ‘public sphere’, fostering the appetite for news and commentary on 
current affairs. The seeds of the expansion of higher education, in this sense, grew 
in the same pot as the seeds of critique: in the idea of a shared political space.  
 
The future of this polity was increasingly reliant on knowledge of the physical 
forces responsible for processes such as combustion, which fueled its technological 
development. England’s supremacy in trade and technology had seemed secure 
until the Great Exhibition of 1851, when the advances of other nations, especially 
Prussia, became clear. It did not take much to connect Prussia’s impressive 
technological development with the reform associated with Von Humboldt. The 
idea of ‘civic’ universities, as a crossover between studium generale – no longer 
aimed at indulging theological or other less spiritual interests of the sons of the 
wealthy, but the future civil servants, engineers, and explorers – and practically-
oriented education, originated here. The needs of the burgeoning Empire could no 
longer be served solely either by the duopoly of Oxford and Cambridge, or by the 
board of examiners in London.  
 
The expansion of civic, ‘redbrick’ universities is synonymous with the expansion 
of regional, largely industrial, centres (Whyte, 2015). Victoria University in 
Manchester, developing on the foundations of Owens College – established thanks 
to the endowment of a wealthy Manchester merchant – and incorporating the 
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Manchester school of medicine, received a royal charter in 1881 (Vernon, 2004). 
Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield and Bristol followed in quick succession. The 
University of Wales, with colleges in Cardiff, Aberystwyth, and Bangor, was 
established in 1893. Initially, most of these institutions were set up as subsidiaries 
of larger regional centres; during the course of the 20th century, most acquired royal 
charters of their own. 
 
This underlines the importance the state had begun placing on higher learning. 
Oxford and Cambridge had grown ‘organically’, at times only cursorily connected 
to, and at times explicitly positioned against, the interests of the state. Two oldest 
British universities were, in a manner of speaking, older than the British Empire. 
By the start of the 20th century, however, the state had more than done its share to 
shift the balance towards a more centralized system of institutions delivering higher 
degrees. A more centralized system also called for tighter regulation. A more 
expansive one, at the same time, required new funding arrangements. The 
development of higher education in the UK in the 20th century will, to a great 
degree, be defined by these – at times opposing, at times converging – tendencies.  
 
20th century 
 
The most remarkable development in British higher education in the early 20th 
century was the establishment of the University Grants Committee (UGC). Initially 
proposed in a report by a commission chaired by Haldane in 1904, the Treasury 
formally established the UGC in 1919. In this sense, the UGC was part of the 
broader reconstruction process in the aftermath of World War I, in part to prepare 
for the expansion of the sector to include ex-servicemen and the growing number 
of secondary-school entrants, in part to ensure state aid – because grants were 
classified as aid – would be distributed in the most rational way possible. At its 
founding, the UGC had “no statutory basis or powers, no bank account, no income-
generating capacity, and no grant [was] made to it” (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p. 
70). Its primary purpose was to distribute funding allocated by the Treasury. At 
that point, state aid constituted not more than one third of universities’ income – 
the remaining two-thirds coming from the combination of endowments and local 
authorities’ funds.  
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Yet, even this change was monumental from universities’ standpoint. In 1920, the 
Oxford Magazine carried a letter that compared the introduction of government 
funding with the effects of the Royal Commissions’ reform in the 18th century. The 
concerned writer argued: 
 
The academical year which is now closing has witnessed three gigantic 
changes, which will slowly turn the course of the University into new 
channels. The accumulated effect will be as momentous in the eyes of future 
generations as that of the First Commission. I refer to the abolition of 
compulsory Greek, the admission of women to membership and degrees of 
the University, and the acceptance of money from a government department 
(1920, cited in Bogdanor, 2010).  
 
Possibly for this reason, during the first two decades the UGC clearly deferred to 
universities, with no question about who was more powerful in the relationship:  
 
Up to 1939, the universities dictated the terms of the ideological climate 
within which any discussion of the universities took place. Academics, civil 
servants and politicians alike considered it perfectly natural that the state 
should be very much the subordinate partner…and that the administrative 
arrangements should reflect that subordinate position (Salter and Tapper, 
1994, p. 107).  
 
This does not mean UGC’s hands were tied. Its role was that of an intermediary, 
left to channel the conversation between universities and the state in the way 
thought most appropriate to the order of things – in which universities were an 
important political actor of their own right. Unsurprisingly, this conversation had 
more than a touch of an ‘in-house’ quality. Members of the UGC and of the 
Treasury belonged to the same club (not just metaphorically: many frequented the 
Athenaeum in London), sharing “unwritten conventions and the personal and 
social relations of a homogeneous community of university men, in and out of 
government, who share common tastes and a common outlook” (Dodds et al., cited 
in Salter and Tapper, p. 105).  
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In other words, the peaceable arrangement between universities and the state 
derived not so much from an alliance of political interests, as from cultural and 
social – read class – homogeneity, with UGC mostly successfully ‘smoothing out’ 
ripples. So it remained until, as well as in the first decade after, World War II. 
Recovery from devastation caused by the war, the Suez crisis, and the beginning 
of the process of decolonization all meant that universities were ‘off the radar’ for 
a while. Yet, it was obvious this would not last. The society was changing rapidly; 
British universities would have to follow. 
 
The second half of the 20th century gave rise to two elements that would 
substantially shape contemporary discussions concerning the role of the university. 
One relates to expansion, and mass attainment, of higher education; the 1944 
Education Act introduced universal secondary schooling (Bathmaker, 2003) and 
thus formally opened the pathway to higher education for an unprecedented 
proportion of the population. The second concerns the introduction of 
measurement, which presented a first step towards a fully developed system of 
performance assessment. To a great degree, this happened in the interstice of two 
reports: one is known by the name of Lord Robbins; the other is known as the 
Jarratt report.  
 
 
Robbins to Jarratt 
 
Not unlike Newton’s Idea of the University, the way in which the Robbins report 
is remembered does not necessarily reflect the full extent of its arguments. In 
contemporary discussions, Robbins is most often associated with opening up 
university education to “all who qualified by ability or attainment” – in other 
words, with being the precursor to massification and democratization of higher 
education (Robbins, 1963). Yet, political history as well as legacy of the committee 
and its recommendations is more complicated; some elements of it exhibit 
characteristics that will remain a prominent element of social dynamics 
underpinning the discussions in the sector to the present day.  
 
The Robbins committee met from 1961 to 1963. It was preceded by the Anderson 
committee, which addressed student finance in view of the expanding number of 
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secondary-school graduates. Robbins’ initial mandate was to “review the pattern 
of full-time higher education” (Robbins, 1963, Preamble), and propose principles 
for its long-term development, including the question of institutional and numerical 
expansion. Rapid industrialization and expansion, not to mention population 
growth, required, it was argued, a more skilled labour force. The report’s celebrated 
formulation – to open higher education “to all who qualify, by ability or 
attainment” (Robbins, 1963, p. 48, art. 133–4) – was, in the first instance, simply 
an acknowledgment of demographic and social trends, which were creating a much 
broader pool of potential applicants than would have been the case thirty or fifty 
years prior. Secondly, and this is where the report did fall more in step with its 
time, it was also an acknowledgment that existing institutions of higher education 
were not necessarily conducive to this expansion. In other words, while possibly 
performing well in terms of educating those who qualified ‘by attainment’ – which, 
in this context, meant by the virtue of previous education – they were, possibly, not 
including everyone who qualified by ability. This represented an important step 
towards equating social justice with governmental intervention: the implication 
was that, left to their own devices, universities were unlikely to work towards this 
goal.   
 
The third and most important contribution of the report, less visible because it was 
bordering on obvious, was to, for the first time, conceptualise higher education as 
a system and thus a distinct domain of public policy. In 1964, the UGC officially 
became part of the newly created Department of Education and Science (DES) 
(Tight, 2009). Instead of a set of disparate universities and colleges, with their 
histories, traditions (or lack thereof), and institutional trajectories, higher learning 
became a matter for the nation-state – and, consequently, its development deemed 
relevant for the well-being of its citizens on the whole, not just for the (still small) 
proportion of those who attended them. This is how the expansion and 
massification of higher education became the main ‘lever’ for governmental 
intervention into university governance. Universities, particularly Oxford and 
Cambridge, could only accept the idea of becoming part of a system under the aegis 
of a central government if this brought benefits. In return, the government 
committed to financing higher education on previously unprecedented scale. In 
addition, it pledged to open new institutions, in order to satisfy what was projected 
to be growing demand. The essence of the ‘social compact’ between the university 
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and the state, thus, was always a tradeoff between expansion and funding. 
Universities accepted public money, but had to, in principle, accede to the fact that 
the source of that money – the taxpayer – may now have a say in how it should be 
spent.   
 
The end of the 1960s was marked by pronounced growth, on two fronts: total 
number of students (from 217,000 in 1962–3 to 376,000 in 1967–8), and the 
number of institutions. The degree of expansion, exceeding even Robinson’s 
projections, should not come as much of a surprise. In a society as classed and yet 
as socially immobile as the UK, with high inbound and almost non-existent 
outbound migration, university degrees offered a rare opportunity to increase 
economic, social, and cultural capital – at least by proxy. The model of ‘ancient’ 
universities, both conceptually and spatially, reflected the assumption that students 
needed to live and socialize away from the environment they came from. Higher 
education, thus, had not just an intellectual, but also an enculturating function: it 
aimed to equalize the cultural and social capital of those who participated in it, 
‘elevating’ non-traditional entrants to the status and social tastes of the more 
traditional ones. In this sense, it emulated, to a large degree, Oxford and 
Cambridge; soon it would become clear that the model that had initially been 
developed in order to distinguish the elite could not be seamlessly transposed to 
the rest of society.  
 
In order to solve this problem, the government established a new form of tertiary 
education: polytechnics. Thirty-one were founded in 1960s and the 1970s, often 
expanding from (or integrating) local colleges of advanced technology (CATs). 
They were marked by a different focus – more technical and applied, less liberal 
arts-oriented; they were also explicitly aimed towards attracting students from the 
local area. The expansion of applied higher education, thus, was also an attempt to 
move away from the residential model that characterized Oxbridge and ‘redbricks’. 
In the speech that inaugurated what would come to be known as the ‘binary policy’, 
Anthony Crosland – Minister of, at that point, newly elected Labour government – 
presented a curious mix of social differentiation and social mobility.  
 
Crosland endorsed the division of higher education into “what has come to be 
called the autonomous sector, represented by the universities”, and “the public 
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sector, represented by the leading technical colleges and colleges of education” 
(Crosland, Speech at Woolwich Polytechnic, 1965). However, explaining why the 
government supported this system, he explicitly stated the objective was to avoid 
academic drift,  
 
(…) with Universities at the top and the other institutions down 
below…characterized by the constant rat-race to reach the First or University 
division, a constant pressure from those below to ape the Universities above, 
and a certain inevitable failure to achieve diversity in higher education the 
society needs (ibid).  
 
While bringing universities under the wing of the state, Crosland was also clear 
that the main role in educating the public was to be performed by polytechnics and 
CATs. Universities were to remain self-governing; at this point, the government 
had not yet tried to manage them directly, developing instead a parallel sector in 
order to extend higher education to a wider population. It also established the Open 
University, which aimed to further open access to higher education through 
correspondence-based learning, or education at a distance.  
 
Enthusiastic expansion in the 1960s was followed by contraction. Student numbers 
fell: for a variety of reasons, demand was not conforming to the projected figures. 
A much more important reduction, however, was in the domain of funding. Stewart 
noted that “From 1974 to 1977 every kind of university grant (…) was withheld 
wholly or in part at some point…This was generally agreed to be the worst 
financial crisis experienced by all universities in peacetime and it came when 
sixteen new ones were hoping to build strength” (1989, p. 162). As 
deindustrialization progressed, job losses and inflation gave rise to growing social 
insecurity and sense of discontent, reflected, among other things, in recurrent 
strikes of workers in the public sector. Neither the Labour not Conservative 
governments managed to do much about the economic downturn. Economic trends 
only became a precursor to a deeper transformation of the relationship between the 
universities and the state.   
 
Universities in England were established by (in the case of Oxford and Cambridge, 
given) Royal Charters. In the context of the administrative apparatus of the state, 
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this meant that the highest authority concerning university governance was the 
Privy Council. Expectedly, however, the Council remained largely uninvolved in 
day-to-day management, using its visitation rights only as a formal guarantee of 
the right of the Crown and the Parliament to have a say in university matters. But, 
with the extension of financial support, followed the extension of power. UGC 
suddenly became subject to demands for reporting: 
 
When a grant in aid represents the major source of income of an organisation, 
the normal rule is that the organisation is required to render its accounts to 
the Comptroller and Auditor General for audit, or to grant him access to its 
books and records, so that he can report to Parliament on matters of financial 
administration and control…Expenditure by the universities is at present the 
sole major exception to this rule (Committee of Public Accounts, 1967, cited 
in Salter and Tapper, 1994., p. 42, my emphasis).  
 
In the 1970s, the Treasury started for the first time actually monitoring expenditure 
on universities. Though different authors disagree about the degree to which the 
waves of student protest in the 1960s (which, in all cases, had limited resonance in 
the UK, when compared to France, Czechoslovakia, and the US) played a role in 
the rise of audit, it makes sense to assume that successive governments were on 
watch in order to prevent campus politics from going haywire, especially after the 
discovery of the Cambridge spy ring in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Warwick 
University occupation that E.P. Thompson described in Warwick University, Ltd. 
(Thompson, 2014 [1970]). The degree to which the introduction of this oversight 
was seen as departure from ‘business as usual’ is reflected in the following 
anecdote. In a meeting of the Expenditure Committee, Chairman of the Science 
Research Council was asked to explain why the council was funding postgraduate 
research. He responded: “My answer to your question why we do it when perhaps 
it is a bit illogical that we should – I quite agree – is that, if we had not, nobody 
would have done so” (Select Committee on Expenditure, 1973, xxviii, cited in 
Salter and Tapper, 1994, p. 44).  
 
Historically speaking, the roots of what critics will dub ‘audit’ lay in the need to 
justify this growing public expenditure on higher education. Yet accountability was 
never the only issue. The commitment of consecutive governments to cut public 
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spending meant that increasing insight into how universities were using 
government-dispensed grants was always with the intent of if not reducing, then at 
least redistributing public funds. The suspicion with which academics viewed any 
attempt at governmental oversight, as the anonymous gentleman cited earlier in the 
chapter, who ranked it alongside the admission of women in terms of 
disruptiveness, was not entirely unjustified. 
 
The precursor to what would become the practice of systematic assessment and 
review of higher education was the Jarratt report, published in 1985 and 
commissioned by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (later 
Universities UK). This was the first direct review of university management and 
other practices conducted by an external public committee; some would describe 
it as a ‘pre-emptive’ or defensive strategy, meant to give universities advantage in 
surveying the sector. However, Jarratt came at the tail end of a longer trend in 
transforming the relationship between universities and the government. Austerity 
and what will come to be known as New Public Management only provided an 
ideological framing (and, possibly, justification) for a more substantial 
restructuring.  
 
New Public Management 
 
As an ideology and a style of governing, New Public Management (NPM) has been 
extensively written about, mostly from a critical perspective. This approach to 
public services was motivated by the desire to cut public spending, which, in turn, 
was predicated on a set of economic and social policies that will come to be 
associated with neoliberalism. While NPM in the UK is first and foremost 
connected to the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher (and later John 
Major), the introduction of increased governmental oversight was a longer and 
more complex process. Thatcher’s encounter with neoliberalism, as many critics 
argue, came through reading Friedrich Hayek (Evans, 2004; Gamble, 1994). 
Regardless of the degree of influence of the writing of Mont Pelerin society (see 
Ledger, 2018, p. 2), it makes sense to recognize that NPM was a bureaucratic 
technology at least as much as an economic ideology (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994).  
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Thatcher’s election in 1979 followed a series of public sector employees’ strikes 
and a growing economic crisis. Therefore, it is not surprising that cutting public 
expenditure, which formed the backbone of the political programme of the new 
Government, was going to extend to funds earmarked for higher education. Cuts 
were primarily envisaged in two forms: funding of international students – whose 
subsidies were progressively withdrawn – and expenditure on home students, 
which the Government had committed to reduce by 8.5% by 1983–4 (Perraton, 
2014). The reforms will reach their height with the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
which effectively abolished tenure by allowing dismissal of university staff on 
grounds of redundancy. The act also wrestled the control of polytechnics from local 
education authorities (LEAs).  
 
For universities, the greatest shift was the abolishment of the University Grants 
Committee, and its replacement with the Universities Funding Council (UFC). To 
some academics, this constituted an outright attack: “The 1979–83 government 
attacked higher education without real thought of the consequences, and the UGC 
implemented government policies too loyally and on particularly narrow and 
socially unresponsive criteria” (Kogan and Kogan 1983, p.110). This reading also 
conveys a shift in the perception of the role of the UGC, from a ‘defender’ of 
universities to instrument of governmental ideology. Its replacement with the UFC, 
therefore, was not just semantic. UGC used to make sure that the relationship 
between the government and universities retained a friendly character. UFC was of 
a somewhat different nature. No longer composed of former academics, it was 
instead a proper bureaucratic body. Universities, in this sense, lost a long-held 
position of equal (if not dominant) partner in determining the direction of higher 
education policy. Instead, they became constituents: a sector like any other, with 
interests and channels for lobbying, but no longer with a privileged position from 
which to do so. The assumption of automatic convergence between the political 
and the intellectual elite was broken.  
 
Some critics ascribe Thatcher’s alleged animosity towards universities to her 
experience at Oxford (e.g. Edwards, 1989), where she was reportedly exposed to 
ridicule for her accent and lower-middle-class antics. Regardless of the value of 
biography-based policy analysis, this interpretation speaks to a broader trend: the 
political and intellectual elite no longer necessarily had shared dispositions. 
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Obviously, in many cases the ruling stratum was still recruited from Oxford and 
Cambridge, thus ensuring the continuity of ‘in-house conversation’. But the fact 
that the Prime Minister, despite having gone to Oxford, did not partake in the 
habitus of its elite, meant that the days of easy alignment between interests of the 
government and that of universities were over. 
 
Education Reform Act of 1988, the first substantive piece of educational legislation 
introduced by Thatcher’s government, initiated this through reinforcing the 
position of statutory commissioners to assist in the rewriting of university statutes 
to allow for the dismissal of academic staff on the basis of redundancy. In practice, 
whereas previous grounds for dismissal would normally fall in the domain of 
serious violation of code of conduct, triggering a lengthy disciplinary procedure 
(and, certainly, often did not happen at all) – this, for the first time, put universities 
– and that means university management – in the position to say staff were no 
longer needed. It turned the lever for the development of higher education 
decisively away from academic self-governance: whereas, previously, universities 
were more-or-less built around the preferences, agendas, and research interests of 
scholars, in this new arrangement, academics were becoming more like regular 
employees, serving the interests of the enterprise.  
 
Importantly, then, from an independent position set to provide a buffer between 
universities and the state, Commissioners turned into an instrument of the latter – 
one aimed at destroying the employment security of university staff, at that. This 
led John Akker of the Association of University Teachers (AUT) to assert that “the 
appointment of Commissioners…represents a very pronounced encroachment by 
the State” (cited in Salter and Tapper, 1994, p. 67, my emphasis). The fact that this 
was felt to be an encroachment reflects the degree to which the assumption that 
universities are self-governing was a natural starting point. When the state wanted 
to manage, in other words, it did so via polytechnics and CATs; universities, by 
and large, were left to handle their own affairs. Yet even this, most hallowed of 
distinctions, was going to change.  
 
The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act abolished the distinction between 
education provided by universities and that provided by colleges of further 
education, allowing 35 polytechnics existing at the time to acquire the status of 
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universities (usually referred to as ‘new’ or ‘post-1992’). It also further reformed 
financing, replacing the UFC with the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) and corresponding funding councils for Scotland and Wales. 
The distinction was at the time primarily symbolical, in view of the broader process 
of devolution; later on, however, it will acquire additional political significance, 
with the differentiation of tuition fee regimes. Last, but by no means least, the 1992 
Act introduced the practice of periodic research assessment: Research Assessment 
Exercise, later known as the Research Excellence Framework.  
 
Tight argues “market rhetoric and associated behaviours were by now firmly 
embedded among senior academic managers and central university staff, even 
though the sector hardly behaved like a conventional market” (2004, p. 83); Trow 
similarly noted that “since government controls the price universities can place on 
their services, and the amount and variety of services they can sell, universities 
currently operate not in a market but in something more like a command economy” 
(1996, p. 310). The ‘managed market’ approach can be seen as a strategy of 
balancing relative scarcity with relative abundance. In this case, the abundance 
related to the number of institutions and growing numbers of students; the scarcity 
to the absence of funds to support their further expansion, at the time when trends 
in employment were suggesting the demand for higher and further education was 
going to grow. Periodic reviews or assessments became the prime instrument for 
measuring the efficiency of spending and influencing the future direction of policy.  
 
The first research assessment exercise (RAE) was conducted in 1998, initially 
introduced in order to provide a ‘benchmark’ against which to measure the quality 
of universities’ research output. The obvious motivation for the RAE was the need 
to distinguish between pre- and post-1992 institutions; as university status as the 
instrument of classification was abolished, research performance was the next-best 
proxy. The universities, predictably, were not particularly pleased by the direction 
in which the sector was going. From the happy days of growth mediated by the 
UGC as a reliable buffer between the government and the universities, the sector 
was facing not only the prospect of economic scarcity, but also a future in which 
government funding was becoming conditional on their performance. Higher 
education in the UK became, in a manner of speaking, a victim of its own success: 
massive expansion – establishment of new institutions, removal of barriers to entry 
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and, finally, extension of university status to polytechnics – made the vast majority 
of the sector vitally reliant on public funding.  
 
The balance of power had fundamentally shifted. This lead Salter and Tapper to 
observe: 
 
 After decades of incremental progress, the state has acquired powers which 
mark a qualitative shift in its relationship with the institutions of higher 
education. It is now in the position to orchestrate change on a scale and in a 
manner that knows no precedent (1994, p. 1).  
 
New Labour, same neoliberalism? 
 
Many hoped the landslide victory of the Labour Party headed by Tony Blair in the 
1997 would herald a sea-change in higher education policy (Brown, 2003). After 
all, Blair had famously designated “education, education, education” Party’s 
priorities in the election campaign (Finlayson, 2003). The emphasis on learning 
and soft skills went well with New Labour’s focus on moving away from reliance 
on industry – which had been devastated equally through technological 
obsolescence and the Conservative policy of outsourcing labour to China and other 
Asian markets – by creating an economy based on knowledge, populated by highly 
flexible, mobile individuals.    
 
New Labour’s project of a ‘knowledge-based’ economy was never a purely 
economic one (Hay, 1999; Finlayson, 2003; Crouch, 2004). On the one hand, of 
course, it was adapting to realities of a post-Fordist, largely globalized world of 
intersecting trade routes, one where Britain no longer had necessarily preferential 
access to the goods produced in former colonies. Focusing on knowledge and 
knowledge industries, in this sense, was also a way to retain a fraction of its 
competitive advantage in global markets: Britain no longer had mines or factories, 
but it certainly had universities. On the other, knowledge (or information) was also 
a way of governing the polity, both in terms of knowing its population, and in terms 
of allowing it to have more direct access to policy-making. This political vision 
was one of constant, uninterrupted communication: the citizens were to inform the 
Government about their preferences; the Government was to inform them about its 
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intentions, not necessarily on the scale of fiscal or foreign policy – in fact, those 
decisions were usually kept away from public scrutiny, as in the case of the Iraq 
War – but certainly on the level of participation. As Finlayson notes, 
 
Constitutional reform has been seen as the beginning of an unstoppable 
movement towards new forms of pluralism, decentralization and civil 
engagement that will break conservative hegemony and allow new forms of 
radical politics to emerge. Directly elected mayors for London, and some 
other large cities, may increase awareness of the relevance of municipal 
action. Citizenship classes in schools surely suggest an interest in revitalizing 
the democratic tendencies of our society, while devolution of Westminster 
power forms a key plank in what the Blairites sometimes call ‘re-connecting’ 
with the people (2003, p. 104).   
 
The idea, therefore, was to ‘fix’ the crisis of representative democracy by 
pluralizing the arenas for public discussion and debate. New Labour, in this sense, 
can be seen as the last stage of belief in a truly democratic, Habermasian public 
sphere, with a vibrant civil society (Giddens, 1998; Blair, 1998). Information 
technologies, from the promise of the World Wide Web to e-governance, were 
designed to circumvent the problems of parliamentary, party politics. Participation 
in the public sphere obviously required a population capable not only of using new 
technologies, but also navigating this increasingly complex world. This is why 
education was deemed to be of utmost importance: it was the solution to both 
Britain’s position in the world, and political dilemmas at home.  
Yet, Labour did not encounter a blank policy landscape. The National Committee 
of Inquiry into Higher Education, chaired by Lord Dearing, was commissioned in 
1996 in order to provide a major review of the state and future direction of higher 
education in the UK, the first such report after Robbins. Importantly, the committee 
had been set up by both sides of the bench, in order to remove the issue of higher 
education funding from the 1997 election campaign. The reasons were clear. 
Student numbers had expanded significantly: from 15% in 1988 to 35% in 1998 
(McGettigan, 2013, p. 17). However, expansion was mostly done ‘on the cheap’; 
that is, by reducing the unit (per student) cost, mostly through enrolments in ‘new’ 
universities, that is, former polytechnics (Clark, Conlon and Galindo-Rueda, 
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2005). Furthermore, the growth in total enrolment did not necessarily mean a 
significant change in the social composition of students. The proportion of those 
from working-class backgrounds remained stable, or actually fell (Chitty, 2014, p. 
205). The question the new government faced, therefore, was how to continue 
expanding higher education on a shrinking public budget. The fact that widening 
participation was by then almost unequivocally accepted as a desirable policy 
orientation should not detract from the fact that neither of the parties had committed 
to increasing public expenditure.  
From this point of view, the Teaching and Higher Education Act of 1998 comes as 
less of a surprise. The Act introduced tuition fees (initially for all students, though 
the Scottish Parliament abolished them for Scottish universities soon after 
devolution), abolished maintenance grants, and revised the provision of student 
loans. The response from teachers’ and student unions was predictably damning, 
with admissions services reporting an almost immediate drop in enrolments, most 
among part-time, mature, and minority students (Chitty 2014, p.206). The full 
extent of the shift to market mechanisms, however, would only be revealed in the 
much-awaited 2003 White Paper, The Future of Higher Education. The White 
Paper announced that universities would be allowed to charge ‘top-up’ fees of up 
to £3000 per year for the most popular courses, with a clear intention of removing 
this cap further down the line.  
 
Reactions to this to a great degree controversial idea are indicative of the 
configuration in the higher education landscape that had begun to emerge. After 
150 Labour MPs signed a motion against the Higher Education Bill that proposed 
‘top-up’ fees, Vice-Chancellors of five UK’s most prestigious universities (Oxford, 
Cambridge, LSE, UCL and Imperial) wrote a letter to The Times urging Tony Blair 
to ‘no[t] retreat’ over fees, claiming that fees were necessary to maintain the quality 
of UK higher education (Halpin, 2003). They also threatened to resort to recruiting 
more ‘overseas’ students should they be banned from charging ‘top-up’ fees in 
order to make up for the anticipated shortfall in income (Chitty, 2014, pp. 210–1). 
The ‘professionalization’ of university management had begun in the late 1990s, 
but they were still overwhelmingly recruited from academic ranks, placing the UK 
in the category Burton Clark dubbed ‘collegial governance’. During the course of 
the 2000s, however, vice-chancellors and heads of schools and departments 
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increasingly came from outside of the university sector (Deem, Hillyard and Reed, 
2007). While many were (former) academics, their experience usually included the 
private sector, industry, or politics.  
 
The position of university managers, therefore, was ambiguous. On the one hand, 
they were placed at the helm of the university, in charge of its sustainability 
(including financial) and wellbeing, and thus also the first line of ‘defence’ against 
possible interference from ‘outside’. On the other, they were also – especially by 
academics – increasingly seen as conduits or enablers of exactly these forces. This 
institutionalised an important rupture: the welfare of the university was no longer 
seen exclusively (nor, it could be argued, primarily) in terms of the wellbeing of 
its students and staff. Rather, it became synonymous with the financial 
sustainability of the institution. This enabled the managers to distinguish the two 
and, in situations of perceived ‘threat’, sacrifice former to the latter, as in the case 
of arguing for tuition fees (a clear disadvantage for students) and justifying it as a 
matter of quality of teaching delivered by the institution.  
 
After the Higher Education Bill was passed in 2004 the new configuration of the 
higher education landscape became clear. On one side were the government and its 
policy of ‘market welfarism’, which suited the leadership of elite universities, who 
expected they would not encounter problems attracting students even at an 
increased fee. On the other were unions, disaffected Labour MPs, and all those 
feeling ‘shortchanged’ by the new policy direction. In 2005, two hitherto largest 
trade unions for university staff (AUT and NTFHE) merged, creating University 
and College Union (UCU). In part, this was driven by the growing realization of 
the problem of casualization. While ‘tenure’, in the strict sense of the word, had 
ceased to exist in the UK with the 1988 Education Reform Act, the second half of 
2000s was marked by an expansion of numbers of casually employed and sessional 
teachers11.  
 
11 As UCU reports (2013, 2015, 2016) have argued (and my own research confirms), it is very 
difficult to provide exact figures, as data-keeping is problematic and beset by controversies, in part 
because UK’s Higher Education Statistics Agency only began gathering data on the type of contract 
in the past two years (most of which is still obscured by the ‘atypical contract’ category), and in 
part because universities have seemingly systematically under-reported the reliance on casual 
labour. Yet, as UCU (2018) clearly states, at least 25% of undergraduate teaching at universities is 
currently performed by casually employed (hourly- or termly-paid) academics. The Russell Group 
universities usually have a higher reliance on casual labour than ‘post-1992’ institutions.  
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The end of the reign of New Labour saw a university sector primed for full 
marketization. Financing and the question of value-for-money figured prominently 
in the 2010 General Election. Liberal Democrats, in particular, campaigned for the 
student vote on the claim they would not remove the cap on tuition fees, something 
both Labour and Conservatives were expected to do. While clearly successful as 
an electoral strategy, the promise turned out to be little more than that: after 
entering the Coalition government with Conservatives, they quickly went back on 
it.  
 
 
 REF and TEF 
 
Like Labour in 1997, the new Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition did not 
inherit a blank slate. Another review, commissioned before the elections but set to 
deliver in its aftermath, was to provide a solution for the funding of higher 
education in the wake of the economic crisis. This is something that the Browne 
Review (Browne, 2010), report of the committee chaired by Baron Browne of 
Madingley, former chief of BP, certainly took into account. The review was 
published in October 2010, recommending a series of changes, most important 
being the removal of caps on tuition fees and the replacement of student grants 
with student loans.  
 
When David Willetts, Minister of State for Universities and Science, announced 
the government’s policy early in November of the same year, Browne’s 
recommendations were not followed in full. Importantly, Willetts’ announcement 
diverged on the issue of fee caps – not removing them altogether but raising them 
to £9000. The purpose of this much-debated and criticized move was to allow 
universities to set prices in accordance with what they perceived was the real value 
of courses they offered, with the expectation this would lead to a ‘natural’ 
hierarchical distribution in which the most expensive courses at the most 
prestigious institutions would set fees at the top of the scale, with less prestigious 
ones leveraging their presumably smaller appeal with lower fees.  
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This is how the idea of university autonomy was directly linked to the idea of the 
market: universities were ‘free’ – but to set prices within a narrowly defined range 
of market behaviours. Another move that cemented the unpopularity of the 
proposal was the abolishment of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA). 
Introduced in the 1960s, EMA provided a means-tested support to young people 
from poorer backgrounds to continue into higher education. Student loans, which 
also offered a ‘top-up’ living allowance, were meant to replace this: however, it 
was obvious that higher education financing had been set on a trajectory of no 
return.   
 
The biggest student protest in Britain to date broke out shortly after. On 10th 
November 2010, the student march set off from the Parliament but, changing 
course, occupied the headquarters of the Conservative Party in Millbank. The 
protesters made clear their opposition not only to tuition fees, but to the austerity 
agenda on the whole. Not only did students show a remarkable degree of radicality, 
but the responses to it were remarkable as well, for a number of reasons. The 
Government deployed riot police, which applied the strategy known as ‘kettling’ 
to prevent the protests from spreading in the streets of London, as well as tear gas 
and batons, a degree of force highly uncommon in student demonstrations in the 
UK (Brock and Carrigan, 2015). The polarization on the Left became visible when 
both the general secretary of the UCU (University and College Union) and 
president of the NUS (National Union of Students) condemned the protests, 
denouncing the violence of a ‘handful of protesters’, opting to focus instead on the 
quiet, ‘backdoor’ route: lobbying Liberal Democrat MPs in the period leading up 
to the vote on fees (Myers, 2018). Last, but not least, cleavages were showing in 
the Coalition, with even some Conservative MPs announcing their intention to vote 
against fees.     
 
While it would probably be incorrect to frame it as his ‘brainchild’, the policy 
nevertheless should be understood in relation to David Willetts’ views on social 
justice. Educated at Nuffield College, Oxford, Willetts rose through the ranks of 
the Conservative Party thanks in part to the recognition of his intellectual potential, 
reportedly earning him the nickname ‘Two Brains’. His career reflected his interest 
in politics as theory rather than just practice: after working for Margaret Thatcher 
in the Downing Street Policy Unit, he went on to establish and serve as the director 
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of studies at the Centre for Policy Studies, a liberal-conservative think tank. 
Throughout this period, he continued to publish treatises and papers on different 
aspects of social and economic policy, seeking to furnish – or shape – Conservative 
ideology, which had been struggling to rediscover its raison d’être for some time 
(e.g. Willetts, 1992).  
 
The Pinch: How the baby boomers took their children’s future – and why they 
should give it back (Willets, 2010) presented his argument that higher education 
was effectively subsidizing the middle class. The book uses statistics to show that 
students enrolling into higher education and accessing student loans were more 
likely to come from affluent parts of the middle class. This meant that, as long as 
higher education was funded from public money, benefits disproportionally 
accrued to those who were already able to afford it – according to Willetts, children 
of the 1960s and 1970s ‘baby boomer’ generation. From this perspective, tuition 
fees were a ‘levelling’ instrument designed to create a fairer set of opportunities, 
by setting a relatively high repayment threshold and additional grants available to 
the most underprivileged. Rather than ‘purely’ neoliberal, then, these reforms 
presented a peculiar mix of market fundamentalism and social justice. This places 
Coalition policies on a political continuum with, rather than a decisive departure 
from, New Labour.  
 
The idea of the market as ‘the great leveller’ extended to institutions. Willetts 
identified the oligopoly of Oxbridge and similar institutions – or, rather, the 
prestige economy – as a factor in maintaining and reproducing social inequalities 
through higher education. In line with his views on cartels as one of the main 
obstacles to markets’ efficient functioning (Willetts, 1992, p. 79 et passim), he 
sought to break up the perceived dominance of the Russell Group. The proposed 
solution was to open the system to ‘alternative’ providers, later called ‘challenger’ 
institutions (Willetts, 2017), and to reframe research assessment in a way that 
would stimulate competition both within and between institutions. The effects of 
the first have so far been somewhat limited, clashing both with deeply-seated class 
stratification in Britain, and with the Government’s own restrictive immigration 
rules. The second became known as the Research Excellence Framework (REF).  
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REF drew on research assessment overhaul plan that HEFCE had announced in 
2007, as well as on the report of the committee chaired by Lord Sainsbury, The 
Race to the Top: A Review of Government’s Science and Innovation Policies 
(Sainsbury, 2007), commissioned by Gordon Brown during his time as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. The report emphasized the need for the UK to boost science and 
innovation in order to compete against “low-wage, emerging economies, such as 
India and China” (Sainsbury, 2007, i), arguing particular attention should be paid 
to efficient transfer of research into publicly demonstrable outcomes, such as start-
ups and economic growth. Its position was that academic research in the UK was 
remaining isolated from the rest of the society, preventing its transformation into a 
dynamic, competitive, knowledge-based economy. While, in itself, the argument 
was not new – the ‘deficit’ model related to public understanding of science had 
been present at least since the Bodmer Report in 1985 (Rayner, 2012) – this 
framing provided a clear pathway for tying measurable (or demonstrable) societal 
effects of research to institutional funding. It resulted in one of, to this day, most 
contentious criteria in research evaluation: impact.     
 
The funding councils defined impact as “an effect on, change or benefit to the 
economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or 
quality of life, beyond academia” (HEFCE et al., 2011), specifying there needed to 
be a “clear link between the research and the engagement or involvement activity” 
that goes “beyond ‘business as usual’ engagement or involvement” (HEFCE et al., 
2012). This added a new and important layer to processes of evaluation. Until that 
point, the criteria used in evaluating research were mostly congruous with (or 
copied from) those applied by academics: papers published in prestigious (‘high-
impact’) journals, invitations to speak at important disciplinary gatherings, etc. 
While the mechanism and principles of accounting and rewards were set up by the 
government, they, to a great degree, mimicked the dynamics of peer review 
‘autochthonous’ to the academic community. With the inclusion of impact in the 
REF, however, not just allocation – deciding how research should be rewarded – 
but also the mechanisms of valuation – that is, deciding how specific outputs 
should be qualified – shifted further away from universities, and, in turn, from 
academics.    
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Unsurprisingly, the opposition – which Willetts once euphemistically described as 
“a lively discussion” – in the academic community to the idea that societal value 
of research can be measured was so strong that the announcement of REF had to 
be postponed until 2011. In many cases, it never stopped, as the process of 
reframing assessment criteria in relation to the aforementioned ‘lively discussion’ 
continues. In 2015, The Metric Tide, an independent review of the effects of 
metrics on research, was published (Wilsdon et al, 2015). While the report was 
critical of the drive to quantify research, emphasising the importance of peer review 
and other ‘non-quantitative’ methods of assessment, its overall message leaned 
more towards riding on, rather than drowning under, the ‘metric tide’. Another 
independent review, this time by a committee chaired by Lord Nicholas Stern, 
followed (Stern, 2016). While Stern recognised some of the ‘pathologies’ of REF 
– including the cost of assessment and tendency towards ‘gaming’, that is, adapting 
employment practices so as to attract staff with highest scores approaching the REF 
cycle – the report recommended maintaining the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative indicators of research output, with a view of shifting completely or 
predominantly towards the latter once measurement techniques are ‘perfected’ 
(ibid.).   
 
For universities, REF had obvious relevance not only because it was tied to 
research funding, but also because it was tied to staff progression and dynamics of 
employment. While the actual prevalence of ‘gaming’ strategies is difficult to 
establish, the purpose of the REF was also to distinguish between those who did 
‘excellent’ research from those who did not, channeling the latter into teaching – 
or, as the unspoken assumption went, outside higher education as a sector. REF, in 
this sense, acts as a sorting mechanism designed to ‘weed out’ weak institutions: it 
establishes value on the basis of research output, and then supports investment in 
high performing institutions, while letting others merge or die out.  
 
A similar mechanism is at the core Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF), 
announced in the 2016 White Paper, Success as a Knowledge Economy (DBIS, 
2016). TEF ranks institutions according to three categories: Gold, Silver, and 
Bronze. While the first round, conducted in 2017, was voluntary, the Government 
made it clear they were hoping to move towards mandatory participation, at least 
for institutions in England. Restricting the possibility of charging higher tuition 
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fees to institutions ranked as Gold, TEF results should operate as a major ‘price 
signal’. Whereas on the one hand it can be seen as a continuation of the policy of 
introducing ‘diversity’ by removing tuition fee caps, on the other, it clearly 
represents a much heavier state involvement in the running of universities. Despite 
its unpopularity among students and trade unions, the concept of ‘variable’ fees 
still allowed universities to set them. Making fees dependent on TEF performance, 
on the other hand, reintroduces price control, but places it in the hands of the 
government – or, more precisely, its interpretation of student satisfaction scores.   
 
Of course, TEF was not the first instrument for the measurement of teaching quality 
at higher education institutions in the UK: many institutions were conducting 
evaluations for much longer than that, and the National Student Survey (NSS) was 
introduced in 2005. Commissioned by the Department for Education and the 
HEFCE and carried out by Ipsos MORI, NSS was meant to challenge the 
assumption that universities highly ranked in league tables had the highest quality 
of teaching. Not entirely surprisingly, student unions at Oxford, Cambridge, and a 
few other highly ranked Russell Group universities initially ignored it, and the 
National Union of Students (NUS) remained divided. Yet, despite the ‘naming and 
shaming’ element, and despite the fact it was meant to influence demand by 
signaling to the students where they were most likely to experience high-quality 
teaching, the NSS was never explicitly tied to tuition fees. The fact it was included 
as a metric in TEF, then, led student unions to call for its renewed boycott. While 
most academics saw TEF as yet another form of governmental interference in their 
work, university managers and PR departments were not ashamed of boasting 
about their institutions’ TEF scores.  
 
What we can conclude, then, is that – possibly contrary to what would be expected 
– there was more continuity between New Labour and Coalition approaches to 
higher education than between Coalition and the Conservative Government that 
came into power in 2015. The start of 2016 saw the restructuring of the sector 
towards heavier-handed regulation, which, although officially ‘in the name of the 
market’, entailed a renewed dosage of government intervention. Higher education 
and research bodies were restructured and recentralized: it was announced that, 
from 2018, the research councils will be united into UK Research and Innovation 
(UKRI), and that HEFCE would morph into the Office for Students (OfS).  
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Before any of that, however, one thing the Conservative government did inherit 
from the Coalition took place: the Brexit referendum.  
 
 Brexit: experts against themselves? 
 
The referendum on United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union took 
place on 23 June 2016. The referendum itself was a consequence of a pre-2015 
election promise David Cameron made in order to boost the appeal of Conservative 
Party for presumably anti-immigration voters – essentially those who supported 
UKIP and/or had previously supported the BNP, but also Labour voters disaffected 
by the effects of the continuation of austerity policies under Blair and Brown. A 
strong emphasis in the campaign went towards linking the issues of European 
Union membership with immigration, on the one hand, and with unemployment 
and cuts to public services, on the other. One example was the Leave campaign 
poster that (falsely) claimed Albania and Turkey were joining the European Union, 
clearly hinting at the presumed droves of cheap labour coming to British shores. 
The other was the bus sign claiming that three million pounds UK was paying to 
the European Union would be used to fund the NHS which, at that point, was under 
a long period of austerity-driven cuts.  
 
The Remain campaign, by contrast, focused on demonstrating the value of the 
European Union through ‘hard facts’ and data, and, towards the end of the 
campaign, on the idea of a shared European identity with foundations in the WWII. 
Whatever else can be said about this campaign strategy, it clearly betrayed those 
in charge of the campaign assumed they were primarily addressing educated voters 
– that is, those who could be persuaded by appeal to facts and data. This, in part, is 
what provided the overture for Michael Gove, Secretary of State for Education 
between 2010 and 2014, to notoriously pronounce that “people of this country have 
had enough of experts”. Whereas Gove managed to lump together the educated, 
cosmopolitan, and relatively well-off, this was never reflected in the campaign: 
while the Leave vote provided coexistence – if not synergy – of nationalist 
Conservative and racist UKIP sentiments, Remain could not muster together the 
pro-European elements of Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats.  
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This should not necessarily be seen as a consequence of ideological incongruity or 
personal animosities: Liberal Democrats’ decision to join the Coalition in 2010 had 
alienated even the ideologically proximate parts of Labour; their experience in the 
Coalition Government, as the same time, made them vary of any form of 
collaboration with the Conservatives. Simultaneously, Labour was struggling for a 
clear political direction, riveted by internal conflicts: Jeremy Corbyn had been 
elected as leader in September 2015, but was already facing strong opposition 
within his own party. While it was clearly going to be a close call, opinion polls on 
the eve of the referendum suggested a slight majority would vote to remain. Murder 
of the Labour (and pro-European) MP Jo Cox by a white supremacist was expected 
to tip the scales decisively in that direction. This chimed with what most pundits, 
as well as leaders of political parties, believed: that the chances of Britain actually 
leaving the European Union were very small. It must have been a surprise when, 
the morning after the referendum, Nigel Farage’s smiling face greeted them from 
the BBC website: the early vote count suggested 51% voted in favour of leaving 
the European Union. 
 
Much has been written about the referendum, the social dynamics that precipitated 
the outcome, and much is still being written about its consequences (e.g. 
Outhwaite, ed., 2017; Balibar et al, 2016). What is relevant here, however, is that 
the period leading up to the Brexit referendum, as well as its immediate aftermath, 
saw an exceptional engagement in the debate from the side of universities (Finn, 
2018). It wasn’t just the public intellectuals, that is, the usual pundits who weighed 
in on the referendum; vice chancellors and other members of senior management, 
normally reluctant to step into the limelight apart from promoting their institution, 
also got involved. In the immediate aftermath of the vote, many wrote angry or 
highly critical pieces that, almost unanimously, labelled Brexit as an outright 
disaster for the higher education sector. 
 
This should hardly come as a surprise. For most intents and purposes, the UK had 
a highly favourable position in the European higher education and research area. 
Major research universities – predominantly coterminous with the Russell Group 
– drew substantial funds from European Commission. These funds included 
research grants made through its Framework programmes (5, 6 and 7), those 
distributed via the European Research Council (ERC), as well as structural funds, 
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for instance those that supported regional development, where universities were 
able to partner with local authorities. The UK was a net benefactor of EU funding, 
both in absolute terms and proportionately (Courtois, ed., 2018).  
 
The other relatively important value for UK universities came from students from 
EU countries. They weren’t straightforwardly a source of income: since European 
Court of Justice ruled that EU students could access higher education in the UK on 
same terms as British nationals, EU students not only paid the same fees, but could 
also access the grants and loans (James, 2016). Combined prestige of UK higher 
education institutions and global spread of English as lingua franca, however, 
meant that, on the whole, UK was a ‘receiving’ rather than a ‘sending’ country. 
Many of these students were financed or co-financed through schemes such as 
Erasmus. Almost equally importantly, services catering to international students 
(including student housing) provided an important boost to local economies, 
especially in parts of the country that had previously been severely hit by cuts to 
industry and public services (Finn, 2018).  
 
At the time of writing it is still early to draw conclusions about the effects of Brexit 
on the economy of UK higher education in research, especially given the lack of 
clarity concerning its participation in research programmes beyond Horizon 2020. 
However, even a cursory overview suggests the sector is set to suffer net losses. 
Collectively, UK institutions are the second biggest recipient of Horizon 2020 
research funding (Courtois, ed. 2018, p. 13), preceded only by Germany. The 
country also has the highest number of principal investigators on European 
Research Council (ERC) and Marie Sklodowska-Curie actions (ibid.), confirming 
its reputation as a preferred destination for research leaders. Doubt, experience of 
xenophobia, and considerations of leaving were widely reported among UK-based 
EU research staff in the aftermath of the referendum. Direct concerns related to 
staff and culture on campus are, of course, important. However, in the context of 
this study, there are political and economic implications of Brexit that are at least 
equally, if not more relevant.  
 
One concerns the possibility of losing access to European Union funds for higher 
education and research. While a proportion of this funding is channeled through 
research councils of England and devolved nations, the majority goes directly to 
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institutions and/or individuals, through a series of competitive grant programmes 
(for research) as well as through tuition fees, Erasmus schemes, and intra-EU 
portability of student grants and loans (for teaching). In practice, the EU represents 
an important source of independence from the state. Of course, EU funding is not 
without its own strings, formal as well as informal. Reporting procedures, for 
example, are notoriously cumbersome, and staff on research grants often have little 
job security or are forced to ‘buy out’ their own teaching time, shifting precarious 
contracts further down the line. Yet, on the whole, access to EU funds represents 
both a source of non-state income, and a source of prestige that can be used as a 
political lever. The second implication relates to the overall projections for the 
British economy. Unsurprisingly, compared with the possibility of food or 
medicine shortages, the needs of higher education and research rarely make front 
pages. However, it seems reasonable to assume that UK higher education and 
research will suffer the economic effects of Brexit at least equally as other sectors 
of the economy. This, obviously, means that universities will be further pressed to 
cut spending or engage in increasingly competitive forms of demonstrating ‘value 
for money’ in order to obtain public funds.  
 
The combination of two trends suggests that ever-growing proximity between 
universities and the state may, eventually, lead to a collision. Even a marginal shift 
in the availability of EU funding for British universities is likely to produce 
significant challenges for the maintenance of their day-to-day operations, not to 
mention forms of expansion – especially infrastructural investment – many have 
undertaken in the past decade. Even if the UK government were to honour its 
promise to cover the ‘shortfall’, this will likely involve even tighter restrictions and 
conditionalities on access. Much like initial strategies of Thatcher and Major 
administrations, this will probably be with the overall aim of reducing expenditure, 
and, in the long run, further ‘disciplining’ universities. 
 
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
Higher education and research policies at the end of the 20th and beginning of 21st 
century in the UK, as much as their critique, need to be understood in relation to 
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the history of universities’ relationship with the state and ‘the society’ in a more 
general sense. The growth of British Empire spurred the expansion of universities 
beyond the mediaeval institutions of Oxford and Cambridge and the (somewhat 
younger) institutions of Scottish Enlightenment. Until after World War II, 
however, universities were still relatively ‘few and far between’; a very small 
fraction of total population went on to study at them, and those who did came 
almost exclusively from the wealthy and privileged strata comprising landed gentry 
and the growing mercantile and industrial middle classes. Given that top-level civil 
servants were similarly recruited from these classes, there was a ‘natural’ affinity 
between those who taught and led universities, and those who were leading the 
country. While Oxford and Cambridge were traditionally wary of the extension of 
state funding, fearing this would necessarily mean the extension of its influence, 
on the whole the period went relatively smoothly. After all, university funding still 
constituted a minuscule portion of state budget – so minuscule it was funded 
directly by the Treasury, rather than by a specific Department – and, given that the 
parents of most entrants could well afford to pay tuition, the issue hardly arose.  
 
This changed substantially in the aftermath of WWII. With the universalization of 
secondary education, the number of potential entrants expanded overnight. The 
report of the Robbins Committee (1963), convened to advise on how to fund higher 
education in these circumstances, suggested opening it to new entrants. To some 
degree, this was a logical extension of the universalization of access to secondary 
education; more than that, however, it reflected the belief that higher education was 
becoming increasingly relevant for the country as a whole. It tied education to 
economic outcomes, thus connecting ‘human’ with economic capital.   
 
This does not mean universities were naturally ‘given’ to this purpose. In order to 
provide technical and practical education, the Labour government of 1965 
introduced polytechnics. In some ways, this was a form of expansion, but it was 
also an essentially conservative social policy that recognized that each part of the 
sector had something to contribute, but on different terms. Universities and 
polytechnics thus continued carrying different class and social significance. 
Differently put, while higher education as a whole was being reframed, 
universities’ position in society altered only fractionally. The biggest change was 
at the level of perception: rather than a separate set of institutions only cursorily 
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connected to the rest of the governing apparatus of the state, universities became 
part of a sector.  
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the fortunes of universities continued to be tied to the 
fortunes of the economy – with growth came expansion, with contraction came 
reduction. Universities were still not required to take a proactive role in economic 
development: it was sufficient they did not obstruct it too much. Occasional bouts 
of campus radicalism notwithstanding, universities in the UK were well integrated 
into the industrial and political landscape of the time, with frictions significantly 
smaller than those that were, at similar times, rippling through campuses in the 
West and East of Europe, US, and parts of Central America. Similarly, social 
critique fitted relatively seamlessly into institutions of higher education; the next 
chapter will deal with some of the reasons for, and implications of, this peculiarity.  
 
In sum, until the 1980s, universities were a rather marginal concern for the 
government. Thatcher’s reviled NPM was not in itself a particularly systematic 
‘attack’ on universities; it was an integral part of the assumption that universities 
were part of the public sector, which needed to be reduced on the whole. The 
abolition of tenure with the 1988 Education Reform Act should be seen in the same 
light; while academics unsurprisingly saw it as a direct attack on their profession, 
it was a strategy oriented primarily towards cutting costs. What greatly helped, 
however, was not just the deterioration of bargaining power through changes 
Thatcher had introduced to weaken politically and infrastructurally influential 
unions (Towers, 1989); it was also the fact that most academics did not necessarily 
see themselves primarily as workers. To some degree, this was a simple empirical 
statement – working class academics were a minority – but it also reflected the 
broader dynamics of the academic profession, where allegiances tended to reside 
within the discipline or the institution, rather than the notion of academic ‘work’ 
as a whole (Becher and Trowler, 2001; Halsey, 1992).   
 
Despite its critics, then, New Public Management was not that much a policy that 
‘attacked’ universities as one that reversed the hitherto held principle of treating 
them as an exception to the governance of the public sector. This principle – often 
miscoded as Haldane’s, or associated with Humboldtian values of university 
autonomy and academic freedom – was, in itself, a historically and geographically 
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specific answer to the same question: how should universities help the state run in 
the most efficient manner? In nascent nations of 19th century Europe, the answer 
was: by training its henchmen, solidifying the national spirit, and providing 
independent technical knowledge. For all these reasons, it was not only beneficial 
but necessary to keep them at an arm’s length from the administrative apparatus of 
the state. In this sense, Weber’s admonishment to new students to stick to value-
neutrality (Weber, 1958 [1918]; see also Shils, ed., 1974), rather than a heroic 
exercise of epistemic and political self-control (to fans), or a self-aggrandizing 
illusion of objectivity (to critics), was a statement of the obvious: neither stood to 
gain much from tighter connections between universities and the state. In the UK, 
where ‘ancient’ universities predated the formation of the nation-state, the 
proverbial arm was longer. The abolishment of the difference between universities 
and polytechnics in 1992, then, was not an ‘elevating’ as much as a levelling act: 
it simply meant that onwards all higher education institutions were to be treated 
equally – as sources of (possibly unnecessary) expenditure that had to prove their 
contribution to economic prosperity.  
 
New Labour took on this assumption. Unfortunately for academics, New Labour 
also took on the belief that education had a role in reorienting UK decisively 
towards a new growth strategy, reflected in the concept of ‘knowledge economy’. 
While Thatcher’s Conservative government, paradoxically, wanted universities to 
be as little trouble as imaginable (and sought to achieve this by minimizing 
expenditure), Blair’s and Brown’s Labour wanted them to be as active, visible, and 
productive as possible – but ideally at a fraction of the cost. The conjunction of 
maximum impact with minimum expenditure, in other words, provided the 
blueprint for governing knowledge production. This is how neoliberalism, 
regardless of initially divergent economic ideologies of Labour and Conservative 
governments, came to be seen as policy orthodoxy. The rest of the story is well-
known. In the aftermath of the financial and crisis of the Eurozone, the Brexit vote, 
and crescendoing anti-immigrant sentiment, universities found themselves amidst 
multiple and intersecting political currents. How they will navigate them remains 
to be seen.  
 
The following chapter turns to interventions that have engaged with these 
developments to see how they framed different elements of this process.  
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Chapter 4: Interventions 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses intellectual interventions that form the corpus of 
contemporary critique of neoliberalism in UK higher education and research.  
 
As argued in Chapter 2, in the second half of the 20th century, critique that 
addressed perceived shortcomings and failings of universities of the sort reflected 
in Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (Woolf, 1992 [1938]) gave way to a more 
systematic engagement with policies aimed at governing them. This had to do, first, 
with massification of higher education – with universalization of access to 
secondary schooling and especially following the report of the Robbins Committee 
in 1963, universities stopped being unproblematically seen as exclusive reservoirs 
for the wealthy and the privileged (Halsey, 1992). Some of these changes were 
reflected in the genre of the ‘campus novel’: from Mary McCarthy’s Groves of the 
Academe (1952) and Kingsley Amis’ Lucky Jim (1954), to David Lodge’s trilogy 
Changing Places (1975), Small World (1984) and Nice Work (1988) (cf. Showalter, 
2005). Not least importantly, student protests in different corners of the globe in 
the 1960s drew attention more prominently to both campus politics and the 
relationship between universities and their social and political context (e.g. Vinen, 
2018).   
 
This should not suggest universities suddenly became central or even particularly 
prominent locus of public attention. The growing appetite for critical commentary 
on different matters, including those pertaining to higher education, should also be 
seen as an effect of the broader transformation of the sphere of cultural production. 
Newsrooms and editorial boards were staffed with recent university graduates, 
developing not only networks of shared cultural affinity but also, importantly, 
conduits of information between academia and the media (Halsey, 1992). This 
included dedicated higher education supplement of The Times, Times Higher 
Education, inaugurated in 1971. Challenging somewhat the tradition of mistrust 
towards intellectuals in Britain (Collini, 2006), it was also an effect of the growing 
importance and institutionalization of a particular way of performing critique, 
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associated with cultural Marxism12 and, in particular, the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies at Birmingham. 
 
The chapter begins with a summary of implications of this particular mode of 
Marxist analysis for the critique of transformations of higher education and 
research that developed at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries. 
Tracing its history from cultural Marxism and the critique of ‘audit culture’ 
developed in anthropology to contemporary ‘culture wars’ surrounding the 
‘Leaver/Remainer’ dichotomy in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, the 
chapter discusses the main ontological tenets of these interventions, focusing on 
arguments and concepts in notable examples. Identifying a set of common 
assumptions and modes of justification provides a backdrop for discussing how 
these assumptions relate to intellectuals’ self-narratives in Chapter 5.  
 
 Early critics: from cultural Marxism to audit culture 
 
The roots of the critique of neoliberalism in UK higher education can be traced to 
a strand of critical writing that blossomed at the end of the 1960s and reached its 
apex in the 1980s and 90s. Its philosophical origins were Marxist, but it 
incorporated the semiotic and cultural turns of French post-structuralism. For this 
reason, it is often classified as a form of ‘cultural Marxism’ (Dworkin, 1997), or, 
geographically more specifically, as the ‘British School of Cultural Studies’. The 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham can be 
considered its institutional ‘home’, though, obviously, both its representatives and 
its influence travelled more widely.   
 
The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham, established by 
Richard Hoggart, was officially inaugurated in 1964. The Uses of Literacy 
(Hoggart, 1958) had sold so well that Hoggart managed to convince Allen Lane, 
 
12 In the past decades, ‘Cultural Marxism’ has (particularly in the US, but increasingly in the UK 
as well) been deployed by right-wing commentators as a blanket term for post-structuralism, post-
modernism, and many other forms of theorizing concerned with politics of representation, in order 
to claim that this type of thinking is responsible, or connected to, a number of progressive causes 
these commentators find problematic (emancipation of women, LGBTQ rights, fight against 
sexism, racism and homophobia, and so on). The use of ‘cultural ‘Marxism’ in this thesis has 
nothing in common with this sort of diagnostic, and is primarily analytical in the sense of reflecting 
the focus on the role of elements associated with ‘culture’ in reproduction of social, i.e. class, 
inequalities that are the object of the ‘earlier’ generation of Marxist theory.  
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its Penguin Press publisher, to fund a centre dedicated exclusively to research into 
different elements of lay or ‘popular’ culture (Webster, 2004). Cultural studies 
never represented a unified field: initially dominated by literary studies, in part due 
to the influence of Hoggart and Raymond Williams, it substantially overlapped 
with the nascent field of media studies, as well as anthropology and sociology 
(Hall, 1992) – the latter, particularly, proving a source of tension or friction at times 
(Rojek and Turner, 2000). Even so, it left an indelible mark on the idea of how to 
go about studying the social. Possibly most of all, Stuart Hall, who took over the 
directorship of CCCS from Hoggart in 1969, epitomized the new kind of public 
intellectual, who openly fused theoretical work and praxis (Collini, 2006; Dworkin, 
1997; Rojek and Turner, 2000).  
 
To fully grasp the influence of this type of analysis on critique of higher education 
in the UK, it is necessary to understand the ambiguous nature of education in 
traditional, ‘orthodox’ Marxism. Following Marx’s German Ideology (1977 
[1932]) all ideas – including those transmitted through institutions of higher 
education – are expressions of material conditions of their production. This is what 
lends the Marxist notion of ideology its negative connotation: institutions for the 
transmission of ideas are necessarily meant to convey the ideas of the ruling class 
(see particularly discussion in Thompson, 1990, pp. 33–40). Education institutions 
can be expected to perform the function of ‘sorting’ people according to their class 
of origin: working class children will be ‘funnelled’ out of schools and into 
(ideally) productive labour at the earliest possible age, those with some social and 
cultural capital into white-collar professions, often administrative or lower 
managerial, and those with greatest amounts of both social and economic capital 
will attend schools that will prepare them to govern and lead. Education 
institutions, in this sense – from schools to universities – cannot help but be 
instruments for reproduction of the ruling order: their narratives, forms of 
evaluation, and awards they bring, will all have been designed with the singular 
goal of contributing to this type of social reproduction.  
 
However, both from the perspective of Lenin’s ‘vanguardist party’, as well as 
Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectuals’, consciousness-raising is a necessary step in 
overcoming capitalist domination. Given that a shift of consciousness is primarily 
a cognitive operation, education becomes the primary avenue through which the 
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working class can become aware of exploitation it is subject to. In Marxist political 
ontology, this clearly poses a problem: if ideas are expressions of material 
conditions of their production, education institutions are likely to reflect the classed 
nature of the society that supports them. How does one commit to revolutionary 
praxis from an institution that is ‘always already’ implicated in the ruling order?  
 
This tension, arguably, motivated Bourdieu’s initial theoretical engagement with 
institutions of knowledge production (Bourdieu, 1984, Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1977), as well as his later work on the production of ideology (see especially 
Bourdieu & Boltanski, 2008 [1976]; also Susen, 2014c, 2016a). On a grander scale, 
the tension was key to the post-war Ideologiekritik of the Frankfurt School 
(particularly Marcuse’s, see e.g. Kellner et al. eds., 2009; Walzer, 2002). In the 
British context, however, it took a somewhat different route. 
 
The difficulty of maintaining a position simultaneously within and against the 
existing order was a prominent theme in one of the earliest expressions of the type 
of critique analysed here: E.P. Thompson’s Warwick University, Ltd. (Thompson, 
ed., 2014 [1970]). Initially appearing in New Society as “The Business University”, 
the book concerns the conflict between students and administration at the 
University of Warwick that took place in 1970. Warwick University, established 
in 1965 on the outskirts of Coventry – a city that had been bombed to the ground 
in World War II – belonged to the group of new ‘plateglass’ universities, 
specifically boosted by the expansion following the Robbins Report (Beloff, 1968). 
Students and staff at these universities were often more politically progressive than 
their counterparts in older universities; Warwick was particularly notable for 
student activism, including its student union.  
 
Despite this, the university administration was slow in providing the union with 
space they could use on a permanent basis. In February 1970, in protest of 
prolonged refusal of the management to provide such space, students broke into 
and occupied a set of administrative offices on campus. In and of itself, this wasn’t 
such an extraordinary event: while Britain never saw student protests on the scale 
of France, Czechoslovakia, or the US, the ‘spirit of 1968’ did reach its shores, and 
student occupations were not unheard of (Vinen, 2018). What the students 
discovered, however, made national news: files kept separately from other 
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documentation, testifying to systemic police surveillance of students and staff, in 
order to keep tabs on potential ‘political radicalism’ and protect the interests of 
industrial capital invested into the expansion of material infrastructure – that is, 
new buildings – at the university.  
 
Even by the standards of Cold War paranoia, especially following the discovery of 
the ‘Cambridge Five’ spy ring, this was extraordinary. What did not help ‘silencing 
the matter’ was that the university tried to prevent students who discovered the files 
from ‘leaking’ them to the press. In response, E.P. Thompson personally copied 
some of the documents and distributed them to his colleagues in order to alert 
academic staff. The discussion quickly turned the question of the interests of capital 
in higher education, and, in particular, the involvement of industrialists in running 
the University of Warwick – what, some decades later, will be referred to as the 
‘academic-military-industrial complex’. After rounds of deliberation, the matter 
was settled, but not before it reached national media in March. Later that year, 
Thompson and student activists gathered the documents, and, together with an 
extended commentary from Thompson, published it as Warwick University, Ltd. 
with Penguin Press.  
 
The title as well as the overall tone of the volume clearly identify the main problem 
as the involvement of industry, or the interests of capital, in matters of higher 
education:  
 
…This analysis points towards a general situation, to the operative modes of 
power and of money in Britain in 1970s, and the relationship of our 
institutions of higher education to industrial capitalism (…) Just as the great 
landed aristocracy of the 18th century exerted their power by manifold 
exercise of interest, influence and purchase, so the new lords seem to 
infiltrate the command-posts of our society, including our educational 
institutions (Thompson, 2014 [1970], pp. 16–17) 
 
Owing, in part, to the serendipitous discovery of incriminating documents, the 
“matter at Warwick” showed that industrial capital, universities, and the state were 
deeply intertwined. It also showed the near-impossibility of disentangling them 
efficiently: 
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In the conflict it became apparent that what was wrong was not a close 
relationship with ‘industry’ but a particular kind of subordinate relationship 
with industrial capitalism – which, moreover, exerts its influence not only 
directly in the councils of the University but also within the educational 
organs of the State…In this sense the case of Warwick no longer appears as 
unique. How far it is a paradigm or prototype of other places, how far it points 
towards tendencies only beginning to reveal themselves elsewhere – this is 
for our readers to decide (ibid., pp. 16–17).  
 
Thompson offered a sobering corrective for the idea that getting ‘rid’ of capitalism 
would be easy: 
 
Nor can the malaise of Warwick be diagnosed in the single personality of the 
Vice-Chancellor. His policies of ever-closer relationship with ‘industry’ have 
been …supported by government, by the University Grants Committee, and 
by Science and Social Science Research Councils, as well as by industrialists 
on his Council. And a good part of these policies has been readily assented 
to by leading members of the academic staff (ibid., p. 17). 
 
The last excerpt is particularly interesting, as Thompson refuses to ascribe 
Warwick University’s surveillance of students and staff purely to ‘commercial’ or 
‘industrial’ interests. What he says, in effect, is that institutions of knowledge 
production, including universities, have become increasingly politically and 
economically dependent on industrial capitalism; and, even more chillingly, that at 
least some academics knew about and went along with this. The pessimism of this 
insight is telling. Barely seven years since the report of the Robbins Committee 
had passed; Stuart Hall had taken over as the director of the Centre for Cultural 
Studies at Birmingham a year earlier. In many ways, for critique, the period was 
one of cautious optimism. What the ‘matter at Warwick’ revealed was that, in many 
cases, institutional expansion came at a price.   
 
For intellectuals on the Left this presented an obvious problem, both politically and 
theoretically. Accepting full implications of the imbrication of education 
institutions and industrial capitalism meant one would have to abandon the hope of 
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revolution from within the academia. E.P. Thompson left his position at Warwick 
shortly following these events; while he continued occasional lecturing in the UK 
and abroad, he never assumed another full-time university post (it is also possible 
to see this in the context of his broader distancing from the British New Left, 
following his ‘ousting’ as the editor of the recently established New Left Review by 
Perry Anderson, Tom Nairn, and Robin Blackburn – see Collini, 2006, p. 171; also 
Nehring, 2011). Poverty of Theory (Thompson, 1978), for instance, can be read as 
an indictment of academic ‘theorising’, or rather, the form of knowledge that 
privileges academic procedures of apprehending reality, and pits it against the 
practical, everyday knowledge as accessed by men and women of the working 
class.  
 
The other route available to academics was to continue to work within existing 
institutions in hope of changing them from the inside. This, arguably, is what 
intellectuals associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at 
Birmingham set out to do. Drawing on Gramsci’s notions of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony, the driving idea was that a revolutionary class can adopt the 
methods and institutions of the oppressor to build a momentum towards revolution. 
Rejecting crude class distinctions of Marxist analysis as outdated, they shifted 
attention from material (re)production – ownership over means of production, 
control of factories and supply chains – towards factors of cultural reproduction: 
literature, the arts, and the media.  
 
Numerous authors have provided both contemporaneous and retrospective 
accounts of the influence of cultural studies on scholarly and political life in the 
UK and beyond (e.g. Dworkin, 1997; Grossberg, Nelson and Treichler eds., 1992; 
Hall, 1992; Edgar and Sedgwick, 2005; Grossberg, 2010). Attempting to 
summarise them would take up more space than available in this thesis. For the 
purposes of present analysis, however, two things are important. One is that 
cultural studies provided theoretical framing for the move away from orthodox 
Marxist emphasis on class and labour relations towards, to borrow Geertz’s (1973) 
formulation, ‘webs of meaning’ – which meant the production of symbols, texts, 
and objects that were seen as part of ‘culture’. The other is that, until late in the 
1990s, higher education did not really figure on its research agenda. This 
particularly notable not only because of the contrast with Bourdieu’s work in 
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France but also because, at the same time, critical studies of primary and secondary 
education were thriving (e.g. Willis, 1981 [1977]; CCCS, 1981). 
 
The absence of structured focus on universities and politics of knowledge can, in 
some ways, be seen as an effect of the shift towards a ‘counterhegemonic’ strategy. 
This entailed fighting for institutions, rather than against them. From this 
perspective, the struggle for legitimizing working class culture – in part, through 
its constitution as a valid object of research – became coextensive with the struggle 
for the working class as such. Similarly, the drive to include migrant, youth, and 
ethnic ‘subcultures’ among legitimate topics of academic research was meant to 
change both the public perception of these groups, and their standing in the 
academia. In this sense, belief in the power of cultural representation led to the 
fusion of the theoretical (that is, academic) and political. In Rojek and Turners’s 
words, “[c]riticism, often of a literary or quasi-literary bent, has generally been 
more prominent than plans for the reconstruction of the social and cultural fabric” 
(2000, p. 630). 
 
While Hall and others were no ‘armchair philosophers’, the integration of critique 
within institutions of higher education thus came with a flipside. This flipside was 
the assumption that changing academic culture was sufficient to change the nature 
of institutions. An interesting dichotomy between critique ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of 
the university thus developed in the 1980s and the 1990s. Critique oriented towards 
the ‘outside’, engaging with multiple facets of Thatcher’s policies, was thriving. 
Simultaneously, intellectuals were engaged in a struggle to position cultural studies 
in relation to other theoretical paradigms on the inside (Weber, 2004; Schulmann, 
1993). It was almost as if critics were forgetting that the same relations that obtain 
on the outside must also apply to the inside.  
 
The first element of university life that would command attention of the national 
press after ‘the matter at Warwick’ was telling. Ostensibly breaking out over the 
disputed appointment of a lecturer at University of Cambridge’s Department of 
English, the affair revolved around the relevance of ‘theory’ – which, in the early 
1980s, was code-word for French poststructuralism – in literary studies (Morgan 
and Baert, 2015). At Cambridge, the study of literature had been split between a 
more traditional, formalist stream, and a more ‘cultural’, poststructuralist one, the 
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latter including Raymond Williams himself. The conflict around the recognition of 
cultural studies as a legitimate paradigm and field of inquiry in an institution as 
conservative at Cambridge, then, was a clash between ‘old’ and ‘new’ ways of 
approaching knowledge – the new, obviously, being associated with the lively 
interdisciplinarity of cultural studies. As entertaining (and at times vicious) as the 
affair was, it also highlighted the fact that positioning critical scholarship within 
the university had taken primacy over questioning the position of the university in 
the broader society.  
 
Critical theoretical engagement, in this sense, became coextensive with critical 
political engagement. Particularly when the former was going well, it is not 
particularly surprising that less attention went into how this very practice was, at 
least in part, made possible by precisely the processes it aimed to criticize. As 
Laurie Taylor recently summarized, critics were reluctant to “bite the hand that 
feed(s) them” (Times Higher Education, 4 October 2018; see also Fitzgerald, 
2018). Rojek and Turner offer a particularly acerbic diagnosis of this process:  
 
Hall’s advocacy of Gramsci's concept of the ‘organic intellectual’ 
stereotyped the work of ‘traditional intellectuals’ as superficial and evasive. 
This bestowed an automatic moral significance upon the cultural studies 
approach which contrasted with the alleged acdemicism of established 
research traditions. (…)The self-image of organic intellectuals is of 
intellectual workers who are closer to material reality and more seriously 
interested in `what is really going on'…This conveyed palpable moral force 
upon Birmingham School research and writing. The work in the 1970s on 
schooling, ideology, culture, the media, policing and Thatcherism has 
tremendous zest, and this partly reflects indignation that these subjects are 
neglected in other research traditions. But it also produced its own variety of 
moral arrogance, intellectual narrowness and over-confidence which has 
carried over into the cultural studies critique of established humanities and 
social science disciplines. This invested cultural studies with a proselytising 
impulse which remains evident to the present day (2000, p. 634). 
 
From this perspective, it is less surprising that the closure of the CCCS, ostensibly 
over its low performance in the RAE (initially through its integration into the 
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Department of Sociology in 1992, and then altogether in 2002) came as such a 
shock. Rather than a more decisive political engagement, however, it galvanized 
the first comprehensive theoretical diagnosis of the changes going on in higher 
education. It came from anthropology, under the name ‘audit culture’.  
  
Audit culture 
 
The concept of ‘audit culture’ was initially introduced by Michael Power in The 
Audit Explosion (Power, 1994), and The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification 
(Power, 1997). Power’s project is a critique of the techniques of governance 
associated with the introduction of New Public Management, primarily in the UK, 
emphasizing the relationship between the increase of instruments of measuring 
performance associated with the reform of public services, and the ritualistic 
quality of public policy and governance. It was imported into social sciences – and 
from there into broader critical vocabulary – through the work of three 
anthropologists: Marilyn Strathern, Cris Shore and Susan Wright.  
 
In 1998, Strathern, at the time president of the European Association of Social 
Anthropologists (EASA), convened a panel at its annual conference on the topic of 
audit. Shore and Wright, who had previously been involved in studying policy 
(Shore and Wright, 1997), had also become interested in how the changes in higher 
education could be framed anthropologically. The title of their article published in 
the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute conveyed a clear diagnostic: 
“Audit culture and anthropology: neo-liberalism in British higher education” 
(Shore and Wright, 1999). A slightly expanded version of that article, along with a 
number of other presentations from the EASA panel, were published as Audit 
Cultures: Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy 
(Strathern, ed., 2000).  
 
More than a third of the volume was dedicated exclusively to changes in 
institutions of higher education. This was significant, even when viewed from the 
turn towards ‘studying up’ (e.g. Nader, 1972) and ‘anthropology at home’ (e.g. 
Peirano, 1998). The use of the concept of ‘culture’ can be read in two registers. 
One is the ambition to claim the terrain for anthropology as a discipline that had 
previously held the monopoly on academic application of the concept; this would 
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have been even more important in the aftermath of the closure of CCCS at 
Birmingham, as well as in order to delineate it from sociology. The other, more 
interesting one, has to do with cognitive estrangement that ‘anthropologising’ 
techniques of measurement and governance creates. To frame audit as a culture, in 
this sense, meant more than signaling its ubiquity or all-encompassing nature. It 
also meant suggesting that ‘members’ of this culture could be studied as ‘the 
Other’, foreign, different. In other words, it implied the culture was not one shared 
by anthropologists who coined the term.    
 
Defining ‘audit culture’ as coextensive or synonymous with neoliberalism 
established a genealogy between this type of study and critique practiced by Hall 
and other CCCS members. It simultaneously provided a catchy term for changes 
in higher education and managed to position the source of these changes outside of 
the university. There was also a methodological affinity, in the sense of an interest 
in how forms of representation – discourses, media narratives, and so on – shape 
society. In the context of ‘audit culture’, critical analysis of discourse was applied 
to texts – for instance, policy texts – in order to infer intentions, and thus 
reconstruct the ideological background, of its authors. This approach to critique, 
which we can dub ‘literary-cultural’, remains influential to this date. Next, we turn 
to its some of its notable examples.  
 
Words and worlds 
 
Stefan Collini is probably the most famous representative of the literary-cultural 
style of critique of higher education in the UK. Professor of English Literature at 
Cambridge, Collini first began writing about higher education in the Times Higher 
Education in 1998 and is at present a frequent contributor to the London Review of 
Books. From “HiEdBiz”, which reviews the 2003 White Paper, The Future of 
Higher Education, to “Browne’s Gamble”, which is an extended critique of 
Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education: An Independent Review of 
Higher Education Funding and Student Finance (the Browne Review), to his 
books (What Are Universities for?, published in 2012 by Penguin, and Speaking of 
Universities that came out from Verso in 2017), Collini has evolved into England’s 
most celebrated higher education critic. 
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Collini’s approach to critique is to deconstruct the language and arguments of 
higher education policy documents, exposing their assumptions in an ironic and 
often highly entertaining way. The books extend this form of critique into a case 
for the kind of education universities should be providing. Collini clearly places 
his work in the broader tradition of intellectual interventions. Preface to What are 
universities for? (WAUF) states: 
 
 [WAUF] is not a philosophical monograph any more than it is a White Paper. 
The literary category to which it most nearly approximates may be that of the 
polemic, which in turn overlaps with the genres of satire, jeremiad, 
manifesto, and essay in cultural criticism. (…) They do not attempt to compel 
assent by means of either logical indefeasibility or empirical 
comprehensiveness, and they do not rest their case on thoroughly worked-
out proposals (WAUF, xiii). 
 
The choice of contrast with (a) White Paper to position the book (intellectual 
product) in a genre is telling. For one, it can serve to pre-empt the potential reader’s 
expectations of, say, empirical data in support of the main argument. But it also 
serves to underline general mistrust towards the form of speech-act that relies on 
facts, figures, and statistics in order to persuade. A great proportion of Collini’s 
writing, in fact, focuses specifically on the critique of the kind of policy language 
that characterizes White Papers and other forms of governmental intervention into 
teaching and research. Writing about university rankings, for instance, he says: 
 
The language here betrays a kind of mercantilism of the intellect, a fear that 
the stock of national treasure will be diminished rather than augmented by 
the success of enterprises elsewhere. It is remarkable how quickly and easily 
this language has become naturalized in the past two or three decades, even 
though it is damaging to the intrinsically cooperative nature of all science 
and scholarship (WAUF, p. 17).  
 
Collini’s critique of the 2003 White Paper is an even clearer example. Published in 
the LRB under the unfailingly sarcastic title HiEdBizUK, the article qualifies the 
paper as “pseudo-market guff” and goes on to present an extended 
 135 
linguistic/literary analysis of its text. This is how it depicts the process of 
policymaking:   
 
It is not simply the fact that no single institution could successfully achieve 
all the aims crammed into this unlovely paragraph, taken from the 
introductory chapter to the Government’s White Paper, The Future of Higher 
Education, published earlier this year. It is also the thought of that room in 
Whitehall where these collages are assembled. As the findings from the latest 
survey of focus groups come in, an official cuts out all those things which 
earned a positive rating and glues them together in a straight line. When a 
respectable number of terms have been accumulated in this way, s/he puts a 
dot at the end and calls it a sentence (Collini, 2003). 
 
And further: 
 
There are two sentences in that paragraph. The first, which is clear enough 
though not a thing of beauty, says that the main aim of universities is to turn 
out people and ideas capable of making money. The second, which is neither 
clear nor beautiful, says there are a lot of other points that it’s traditional to 
mention in this connection, and that they’re all good things too, in their way, 
and that the official with the glue-pot has been having a busy day, and that 
we’ve lost track of the subject of the verb in the last line, and that it may be 
time for another full stop (ibid.). 
 
On one level, this is obviously a critique of the bureaucratic language of 
policymakers. On another, however, it also reveals something about the 
background assumptions concerning the policy process. In this account, civil 
servants throw together words expected to elicit positive responses from the public. 
It is, in fact, meant to be an only slightly exaggerated satire of New Labour 
approach to governing: 
 
‘Modernization’ is, of course, trademark NewLabourSpeak, here combined 
with the language of the personnel departments of commercial companies. 
What it essentially means is that, given a number of people doing roughly 
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the same job, a way has to be fund to pay some of them less than others 
(WAUF, p. 161).  
 
What this type of analysis relies on, however, is more than just a tinge of sarcasm 
towards meaning-oriented modes of governing. Fundamentally, it assumes a causal 
relationship between framing of a concept, an idea, or a problem, and forms of 
political agency. Alan Finlayson associates this type of political strategy with the 
post-Habermasian shift from a ‘culture debating’ to a ‘culture consuming’ public:  
 
Contestation of the boundaries that hedged off political speech from other 
sorts of speech has been central to democratic politics…latterly, this has 
extended into a general challenge to the distinctiveness of political 
communication. What counts as a political statement or expression had also 
been subject to challenge such that any form of communication can be 
regarded as political (…) It was from this world of nervous individualization, 
social anxiety shared between strangers, permanent and competitive 
judgment, mass media distraction, fear of collective activity and constant 
search for leadership, that New Labour was born. Our condition is that of 
simultaneous proliferation of meanings and a downscaling of their 
meaningfulness. Everything needs to be read but nothing is really worth 
reading. In drawing on this culture…New Labour revealed to us something 
about what it is and how it works. It cannot simply speak and ‘do’ politics in 
‘traditional’ ways. It is engaged in the process of ‘making sense’ (Finlayson, 
2003, p. 30–34). 
 
As the title of Collini’s second book on the topic, Speaking of Universities, 
suggests, the way something is talked about – spoken – has the power to bring 
things about. There is a direct line between ‘marketspeak’ and policies such as 
REF, rankings, and so forth. This vision of society shares the basic assumptions 
with Orwell’s 1984: ideology is transmitted through words, and these words can 
serve to distort reality. War is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength; 
repetition of such words is sufficient to convince the ‘receiver’ – the audience – of 
their truthfulness, successfully obscuring the nature of things, and thus changing 
how subjects relate to the world around them.  
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A similar line of critique is pursued in Killing Thinking: Death of the University 
(Evans, 2004). Mary Evans, Professor of Gender Studies at the LSE, analyses the 
transformation of UK universities in relation to two social trends: massification 
and the rise of audit and assessment. In her view, audit is “conceptually illiterate” 
(2004, p. 30); the obsession with testing and measurement reveals an impoverished 
imagination that cannot conceive of the value of knowledge for its own sake, 
probably best reflected in the statements of Charles Clarke, then-Secretary of State 
for Higher Education, who famously referred to it as “a bit dodgy”.  
 
Evans explicitly compares the language of university reforms to 1984 and 
concludes:  
 
Eroding the meaning and the use of language is, as every dictator knows, an 
important part of recreating a social world. The invasion of the academy by 
'transferable skills', 'relevance' and 'entrepreneurship' is part of the creation 
of a new academic world - an academic world which is assumed to be more 
'modern' than the one it replaces. This rhetorical agenda about – and for – 
universities is all too welcome to some academics and academic 
administrators, since it suggests that universities could become an integrated 
part of the social world, a world of decision making, profit enhancing and 
energetic social intervention. Maintaining the boundary between the 
academic and the non-academic world is not easy, and the seduction of the 
new rhetoric of learning is that it apparently promises a part in the matters 
and events of the wider social world. Rather than being sidelined to some 
social and cultural dead end the universities are promised a part in that 
'project of modernity' which is dear to so many hearts (Evans, 2004, p. 66, 
my emphasis). 
 
Tracing the lineage back to Orwell thus means more than a ritual invocation of the 
English intellectual whose name had become synonymous with the critique of 
public language. It also serves to affirm that words matter, both in the general sense 
– that is, they require close attention, are not trivial – but also in the sense in which 
they have ‘real’, ontological effects. To paraphrase, words create, shape, and can 
also merge worlds.   
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The assumption that ‘words create worlds’, of course, is not uniquely applied to 
the policies of New Labour. In For the University, Thomas Docherty traces it to 
the period between 1960s and 1980s: 
 
The culture of mistrust that dogs and threatens the sustained viability of the 
University is something that is at least tacitly endorsed, if not actually 
inaugurated, by political discourse. The debate here, over the question of 
social and cultural authority, might have its roots in real politics. We should 
recall that, in the 1970s, miners in the UK successfully challenged the centre 
of political authority. Edward Heath, faced with a powerful strike, went to 
the country explicitly inviting people to decide who rules Britain? The people 
duly did decide and, in the election, they ejected Heath from office. That 
political mistake was not to be repeated. When miners again went on strike a 
decade later, in 1984, the question of who rules Britain was not posed. 
Instead, the government established a new kind of language for a new debate 
(Docherty, 2011, p. 2, my emphasis).   
 
Here we can see more explicitly how the link of language, culture, and politics is 
established through maintenance of the boundary between rhetoric (or discourse) 
and ‘real politics’. Language is the primary point of epistemic access: it both 
reveals and obscures the intention of civil servants, or the ‘true face of power’. The 
role of the critic, then, is to unmask intentions hiding behind language, using the 
same tool: superior powers of language. 
 
Obviously, given the literary background of Collini, Docherty, and Evans, it is not 
surprising they should choose to focus on the language of policies. Yet, by the start 
of the 21st century, it was becoming clear this line of critique cannot fully account 
for how things came about. The ambiguity of Docherty’s “at least tacitly endorsed, 
of not actually inaugurated” line is telling. Is discourse more about directing the 
preferences of specific actors, or does it literally create realities? Does policy 
language, on par with Orwell’s 1984, ‘brainwash’ people into actually believing 
that, to borrow Thatcher’s famous dictum, ‘there is no alternative’? If so, how does 
this come about – who has the power to make this happen, and how did they acquire 
it? Answering these questions seemed to require a more serious engagement with 
the political and economic mechanisms by which these ideas were translated into 
 139 
practice. This gave rise to a slightly different strand of critique, one that can be 
dubbed ‘political-economic’.  
 
The name(s) of numbers  
 
Andrew McGettigan’s The Great University Gamble: money, markets, and the 
future of higher education (GUG) set out explicitly to provide an account of 
“political economy of institutions in their new environment” (McGettigan, 2013, 
x). McGettigan’s book is widely cited and, despite the inflation in the number of 
volumes that focus on the critique of the transformation of higher education and 
research in the UK, remains highly influential. At the point of publication, 
McGettigan offered one of the rare economic analyses of policy changes in higher 
education accessible to a broader audience. The book traces the neoliberalisation 
of higher education and research through connected analysis of massification, 
changes in student financing (including tuition fees, introduction of loans, and 
abolishment of EMA), and techniques of market-making including sector 
deregulation (the rise of for-profit and private providers), introduction of private 
equity, and, finally, the selling of student loan book.  
 
Rather than mocking the ‘gibberish’ of Government’s policy papers, McGettigan 
engaged with numbers and statistics concerning, for instance, student numbers, 
calculation of financial (actuarial) risk, and the role of private equity. While the 
book is written in a relatively accessible journalistic prose, it does not shy away 
from tackling technical concepts, or utilizing tables and graphs.  
 
In the years following the economic crash of 2008 these concepts have filtered 
from specialized into general critical vocabulary; however, at the time of 
publication, in the context of critique of higher education and research they were 
still, in many ways, ‘anathema’ concepts. McGettigan, therefore, did two things: 
one was to take financial instruments seriously; the other was to try to explain to 
an educated but still ‘lay’ audience what they were: 
 
Above all, we need to be attuned to the inflections of ‘privatisation’, which 
in common parlance is normally limited to the transfer of assets and 
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responsibilities from the state to the private sector. In higher education, we 
see different processes, policy considerations and initiatives: 
 
1. Marketisation or external privatisation, whereby new operations with 
different corporate forms are allowed to enter the state system to increase 
competition. (…) 
2. Commodification – the presentation of higher education as solely a private 
benefit to the individual consumer; even as a financial asset where the return 
on investment is seen in higher earnings upon graduation.  
3. Independence from regulation – private providers assessing the student 
loan book are not bound by numbers controls and do not have to comply with 
reporting or monitoring requirements nor widen (sic) participation initiatives. 
4. Internal privatisation – the changes to revenue streams within institutions 
so that for example, direct public funding is replaced by private tuition fee 
income. (GUG, p. 8).  
 
The interesting thing, however, is that McGettigan is not an economist, a political 
scientist, or even a sociologist. Originally trained as a philosopher at the University 
of Warwick, McGettigan was in the process of completing his PhD at the 
University of Middlesex when the Centre for Research in Modern European 
Philosophy (CRMEP) was closed. The closure of CRMEP became one of causes 
celèbres of the ‘war on universities’. In 2010, one of administrative reforms at 
Middlesex announced that the hitherto highly regarded Centre would be split into 
separate units, each to be integrated into bigger Departments/Faculties. Such 
reforms have, by that point, become quite common in UK universities: in 
particular, social sciences and humanities departments, frequently dubbed too 
expensive, were disbanded and/or transformed into smaller units – usually within 
a suitably marketable environment, such as schools of business and management. 
With Middlesex, however, the matter drew both an opposition from academics in 
the UK, and support from philosophical luminaries abroad – from Badiou and 
Butler to Sloterdijk and Žižek. It was eventually resolved by the relocation of 
CRMEP to Kingston University (Alliez et al, 2010), whose then-Vice-Chancellor, 
Peter Scott, was himself a prominent and fervent critic of Government’s higher 
education policies. While, in this sense, CRMEP and its staff were luckier than 
many of their counterparts in other UK universities, to many commentators this 
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only confirmed that social sciences and humanities across the country were under 
attack by neoliberal forces (e.g. Segal, 2010). 
 
In this sense, McGettigan shared the same starting point as critics of ‘audit culture’ 
who witnessed the closure of the CCCS. Yet, his opening positioning is narrated 
quite differently:  
 
In 2010, a series of events brought me to the realisation I knew hardly 
anything about what was happening in English universities, despite having 
been around them as a student, lecturer and employee for the best part of 20 
years (GUG, vii) 
 
This represents a significant departure from previous entry points. Despite having 
no professional knowledge of higher education policy, economics, or public 
administration, neither literary scholars such as Collini, Docherty, or Evans, nor 
anthropologists such as Strathern, Wright, or Shore exhibited much reticence about 
writing on higher education. Having a position within higher education seemed to 
constitute sufficient epistemic legitimation. McGettigan, by contrast, began by 
admitting that despite having been part of the system he knew very little about how 
it works.  From this perspective, the relevance of engagement with ‘facts and 
figures’ – especially the latter – becomes clearer. A more serious engagement with 
policy instruments, in turn, should be placed in the context of intellectual 
mobilization around the Campaign for the Public University and the Council for 
the Defence of British Universities.  
 
Playing (with) politics 
 
The Campaign for the Public University (CPU) was initially established by John 
Holmwood, Gurminder Bhambra, and a group of PhD students who were at the 
University of Warwick in the period leading up to the publication of the 
Government’s 2011 White Paper, Students at the Heart of the System. Building on 
the momentum of 2010 student protests, the Campaign aimed to provide a broad 
platform for academics – mostly from social sciences and humanities – to mount 
an opposition to higher education reforms. Not long after, another organization 
with a similar agenda was established: Council for the Defence of British 
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Universities (CDBU). Unlike CPU, which was a broad coalition of academics, 
students, and activists across the UK, CDBU was predominantly comprised of 
high-ranking professors from Russell Group universities with a heavy 
representation of Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
The Campaign and the Council initially worked together, but eventually came to 
disagreement concerning level of ‘political radicalism’ in their publications. 
Despite ideological divergence, two groups’ political strategies were quite 
complementary. CDBU published articles on its website and also funded 
McGettigan’s book. Its major role, however, was to use the influence of individual 
members to lobby the House of Lords to exercise rights of veto, especially since 
there seemed to be a chance of stirring up cross-bench opposition to reforms. 
Additionally, David Willetts was the Minister for Universities, which probably 
contributed to belief it would be possible to exert some influence over policies13.  
 
While CPU also produced what could be considered more ‘traditional’ forms of 
intellectual interventions – articles in Open Democracy, letters in The Guardian, 
and two edited volumes, most of its energy was channeled into the Alternative 
White Paper. In Defence of the Public Higher Education (further: AWP) was 
published on the Campaign’s website in 2011. Announced and promoted through 
social media, it adopts the format and style of a ‘regular’ policy paper: clear and 
concise, with relatively few references, headed by a point-by-point executive 
summary, and followed by proposals for what the authors and signatories think the 
Government should do for, or about, higher education. The fact it is more policy-
friendly than literary critique is evident from one of the opening paragraphs:  
 
We do not argue against the market, as such, but for the recognition that 
market relations cannot encompass all social relations and that there are 
 
13 Willetts often accepted invitations to share the platform with critics of the Coalition’s reforms, 
though, as can be gleaned from tuition fees and the REF, not necessarily allowing himself to be 
swayed by his opponents’ arguments. Rather, this strategy of engaging in debate with a wide range 
of social and political actors should be seen as an application of neoliberal policy of ‘governing by 
consensus’. In other words, inviting consultation on specific policy issues was more of an attempt 
to pacify sources of possible resistance by giving them a voice and thus co-opting them into the 
political process, a strategy that, in and of itself, is associated with neoliberal (or post-liberal) forms 
of governing.  
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important social conditions that are necessary for markets to flourish. 
Subjecting education to the market risks undermining what enables both 
society and markets to flourish. (AWP, para. 1.6) 
 
This is quite far from the dismissive mockery of policy narratives that characterises 
literary critique. The following sentence in the same paragraph helps position the 
narrative more clearly: 
   
It is illogical that a financial crisis brought about by market failure should be 
used by government as the occasion for the marketisation of our system of 
public higher education (ibid.) 
 
This situates the paper clearly within the domain of the political, rather than outside 
of it. Its purpose is to argue higher education has a public role, which cannot be 
reduced, expressed, or served by market instruments. It lists some aspects: 
maintenance of confidence in public debate, intergenerational justice, health and 
well-being. In this sense, the paper shares with other interventions the emphasis on 
public, as opposed to private, value of knowledge. Where it departs from them, 
however, is the vocabulary of justification: instead of a principled assertion that 
education is not for sale, it engages in economic and political analysis that aims to 
show that education is not entirely subjectable to market forces. In this, its tone is 
remarkably different from the refusal to entertain the language of ‘markets’: it 
argues for rebalancing public and private elements of higher education, rather than 
dismissing the latter entirely.  
 
In Boltanski and Thévenot’s terms, this mode represents a ‘compromise’ (2006, 
pp. 293–335) between different worlds. It hybridizes different orders of worth: 
from the ‘civic’ world it takes the relevance of democratic deliberation and trust; 
from the ‘market’ world it takes the relevance of economic flourishing. It would 
be possible to interpret this mix of public and private – or ‘social’ and ‘market’ – 
logics as a vestige of belief in the possibility of combining market mechanisms 
with social justice, which certainly informed New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ (e.g. Hay, 
1999), as well as with the broader project of social democracy. The paper 
occasionally approvingly cites the Dearing Report (Dearing, 1997), which, despite 
introducing ‘top-up’ fees, nonetheless affirmed the public purpose of education 
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(leaving aside the question of whether for reasons other than rhetorical). More 
simply, however, it could be seen as a reflection of the genre: the AWP is not a 
‘jeremiad’ or a soliloquy, and, as such, is not necessarily addressed to other 
intellectuals. If its purpose is to engage seriously with governmental reforms, then 
it makes sense it should do so in a language palatable to civil servants: not 
invocations of eternal or universal value of social sciences and humanities, but 
arguments that attempt to convince the intended audience that their plans have 
harmful consequences in the long term, including in relation to their own criteria. 
 
The contrast of this more market-friendly (or, more precisely, more market-order-
friendly) approach is particularly pronounced when compared to two related 
publications that came out at the same time: The Manifesto for the Public 
University (Holmwood, ed., 2011), published by Bloomsbury, who also published 
Docherty’s For the University, and The Assault on Universities: A Manifesto for 
Resistance (Bailey and Freedman, eds. 2011), published by Pluto (who also 
published McGettigan’s book). Despite their titles, and the inclusion of a set of 
political commitments, both publications are edited volumes, closer in style and 
layout to ‘classical’ intellectual interventions than to political pamphlets and 
manifestos. They do not mean to demonstrate that marketisation is happening or 
that neoliberalism is bad, but, rather, to provide a set of intellectual interpretations 
of these trends.  
 
 Justification: from ontology to epistemology (and back) 
 
Interventions converge around the mode of justification when it comes to 
arguments why education should not be subjected to market logic. While 
diagnostic aspects, as we could see, can ‘adopt’ the language and tools of policy 
discourses, normative aspects almost inevitably entail a shift to the ‘ontological’ 
mode: in other words, the assertion of the ‘whatness of what is’.  
 
In the opening chapter of The Great University Gamble, for instance, McGettigan 
uses the ‘nature’ of education to argue against the damaging effects of the market: 
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Is education a consumer good that benefits from market reforms? It is not 
consumed in the same way as gas, electricity and water, where privatisation 
has hardly been an overwhelming success (GUG, p. 10, my emphasis). 
 
Later in the book, he qualifies the category of ‘beings’ education belongs to in 
order to correct what he feels is government’s misunderstanding of its true nature:   
 
In two ways, the government misunderstands the kind of ‘good’ that 
education is: 
 
The market is being set up as if undergraduate education were a normal 
consumer good: it is not. For better or ill, undergraduate HE in England is a 
positional good: institutions are ranked in hierarchy, and opportunities are 
restricted. Its reforms treat it as solely of benefit to the private individual, 
missing the associated public benefits which are now at risk (GUG, p. 55) 
 
Collini takes a somewhat similar approach to drawing distinctions in comparing 
universities and private companies: 
 
The truth is, of course, that universities are not businesses and they do not 
operate in a market... All comparisons and analogies are potentially 
misleading, but it would be less inaccurate to say that, historically, British 
universities have been national cultural institutions that more closely 
resembled, say, the British Museum or the BBC rather than, say, Bhs or BP 
(Collini, 2010, reprinted in WAUF). 
 
This is how critique demarcates different worlds. On the one hand, there is the 
market world, where entities such as businesses or oil companies reside. On the 
other, there is the sphere of un-quantifiable goods (or good), which is what should 
be the proper location of universities and academic knowledge. From here, we can 
draw implications for how they should be valued: 
 
…There are some kinds of intellectual enquiry that are goods in themselves, 
that need to be pursued at the highest level, and that will almost certainly 
continue to require a certain amount of public support. These may now form 
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a relatively minor part of the activities carried on in universities, and it is 
much easier, using economic and utilitarian arguments, to justify the other 
activities; but they remain indispensable. Amid the uncertainties currently 
facing universities, the only certain thing is that these are all problems which 
will be exacerbated rather than solved by placing them in the lap of the 
market. (Collini, 2003) 
 
The positioning of higher education (or knowledge) as a good, thus, proceeds in 
two steps. The first is to claim education is not a ‘normal’ consumer good. This 
serves to destabilise its association with the world of the market. The second is to 
claim that, as such, it should be excluded – in total, or in part – from the order of 
worth that aims to reduce it to elements ‘amenable’ to market inclusion.  Trying to 
reassign (or reposition) them to the first sphere is bound to create adverse effects.  
 
Rather than curry favour by pretending that these are in fact the chief 
purposes of universities, their defenders might do better to acknowledge the 
non-utilitarian nature of much intellectual enquiry... As a start, one might 
want to insist, first, that intellectual activity can, for the most part, be judged 
but not measured; second, that although a number of ‘skills’ may be a by-
product of a university education, they are not its defining purpose; and third, 
universities only bear superficial and largely misleading resemblances to 
commercial companies (ibid.). 
 
The third step, thus, seeks to specify forms of evaluation, or types of ‘test’, that are 
admissible from critics’ point of view. If intellectual activity can be judged but not 
reduced to a number, it should only be judged by those who have spent years 
perfecting academic ‘ways of seeing’; that is, other academics.  
 
Given that it is premised on an assertion about the nature of knowledge and/or 
education, this mode of justification can be dubbed ‘ontological’: it concerns, in 
Boltanski’s terms, ‘the whatness of what is’. Further, this ontological mode morphs 
diagnostic and normative facets: asserting the nature of knowledge as a non-
marketable commodity, and the non-identity between universities and companies, 
translates into the way they should be governed. In Collini’s argument, that entails 
prying knowledge (or, more precisely, certain forms of knowledge) away from 
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attempts to measure it or reduce it to market principles. McGettigan’s approach is 
to assert knowledge also has value that cannot be expressed in terms of private 
benefit or utility, and thus measured in economic terms. While one frames 
knowledge as the opposite of marketable goods (commodities), and the other as 
not entirely commensurable with, they share the argument that appeals to an 
essence of things. Contrasting knowledge with goods such as electricity and gas, 
or universities with private companies, then, is a form of asserting ontological non-
equivalence: not only that one cannot be reduced to another, they also cannot be 
measured (or judged) according to the same criterion. 
 
The ontological mode of justification is not an exclusive reserve of intellectual 
interventions critical of higher education reforms. David Willetts’ A University 
Education (AUE), which came out at the end of 2017, presents a lengthy narrative 
of the history of universities in the UK in the first part, to develop proposals 
(‘solutions’) for how they should be run in the last. Interestingly, Willetts opens 
the book with a critique of precisely ontological modes of justification: 
 
We shift from is to ought, from descriptive to normative, and that account of 
a university becomes the standards against which all contemporary 
universities are judged. Many are then found wanting. This leads straight into 
narratives of betrayal and ruin, which is often attributed to the very growth 
of higher education which Whiggish optimists celebrate. It looks as if the 
critics are uncomfortable with the reality of mass higher education (AUE, p. 
37).  
 
While Willetts associates ‘essentialist’ reasoning with the critique of the 
transformation of higher education (and, by extension, with an idealist tradition), 
his own account is no less prescriptive: 
 
We need an account of what it is to be a university which is neither so loose 
that anything counts nor so stringent that it ends up left behind and irrelevant 
like Pattison’s hysterical attacks on Gladstone’s Victorian reforms of Oxford. 
We can already see the outlines. A university is an independent corporation 
devoted to higher education. It is a community of scholars and students. Its 
autonomy, evidenced above all in the right to award its own degrees, sets a 
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university apart from other forms of higher education. For education to be 
higher it must be at the frontiers of knowledge: that does not mean it must 
include research but at least its teaching needs to be informed by new 
discoveries and current arguments (AUE, p. 37, my emphasis).  
 
There is a lot going on in this paragraph: in addition to using the opportunity to 
position critics of governmental reforms as a bunch of outdated elitists by drawing 
a not-too-implicit analogy between writers like Collini and Pattison (and, by 
extension, Gladstone and himself), it also attributes particular characteristics to ‘the 
university’. Some are inconspicuous enough, like independence. Some, however, 
less so: the definition of autonomy as “the right to award its own degrees” is very 
different – and has strikingly different political implications – than, for instance, 
definitions that emphasise the independence of universities from state interference, 
assert the principle of territorial integrity, and so on. It is also notable in the 
breaking up of the unity of teaching and research: if a university need not 
necessarily include research, this clearly opens the path for the bifurcation and 
further stratification of universities into ‘teaching only’ – precisely one of possible 
outcomes of the REF.  
 
Positioning the book as an intellectual intervention, Willetts takes particular care 
to delineate it from other representatives of the genre: 
 
(…) Crude conspiracy theories claim to explain what is happening to a 
complex institution. One such narrative is ‘Universities are under attack from 
managers/ministers/markets threatening my/your/all disciplines’. Another is 
‘Universities are ivory towers: there are too many of them and too many 
people go’. That is why I have tried to convey what I have learned from my 
university education over the past decade and assembled the evidence to 
explain why both of those narratives are wrong. Such is my respect for the 
values of the academia that, even if one may suspect this is a heavily 
disguised ministerial memoir, it is at least the first example which has been 
subject to academic peer review (AUE, p. 361).    
 
Despite ostensibly criticising ‘essentialist’ approaches, Willetts is equally 
concerned with the whatness of what is – in this case, the nature of ‘the university’. 
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His account is framed as more historical than others; yet, to assert that the nature 
of the institution is fundamentally defined by its history is no less an ontological 
statement than the assertion that knowledge is not the same as gas or electricity. 
While clearly writing against a particular approach to critique – one defined here 
as ‘literary-cultural’ – Willetts nonetheless asserts authority through the same sort 
of epistemic positioning that presupposes a privileged access to reality: I know 
what the university is.  
 
The importance of epistemic positioning became evident in the encounter between 
Collini and Willetts during the launch of Collini’s book, Speaking of Universities 
in March 2017 (which I attended as part of fieldwork). The event, entitled ‘The 
Future of Our Universities’, was hosted by the London Review of Books and took 
place in University of London’s Senate House – notable both for its grand interior, 
and its 1984 associations. Besides Collini and Willetts, speakers included Marina 
Warner, another prominent critic and former professor of English at Essex (from 
which she resigned in protest of managerial reforms), and Dinah Birch, Professor 
of English Literature at the University of Liverpool, as the chair.  
 
The event started inconspicuously enough – with an opening statement about the 
‘state’ of higher education (grim) and worries about the future of universities 
(justified), followed by praise for Collini’s book, as is customary (Bacevic, 
fieldwork notes). Collini spoke for about fifteen minutes, framing some of the main 
points of the book. Then Willetts got up to speak.  
 
DW: Thank you very much for the opportunity to join you this evening. And 
of course I enjoy what Stefan wrote about British intellectual history in the 
19th and 20th century, and I am kind of obliged to read everything Stefan 
writes about universities. And there are flashes of brilliance in what he writes. 
I thought his description of what is ‘the real world’ in his book What the 
universities are for is absolutely to the point. Nobody is trying to argue that 
the values and distinctive characters of universities are entirely to disappear 
and be entirely absorbed by other values of other organisations in the society.  
 
The positioning in the opening statement is clear on a few points. While asserting 
knowledge of Collini’s writing of universities (‘kind of obliged to read everything’) 
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it consigns Collini’s epistemic authority to intellectual history. It also immediately 
qualifies its distance from Collini’s argument, by framing the latter as an 
overstatement.  
 
         [Willetts paused] 
 
DW: But -- and it's a very big but. But, the-- this language of defending 
universities from all these terrible outside threats seems to me very far from 
the reality that I see.   
 
         [Ironic laughter in audience: Ha! Ha!] 
 
Here we have both an emphasis on language – not unlike the focus of Collini, 
Warner, and other representatives of literary-cultural genre of critique – and the 
assertion of epistemic authority through claims of an insight into ‘reality’.  
 
DW: And if I’d try to do a Stefan Collini on Stefan Collini, I would say: what 
is the cultural phenomenon that lies beneath this argument that both Stefan 
and Marina Warner espouse very elegantly and passionately, and of course 
believe in?  
 
The framing of opponents as emotional, as well as misguided, is remarkably similar 
to the ‘brainwashed’ VCs, ‘sadist Hitlers’, and ‘Thatcherite ideologues’ of other 
interventions.  
 
DW: But it’s a picture of the government as either incompetent or a liar,  
 
[shouts in the audience: Oi! Oi! Boo] 
 
[Willetts pauses, laughs, says ‘O, let us hear’ and carries on] 
 
It’s a picture of government as both incompetent and a liar. Now, where have 
I come across this? This is classical, neoliberal, small business, ‘let’s get 
government out of the way, they are the problem, they are the enemy, they 
are dangerous’. 
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In this, Willetts fascinatingly managed to position himself as a critic of 
neoliberalism through framing his ‘opponents’ as closet neoliberals. He proceeded 
to quote passages from Collini’s book that supposedly confirmed this reading, and 
to ‘fact-check’ Collini, listing a number of ‘incorrect’ statements he had 
supposedly made (Bacevic, fieldwork notes). The audience grew increasingly 
agitated, with one member eventually getting up and practically heckling Willetts. 
The event was notable not only for this ostensive ‘breach’ of academic etiquette, 
but also, more importantly, for the assertion of epistemic superiority. Rather than 
frame his critique in political terms – as, after all, most of the audience expected – 
Willetts was saying, basically, that Collini did not know what he was talking about.  
 
The specific feature of critique of neoliberalism in UK higher education, thus, is 
assertion of authority via claims to superior access to the ‘whatness of what is’. 
This assertion is meant to circumvent adherence to moral frameworks for 
justification associated with Boltanski and Thévenot’s polities: the assertion that 
this is because of the inherent nature of things/goods, at the same time, positions 
the speaker as someone whose view of reality trumps these distinctions. While 
some interventions will include arguments that fit within one of six orders – for 
instance, the argument that commodification of education is bad for democracy fits 
the ‘civic’ polity – they always entail, at least in addition, the ontological mode of 
justification.  
 
The ontological mode of justification, however, does not lend itself easily to reality 
tests. Asserting that education is not a commodity, or that universities need not 
necessarily engage in research, remains a purely ‘academic’ statement unless 
somehow brought to bear on reality. Knowledge or universities do not ‘naturally’ 
behave in any sort of way. Ontological justification thus inevitably has to invoke a 
social agent that has the power to make certain things happen. This brings us to 
how interventions frame political agency.  
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Thatcherites and bankers: political agency 
 
Asserting that education and market values are non-commensurable would seem 
to be at odds with the broader diagnostic of intellectual interventions: namely, if 
something is not a commodity, how come it’s being sold?  
 
McGettigan readily admits that markets in higher education are an outcome of 
governmental intervention: “Markets of this kind have to be created. In the longer 
term, these measures are designed to create a wholly different system with markets 
determining what is offered” (GUG, pp. 5–8) 
 
The logical question is who and why creates markets:  
 
Market solutions are a key plank of a general ideology that runs across all 
political parties. Many ministers and influential individuals in government 
today were junior ministers and advisors in the heyday of Thatcherism. For 
them the ‘discipline of the market place, the power of the consumer and the 
engine of competition’ was needed in education…the market envisioned by 
Conservatives in higher education, as a lightly regulated sector with a variety 
of providers, cannot appear fully formed. It has to be created (GUG, p. 55) 
  
There are free market ideologues in both Coalition partners who simply see 
increasing competition and student consumerism as battering rams with 
which to overcome university inertia. (…) Ultimately, these aspects come 
together in a single ideological aim. The broader vision in the UK is to roll 
back the state to a minimum function – to broker deals between finance and 
private sector provision. This continues a strand of 1980s public policy but 
one revivified by improvements in data management and, yes, financial 
derivatives (GUG, p. 8) 
 
Any question as to who benefits would need to clearly demarcate the self-
positioning, constantly lobbying elite and new private providers primed to 
enter the ‘level playing field’ from the middle tier. What motivates this 
gamble is not hard to find. The clear intent of the government is to make 
universities more customer-, business-, and industry-focused (GUG, p. 7) 
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Neoliberal or market ideology is therefore a vestige of the time of Thatcher. This 
establishes a continuity between education policies of the Conservative Party, and 
those implemented by the Coalition Government. Yet, while ascribing ‘general 
ideology’ to all political parties, interventions are reticent to specify the role played 
by New Labour in implementing these reforms. One of the chapters in The Assault 
on Universities, titled “The war against democracy and education”, argues that 
 
The formation of the Conservative and Liberal government in the UK context 
has intensified a war against democracy…recent changes in policy in 
education need to be seen in terms of continuation with certain elite strategies 
from the past. The main difference lies in terms of the aggressive 
abandonment of any idea of social citizenship (that was still evident within 
New Labour) for a more hard-nosed liberal citizenship (Stevenson, 2011, pp. 
71–75).  
 
It is not difficult to interpret this as equally a consequence of the awareness of many 
of the critics that a much-hoped-for Labour Government continued (and expanded) 
neoliberal policies, and that Liberal Democrats went back on their widely 
trumpeted commitment to tuition-free education. This suggests a broader political 
unease: there were, literally, no ‘good guys’ (on the) left. One way in which 
interventions attempt to resolve this, as we can see, is by establishing a clear 
lineage between the political ideology of decision-makers at present, and 
“Thatcherite free-market ideologues” of the past. This serves to frame 
neoliberalism as ‘Other’, both politically and institutionally. The other is to identify 
what could collectively be called market Träger, or ‘agents of neoliberalism’: 
bankers (e.g. Baron Browne of Madingley), consultants for international 
corporations (such as McKinsey), etc. The third became to situate these ‘agents of 
neoliberalism’ inside universities: among university managers and, in particular, 
Vice-Chancellors.  
 
Distrust towards university managers, as we can remember, was already a strong 
motive in EP Thompson’s Warwick University, Ltd. On the one hand, this can be 
seen as a reflection of their association with the ‘boss’ or capitalist class, consistent 
with the ontological tenets of Marxism. Yet, the degree of viciousness in some 
 154 
cases went far and above the critique of politicians or even bankers, especially 
when it came to interpreting managers’ intentions or motivations.  
 
Evans’ Killing Thinking is illustrative: 
 
We need to try and enter the nightmare world of the university appraiser or 
quality assurance manager. We have to assume (although it is sometimes 
difficult) that these women and men cannot be compared with the piano 
player in the brothel – these people do actually know that they are working 
in universities. So we could perhaps assume that assessors choose their 
careers in order to make good the absence of God in a secular society. 
Judgement in the twenty-first century no longer lies in the hand of God: 
without this moral compass, however rigid it may have appeared, we 
enthusiastically create our own systems of judgement. The facile belief that 
a secular society is in some way free of the authority of judgement would be 
proved false by a day spent in a British university. Since God no longer 
exists, we have invented assessment... Equally, the expression 'little Hitlers' 
might have a resonance for many academics; despite its unfortunate anti-
German connotations, most people are familiar with the idea that there are 
some people (be they in universities or any other community) who simply 
cannot resist the opportunity to evaluate, judge and even reach the paradise 
of the appraiser, the condemnation of the appraised (KT, pp. 34–35). 
 
Literary embellishment aside, this is a rather stark condemnation in itself. 
Managers and assessors are equated with automatons, but not sufficiently 
unthinking automatons as to excuse them from political responsibility: on the 
contrary, they enjoy and willingly choose the opportunity to evaluate academics. 
‘Thatcherite free-market ideologues’ get an easy hand, by comparison.  
 
Marina Warner used her position as the chair of the committee for the Man Booker 
Prize – which meant she had the opportunity to read a lot of Chinese novels – to 
compare the management of universities with the Chinese version of corporate 
communism. In an article in the London Review of Books, she remarked: 
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The world of Chinese communist corporatism, as ferociously depicted by 
their authors, keeps reminding me of higher education here, where enforcers 
rush to carry out the latest orders from their chiefs in an ecstasy of obedience 
to ideological principles which they do not seem to have examined, let alone 
discussed with the people they order to follow them (Warner, 2014). 
 
The idea of an insurmountable rift between academics and managers probably 
reached crescendo with the furore over the salary of Vice Chancellor of the 
University of Bath, Glynis Breakwell, that broke out in 2017. Through articles in 
The Guardian and elsewhere, academics and journalists started drawing attention 
to the frequently excessive pay and benefits packages given to top managers of UK 
universities. “People running our universities” were described as “fat cats” 
(Chakraborty, 2017). The mantle was taken up by Andrew Adonis, former Labour 
MP who was Minister of State for Education in Tony Blair’s government, and Head 
of Policy Unit at Number 10 in 2004 – thus also indirectly responsible for New 
Labour’s policy on tuition fees.  
 
The forms of positioning here were quite clear in drawing boundaries between 
managers, on the one hand, and academics (and, presumably, students) on the 
other. Managers became proxies for the capitalist class as a whole: their interests 
and agency, correspondingly, were associated with the interests of Big Capital, 
including ‘Big Pharma’ companies such as Astra Zeneca, whose representatives 
sat on the council of the University of Manchester. By implication, academics were 
positioned as almost completely devoid of financial interests. This unease about 
the concept of interest – or utility – will, as we will see in the next chapter, play a 
prominent role in intellectuals’ self-narratives.  
 
This is also when the concept of ‘precarity’ started figuring more prominently in 
mainstream media (e.g. Evans, 2018). While the casualization of academic labour 
had been going on for a while – legal grounds for the abolishment of the UK 
equivalent of tenure were instituted by the 1988 Education Reform Act – insecure 
employment mostly became an issue only when institutions were ‘restructured’ or 
closed, as in the cases of the CCCS at Birmingham or CRMEP at Middlesex. In 
this sense, labour insecurity primarily meant insecurity for those who were already 
employed at a higher education institution. This framing rarely focused on the 
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growing army of reserve labour, primarily composed of graduate students and 
postdocs – summarily referred to as ‘early career researchers’ – who may never 
achieve the stability or security of employment necessary to identify with a 
particular institution.  
 
Until the USS strikes in spring of 2018, the notion of precarity remained the reserve 
of activists, unions, or, alternatively, academic publications specializing in work 
and labour relations. It is possible to read the absence of precarity in intellectual 
interventions as an effect of their focus on the ‘war’ on universities: namely, if the 
emphasis is on the institution, different situations, statuses, and positionalities of 
those who make up the institution – especially if they do not remain employed at 
any single one long enough – can be of lesser interest. A more likely explanation, 
however, is that these issues remain invisible because they would puncture the 
image of ‘the’ university as a unitary institution besieged by enemy forces from 
the outside. They could also suggest that divisions and power relations within the 
institution are not necessarily reducible to ‘managers’ vs. ‘academics’, and that 
‘academics’, after all, is not a unitary notion. They would serve as a reminder that 
hierarchical divisions exist and persist within the academic community, and that 
exploitation tends to happen between academics – and especially between ‘junior’ 
and ‘senior’ ranks.  
 
The rise of the notion of precarity may signal a return to a Marxist emphasis on 
labour and labour relations. However, it also bears mentioning that ‘precarity’ still 
foregrounds the identity of ‘the academic’ (even if qua worker), thus framing 
political agency primarily on the continuum between ‘in [academic] employment 
– outside [academic] employment’. It equally serves to position ‘academics’ as a 
collective political subject. In this sense, the critique of precarity also draws on the 
dichotomy between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’: ‘inside’ is constructed as a place of 
(relative) security, while ‘outside’ is constructed as a dangerous space full of 
neoliberals.  
 
From a similar Marxist pedigree, however, comes another strand of critique, also 
concerned with the boundaries between outside and the inside. For this strand, 
however, the enemy is truly and well on the inside.  
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 Barbarians at the gate? Freedom of speech and universities’ ‘culture war’  
 
The salience of distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is crucial to 
understanding the strand of critique that associates the current crisis with the 
decline of standards within the university. Primarily through the work of Frank 
Furedi and other contributors to the online magazine Spiked!, this strand of critique 
has evolved into an attack on what is perceived to be the ‘culture of political 
correctness’; in recent years, this argument had been taken up by a number of 
politicians and commentators, including, most famously, Jo Johnson, Minister of 
State for Universities between 2015 and 2018, and Toby Young, briefly appointed 
in 2018 as the Head of Office for Students.     
 
Spiked! represents a curious mix between radical (‘anti-Stalinist’) Left and Alt-
Right. It originated in the Living Marxism journal (later abbreviated to LM), once 
associated with the Radical Communist Party of Great Britain. Increasingly, 
however, the defence of ‘free speech’ has brought Spiked and associated authors 
closer to the libertarian end of the spectrum: the magazine is reputed for receiving 
funding from the Koch Foundation, and has become a staple reference for Alt-
Right commentators who share its disdain for what they perceive to be ‘censorship’ 
and ‘content policing’.  
 
What this line of critique has in common with other forms examined here is 
suspicion towards outside intervention and its effects. The only difference is that, 
for many representatives of this strand of critique, the ‘capitulation’ has already 
happened. While it may at first appear as if it is concerned with attacking, rather 
than defending the university, its broader argument is that, in order to be saved, the 
university needs to be purified or saved from forces inimical to it, many of which 
are already ‘within the gates’.  
 
This argument has origins in the critique of decline of standards of intellectual 
inquiry and the rise of ‘philistinism’, facile commentary on current affairs. Furedi’s 
Where have all the intellectuals gone (2004) is an early representative of the genre. 
Furedi decries the ‘dumbing down’ of public debate, which he sees as a 
consequence of the erosion of universal standards of truth and culture intellectuals 
are historically best positioned to provide (2004, pp. 10–15, 72–90). This has been 
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replaced by the plurality of standards and ‘cultures’ that give political primacy to 
individual (or group) experience over common standards – in other words, by 
‘identity politics’. In this sense, it shares the vocabulary and ideological 
background with the critique of the deteriorating fabric of liberal democracy, as 
well as, in line with its title, diagnosis of deleterious effects of these changes to the 
figure of ‘public intellectual’, characteristic of the ‘declinist thesis’ (Baert, 2015; 
Baert and Shipman, 2012).  
 
Yet, it also includes a specific claim about the effects of the instrumentalization of 
knowledge, which brings it closer to other types of critique examined so far: 
 
When knowledge is regarded as a product, its relationship to its own cultural 
and intellectual origin becomes indistinct. Knowledge is increasingly seen as 
the product of a technical process rather than of human intellectual work 
(Furedi, 2004, p. 7) (…) Dumbing down is fueled by powerful forces that 
treat knowledge and culture as merely the means for the realization of a wider 
and higher objective…an orientation that is defined by a dogmatic 
commitment to instrumentalism (2004, p. 12).   
 
This is how the link is established between the general decline of standards as a 
social trend, and specific changes in higher education. What’s happened to the 
university? (Furedi, 2017) frames the transformation of universities as the last stage 
in decline of Enlightenment legacy of high culture and reasoned debate. Instead of 
this, Furedi argues, universities have given in to a “therapeutic culture” that 
perpetuates the image of students as permanently immature and in need of 
protection from any potentially disturbing experiences – from conflict with their 
peers to teaching material that discusses slavery, racism, sexual and other forms of 
violence in ways that can be hurtful to students or disrespectful of their origins 
(ibid.). In his view, this prevents them from confronting challenges that are an 
essential part of higher learning, as ‘recognition’ and ‘validation’ of ‘feeling’ takes 
precedence over the ability of reason to discern particular from the universal.    
 
This line of critique takes particular aim at ‘trigger warnings’, but expands it to 
include various cases where student unions on both sides of the Atlantic have ‘no-
platformed’ controversial speakers, cancelled parties, and used other means to 
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protect themselves from exposure to ideas that, from the standpoint of Furedi and 
associates, would have a beneficial effect on their development or maturation as 
free thinkers, intellectuals, and academic citizens. Students, however, are not the 
ones to blame. This line of critique traces the beginnings of the practice of 
‘coddling’ to university administrators, who, in their view, not only tolerate but 
actively promote the infantilization of students. This, in turn, is connected to the 
growing importance of student experience, that is, student satisfaction with 
services they get on campus, and the administrators’ fear of ‘bad press’ or student 
revolt. The reason why students can exert this sort of pressure, of course, is the 
shift to fees-based financing models, which allow them to act as consumers; in 
other words, neoliberalism.  
 
This is not necessarily the same object as in previous interventions. This line of 
critique focuses on the ‘paternalistic’, protectionist side of higher education 
policies: in other words, those policies that seek to protect or defend the interests 
of students qua consumers. It has fewer or no issues with markets as such; in fact, 
it welcomes the exchange of goods and services in the same way in which it 
welcomes the exchange (‘marketplace’) of ideas. What it does have an issue with, 
however, is that anyone would try to obstruct its flow.  
 
This line of critique converges more substantially with other forms examined here 
on the basic assumption that words are important. While, on the one hand, it takes 
‘offense’ or ‘trauma’ to be questions of (over)sensitivity – that is, it claims that 
students and other representatives of ‘language police’ invest words with the power 
they do not have – on the other, it sees few problems in investing ‘free speech’ 
(literally, words as autonomous agents) with the same set of powers. In one case, 
words can wound or otherwise affect human beings – in the other, those same 
words (if allowed to flow unrestricted) can impact, transform, and in general 
improve their lives. In fact, exposure to these free-floating ideas is, in the view of 
the advocates of ‘free speech’, the purpose of higher education, and being able to 
engage in free exchange of words the very road to wisdom. ‘Freedom of speech’, 
thus, is not so much about what is being said, as about who has the right to 
determine what will be said at universities. The problem, then, is in the shift of the 
distribution of this power towards (‘spoiled and coddled’) students, or regulators, 
university administrators, parents – in other words, anyone but themselves.  
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This type of narrative positions the speaker as the purveyor or conduit of ‘true 
university values’; he (or she) knows what higher education really should be about. 
Sometimes, it is justified by references to academic freedom and/or academic self-
governance: that is, the idea that higher education is best left to academics, who 
should have the final (if not the only) say in how it should be run. Speaker’s 
privileged access – epistemic or political – to the real nature of this inquiry is, of 
course, rarely explicated and even less often questioned. The detached tone of a 
concerned observer, thus, combines the positionality of an insider – someone who 
is an academic – with the epistemic authority of an outsider – that is, someone who 
stands above the petty squabbles and divisions that inform life both ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’. The position from which this defence is made presupposes that the 
speaker has privileged access to universal values, and the power to give an 
authoritative interpretation of what they are in situations of dispute.  
 
Steve Fuller’s Academic Caesar (Fuller, 2016) takes a similar route. In part a 
sociocultural critique similar to the style of Furedi, in part a semi-cynical ‘how-to’ 
manual addressed to the hypothetical university leader who seeks to steer the 
University through ‘troubled waters’ while accepting the ‘reality’ of neoliberalism, 
the book fuses the defence of the universalist tendencies of liberalism with 
‘strategic’ or instrumental reasoning, justified, again, by the exigencies of the 
present moment: 
 
Why should the state, as the custodian of society, be interested in sustaining 
the teacher-researcher role that underwrites the university’s corporate 
integrity? Consider the talk about the need to foster a ‘climate of innovation’. 
Fidelity to the concept requires more than using the word ‘innovation’ a lot 
and boosting each and every crazy idea to paradigm-shifting status. Rather, 
it involves the public’s exposure – both in and out of the classroom – to 
people who embody the dynamic rush of intellectual life  (…) They routinely 
move others away from their comfort zones, as they move themselves from 
their own. It is in this deep sense that universities provide a ‘climate of 
innovation’ which merits continued state support. But who is capable of 
leading such people? Enter the Academic Caesar (Fuller, 2016, p. 41) 
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Lest the audience retain any doubt over the speaker’s qualification to advise ‘the 
Academic Caesar’, Fuller reminds his readers where academics’ true allegiances 
should lie:  
 
… AC must also maintain a clear distinction between the university’s 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ constituencies – say, on the one hand, academic 
staff, students and alumni, and on the other, representatives of politics, 
business, etc. This is how a university in the imperial mode retains its 
republican core, and the AC can legitimize his/her exercise of power in terms 
of the protection of institutional autonomy. Thus, the AC must prevent 
external constituencies from unduly influencing the governance of the 
internal constituencies, say, by allowing a large client-oriented grant to an 
academic department to set a standard to which other departments are then 
held accountable. Rather, the AC should see such grants as, in the first 
instance, upsetting the institution’s equilibrium, which of course need not be 
negative. However, the AC must then use grant overheads creatively to 
engage in compensation or redistribution across the institution (ibid, p. 52). 
 
There is hardly anything particularly ‘revealing’ in this injunction: in fact, it is 
highly likely many academic managers apply similar reasoning when engaging in 
their work. What it does do, however, is affirm the speaker’s epistemic authority 
to adjudicate the boundaries of the university – what should be in and what should 
be out. In a manner of speaking, this approach merges elements of civic, domestic, 
and industrial orders; the figure of the ‘Academic Caesar’ is a crossover between 
the ruler of the polity (in this case, the republic of academics) and pater familias 
(in the sense in which the university is a ‘home’ or household) whose ‘job’ is to 
create value for his constituents/family. At the same time, there is more than a whiff 
of military leadership, as his task is above all to protect those who are ‘inside’ 
(within the household/boundaries of the polity) from incursions from the ‘outside’.  
 
This dynamic of inside/outside, in the end, will assume a particularly salient form 
in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and in the discussions about universities’ alleged 
‘Remainer’ bias.  
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Among the few consistent characteristics of referendum results was the fact that, 
on the whole, university town tended to vote Remain (Finn, 2018). Obviously, 
there are different ways in which this can be interpreted sociologically: university 
towns visibly benefited from immigration (which was also more educated and more 
highly skilled than on average); the population there was already more affluent, 
with higher levels of cultural and social capital; and so on. None of these, however, 
prevented right-wing tabloids – as well as some of mainstream media – from 
launching a campaign alleging universities’ ‘pro-Remainer’ bias. 
 
This particular instance has to be understood in the context of longer discussions 
concerning the relationship between higher education and political orientation. 
Like some other ‘moral panics’ (including the ‘free speech’ one), this one was in 
part imported from the US, where discussions of alleged ‘left-wing’ bias in 
universities (and especially social sciences and humanities) had been going on for 
some time (e.g. Haidt & Lukianoff, 2018; Bloom, 1987). Obviously, like in the US, 
the ‘concern’ is not entirely unfounded: it is not a big secret that academics in social 
sciences and humanities are more likely to hold left- than right-wing views, and 
that students can do the same. However, inferring that students are pro-EU because 
their lecturers are could be seen as a variation on the ‘free speech’ argument that 
assumes students are incapable of forming opinions independently of the university 
and thus will inevitably be ‘led on’ by what their lecturers are saying. 
 
What made the case transcend the confines of the Daily Mail was a letter sent to 
the Vice-Chancellors of a number of universities by the Conservative MP Chris 
Heaton-Harris in 2017, asking for EU-relevant syllabi. After a scandal broke out 
in the media, Heaton-Harris tried explaining the request was for his ‘personal 
research’, but to no avail. Left-leaning social media had already zeroed in on 
accusations of censorship, in turn fueling the right’s charge of a ‘Remainer bias’. 
Again, much like in the ‘free speech’ debate, the issue revolved around who has 
the right to decide what counts as the acceptable range of opinions, and the 
boundary between universities and the world of politics.  
 
Shortly after the Heaton-Harris letter, Will Davies, lecturer at Goldsmiths and one 
of Britain’s prominent academic political commentators, published a blog post that 
offered a critique of dynamics behind the ‘enemies of Brexit’ narrative: 
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If universities didn’t exist, these voices would need to invent them, if only 
for their own therapeutic purposes. The university has become a simulacrum 
onto which the anger and resentments of contemporary conservatives can be 
poured (…) As the frustrations of the Brexit process and long transition kick 
in, universities (and experts) may serve again as villains for some. (Davies, 
2017) 
 
To some degree, then, the focus on universities can be seen as part of the broader 
attack on ‘experts’ and ‘liberal elites’, supposedly out-of-touch with popular 
sentiment (which, as the common wisdom went, was in favour of Brexit). Yet, what 
was becoming obvious was that universities were starting to be framed as stand-
ins for ‘body politic’ as a whole.  
 
Davies was not alone in feeling indignant about the fact that universities, and 
particularly what they teach, had become a kicking post in the Brexit debacle. Yet, 
while previously mostly sticking to comments on social media, this period marked 
a shift towards connecting universities’ alleged ‘bias’ more explicitly with other 
sociopolitical trends:   
 
Neoliberalism has meant that universities have mastered the arts of economic 
justification. Their financial acumen, their marketing rhetoric, their 
calculations of graduate employability are now far more advanced than they 
were in the 1980s. They are no longer permitted to absent themselves from 
broader economic discourses or the capitalist obligation to compete. Brexit 
means that universities may now have to master equivalent skills in political 
and cultural justification. There is no point denying that there are forces 
pitted against them, many of which simply want to disempower them. But to 
simply join a culture war on the same terms as the instigators is to invite 
deadlock (ibid.) 
 
From audit culture, to culture war: the critique of transformations of higher 
education and research has truly come full circle. The following section will 
summarise this trajectory, before engaging with the ways in which authors of 
interventions narrate and reflect on their object.   
 164 
 
Conclusions: the intervention imperative  
 
The ‘war’ on universities and, correspondingly, the need to defend them, can be 
distilled to the following argument. The government is trying to ‘impose’ on 
universities a mode of measurement, recognition, or valuation that is inimical – 
opposed – to the nature of the institution and what it produces. This, however, is 
not just a question of miscognition: if it were, academics would have little to fear 
beyond mild annoyance at talking at cross-purposes. However, if the government 
has the power to create markets – and to make students and other actors behave 
like consumers within them – that means it can change the very nature of 
education. Any attempt at reducing knowledge to economic utility, and express its 
value or contribution through numbers, metrics, or ranking, is, therefore, an 
ontological – or existential – threat.  
 
How do interventions address this threat? As Des Freedman writes in The Assault 
on Universities,  
 
We also have another responsibility: to defend the idea of university 
education as a public good that is reducible neither to market values nor to 
instrumental reason. Attack is often the best form of defence, and this book 
is a contribution not simply to thinking about how best to preserve what we 
have in higher education but to demand much more (Freedman, 2011, p. 10). 
 
This, in part, is what intellectual interventions set out to do: invent, or reinvent, a 
vocabulary or frame of thinking that could counter what is perceived as a threat to 
the university’s very existence. McGettigan writes: 
 
 As universities and colleges are forced to operate in commercial terrain, it is 
basic business imperatives that come to the fore. Our habits of thought about 
higher education are no longer appropriate for this new terrain (GUG, ix); 
 
And later: 
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Willetts and his counterpart, the Education Secretary, Michael Gove, favour 
a new wave of public sector privatisation. In response, we must develop new 
methods of analysis and concepts which grasp the transformation we are 
living through (GUG, p. 9) 
 
Interventions thus share the assumption that words, that is, intellectual products, 
are an efficacious way to address changes to universities. In exceptional cases, 
these interventions address more directly the domain of the political: for instance, 
CPU’s Alternative White Papers were also meant to provide a policy blueprint for 
a potential Parliamentary opposition to legislative reforms. The majority of 
interventions, however, take a more ‘classical’ form, such as books – Collini, 2017, 
2012; Willetts, 2017; Furedi, 2018, 2004; Docherty, 2015, 2011; McGettigan, 
2012; Evans, 2004; edited volumes – Holmwood, ed., 2011; Bailey and Freedman, 
eds., 2011; articles, opinion pieces, ‘Letters’, and blog posts.  
 
Within these, two main ‘styles’ of critique can be identified. One, which can be 
described as ‘literary-cultural’, focuses on the meaning (or, as it often claims, lack 
thereof) of language of specific policies. The emphasis is on mocking the 
‘bureaucratese’ of civil servants, pointing out the vacuity of their pronouncements 
or their own internal inconsistency. There is a transfer from epistemology to 
ontology implied here: since the ‘minds’ (or intentions) of civil servants are 
primarily knowable through words – that is, the language of policies – the best way 
to address them is more words – that is, intellectual interventions.  
 
The other style of critique, which can be described as ‘political-economic’ entails 
a more direct engagement with politics. Clearest examples are Alternative White 
Papers of the Campaign for the Public University (CPU et al., 2011) and 
Convention for Higher Education (Holmwood et al., 2016), which, especially in 
the latter case, are closer in form to policy papers than ‘traditional’ style of 
academic critique, but this approach is also present in Andrew McGettigan’s The 
Great University Gamble, for instance. This line of critique, which became more 
prominent after 2010, pays more attention to economic foundations (or, in the 
contemporary version, its financial instruments) of the relationship between 
universities and different social groups (academics, students) than to 
representations or meaning of policy language. In a manner of speaking, this can 
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be taken to signify a return to an older, materialist version of Marxist analysis, 
away from the ‘literary-cultural’ version associated with the influence of cultural 
Marxism on late 20th critique in Britain, and, especially, its institutionalization in 
universities.  
 
When it comes to forms of justification, however, interventions converge around 
the assertion of authority via claiming privileged access to – true knowledge of – 
the ‘nature’ of universities, knowledge, or other actors. This ‘ontological’ mode of 
justification entails the assertion of what Boltanski referred to as “the whatness of 
what is” – that is, true (and relatively stable) characteristics of reality. In this, they 
stake their authority on positioning other objects and persons within specific 
domains or worlds, where the most salient distinction is between the ‘worlds’ of 
universities (pure, unspoiled knowledge) and the market. Actors (‘beings’) that 
transgress the boundary of these worlds – predominantly coded as the distinction 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (of the university) – such as politicians or university 
managers and administrators are coded as ‘Other’. Through this, interventions also 
constitute the position of the speaker/author as someone on the inside, who, 
presumably, speaks for other academics – and for the university.  
 
Similarly, while certain interventions include public ‘performances’, such as book 
launches, panels and conferences open to ‘general audiences’ – but these events 
should not be mistaken for occasions of public confrontation. In Boltanskian terms, 
they are ‘truth tests’ rather than ‘reality tests’. They usually entail an exchange of 
opinions among like-minded individuals, meant to provide opportunities for the 
affirmation of a shared diagnostic; in other words, for the communal participation 
in pronouncements, or speech acts, that confirm rather than dispute ‘the whatness 
of what is’. In this sense, the Collini—Willetts encounter seems like a potential 
rupture. From the context of intellectual positioning, however, this act is less 
‘disruptive’ than it may appear. Willetts’ own book, A University Education, came 
out barely eight months after the Senate House event. It was also promoted through 
events featuring only slightly differently composed ‘expert’ panels; the flagship 
one took place half a block away, at University of London’s Institute of Education, 
in January 2018. In line with Willetts’ critique of ‘impressionistic’ interventions, 
this can be seen as an act of epistemic positioning that signals belonging to the 
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world of educational (that is, specific) expertise rather than the general 
commentariat.   
 
This means we need to explain both how these come about, and what, specifically, 
makes authors choose a specific mode of or venue for interventions. After all, many 
other responses to changes to universities are imaginable: from silence and 
compliance, to organizing a protest or strike, running for office on a political 
platform that would seek to challenge these processes, or – even – leaving 
academia altogether. However, with few marked exceptions, these responses were 
almost entirely absent. Until the USS strikes in 2018, labour organising at 
universities was relatively weak and haphazard, and UCU membership stood at a 
historic low. Similarly, despite the preponderance of discourses about the 
deterioration of working conditions in the academia – including, especially in the 
aftermath of the suicide of Stephen Grimm of Imperial College in 2015, rising 
concerns about ‘mental health’ and ‘well-being’ – ‘protest’ resignations remained 
few and were usually motivated by other compounding factors, such as in the case 
of Sara Ahmed, who left her post at Goldsmiths College in reaction to the 
institution’s refusal to address a case of sexual harassment.  
 
Accounting for interventions, therefore, requires engaging with actors’ own 
explanations and reflections; for this, we turn to interviews.    
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Chapter 5: Interviews 
 
Introduction and a note on transcription 
 
Preceding chapters situated intellectual interventions in historical, political, and 
economic context, and provided a formal analysis of their content. This chapter 
focuses on how authors of some of these interventions narrate their own identity, 
agency, and position, starting from the point at which they decided to engage in 
interventions, through their relations with other relevant actors in the higher 
education landscape – from fellow academics to university managers, 
administrators, and politicians – to their reflections on the political moment and the 
role of interventions (and, by extension, intellectuals as such) in it.  
 
In this sense, authors’ reflections and self-narration are assumed to represent an 
accurate (though, obviously, imperfect) reflection of their views of ‘the world’ and 
what it means to intervene in it. As elaborated in Chapter 2, interviews were 
relatively unstructured, allowing participants to develop their train of thought and 
conversations to flow as naturally as possible given the constraints of the situation. 
Of course, like any form of self-narration, these reflections are both stylized and 
themselves a product of interaction between narrators and the interviewer. To 
provide a better sense of how some of these reflections emerged dialogically, 
longer excerpts from interviews occasionally include my lines or questions, 
indicated by [JB]. Similarly, excerpts from field notes are included in cases where 
they are helpful in illuminating the context of the situation. In most cases, however, 
participants’ narratives are at the front.  
 
In accordance with this, narratives are minimally edited for clarity (e.g., erased 
hesitations and repetitions), and identifying elements have been omitted. As noted 
in Chapter 2, this can make participants seem distant, or ‘incorporeal’; however, 
this was a necessary precaution against specific quotes being too obviously 
traceable to a specific author. Participants were also assigned random pseudonyms; 
these are further varied in the exposition, which means their primary purpose is to 
allow for relatively ‘natural’ sentence structure whilst maintaining anonymity of 
their authors.  
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The concluding parts of the chapter offer some reflections on what the way in 
which participants narrate and reflect on their social world means, in particular in 
the context of the relationship between knowledge, interventions, and reflexivity.  
 
More than a feeling 
 
As an anthropologist, I was very aware of preconceived notions about the field, 
and particularly about participants’ intentions or motives. The opening part of the 
interviews immediately challenged some of these notions. Namely, intellectual 
interventions – as the name suggests – are usually thought of as intellectual 
products. This connotes a process of thinking, possibly engaging or applying 
theoretical or analytical ‘toolkit’ of one’s own discipline, as well as positioning 
that product in different social contexts where it is meant to have effects. Prior to 
coming to Cambridge, my views on intellectuals were primarily shaped through 
reading Bourdieu (especially 2000 and 1984) and New Class theorists (in particular 
those who focused on Eastern Europe – e.g. King and Szélenyi, 2004; Eyal, 
Szélenyi and Townsley, 1998), both of which emphasized the role of strategic, 
rational conduct when it came to intellectuals. It could be said I had an 
overcognitivized notion of interventions. Yet, as the interviews began with 
questions about how interventions came about and what prompted them, most 
participants narrated their initial entry as prompted by a feeling. 
 
Beatrice*, for instance, narrated how her initial intervention came about in 
response to redundancies at the higher education institution where she was working 
at the time:  
 
…it was terrible because they were basically cutting back people on the basis 
of not having adequate grants – really losing people who were very far from 
being dead wood, but who didn't meet some sort of fairly rigid criteria, and I 
can't quite remember it, but I was sufficiently exercised to write something 
that eventually got into Times Higher… 
 
Anne* described the process of deciding to write a book about changes in higher 
education: 
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I was really angry about it and I wanted to make the case in public, so this is 
where [the book] came from, yeah – and I've seen so much going wrong. I 
just thought there was so much happening that I was not happy with and so 
much happening that I thought was just nonsense, absolute nonsense, and I 
thought I have no place here and I want to explain why. 
 
Luke* framed his frustration with both the political situation and the changes in 
higher education in the following manner: 
 
…various things were really getting under my skin all at once so I began to 
realise that universities were becoming a sort of lightning rod for all of the 
frustrations and sort of neuroses and fantasies of Britain...  
 
“Angry”, “frustrated”, “exercised”, “under [my] skin”: these words suggest 
participants experience the processes they are writing about in a highly 
personalized and visceral way. Of course, this is congruous with a steadily 
expanding set of scholarly work that focuses on the affective, or ‘felt’, effects of 
neoliberalism in universities (Loveday, 2018; McNeill, 2014; Burrows, 2012; Gill, 
2009; Sparkes, 2007). Some of this work is influenced by the ‘affective turn’, but 
a lot of it draws on the tradition of feminist analysis as well as Raymond Williams’ 
concept of ‘structure of feeling’, designed to link phenomenological and 
ontological aspects of Marxism.  
 
Yet, while most of these analyses focus on internalization of feelings, and the 
often-detrimental effects on academics’ general or mental health, participants in 
my study talk about externalization, that is, the drive to ‘get it out there’. This 
suggests interventions can be seen as a way of translating a visceral, felt experience 
of one’s working conditions into an intellectual product.  
 
One participant, for instance, recounted how they wrote an entire book in “about 
six weeks…it was all settled in my head and then it was about a chapter a week”. 
Anne* similarly said: 
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Oh I wrote it really really fast. I wrote it in about three months, and I knew 
exactly what I want[ed] to say, and if I was to write it again I would go back 
and be a bit more careful about things. But no, I didn't find it difficult to 
write. 
 
For Richard*, the speed of output was one of the criteria in deciding how to frame, 
or pitch interventions:  
 
I can write very quickly and I just go get it off my desk, whereas the problem 
with doing things for those sorts of [edited] publications is they want to send 
it round and round and round over several months. I think psychologically 
that's not very -- it comes back again two weeks later and it comes 
back…there are times when that sort of thing can and can be conducive. So 
that's why I think I like blogging, it's much more, sort of, it's done and then 
it's gone kind of. 
 
This participant has published via other channels: newspapers, journals, even 
podcasts. However, he sees the editing process, in some contexts, as an 
unnecessary encumbrance in placing interventions ‘out there’. Yet, this distinction 
can normally be made only from an already established position; in other words, 
in order to be able to choose a particular route, one needs to have access to both 
‘gatekeeper’ publications and own venues for publishing. Thus, despite the feeling 
of ‘immediacy’ that characterizes participants’ descriptions, the process of 
producing interventions requires more than ‘just a feeling’.  
 
It was interesting to see how – and if – participants would narrate other factors. 
 
 The accidental expert 
 
The very definition of intellectual intervention presumes its successful 
accomplishment, at least to the degree of placing it ‘out there’. What began to 
emerge from interviews was that possibility of making an intervention hinges on 
access to different kind of social networks.  
 
This is how George* described his initial involvement: 
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I've written for [journal] for quite a few years on the ordinary things I write 
about; I can't remember why, I think I must have just one point suggested 
could I write something about -- or maybe they suggested would I write 
something about -- current higher education policy. But once I started doing 
it then it became more an expectation, when there was a new piece of 
legislation or policy, they would contact me and say would I write something 
about it... 
 
Ellen* recalled being approached by a publisher after a public lecture: 
 
I think I've given a talk and maybe the publisher came to me; I mean I didn't 
have to find a publisher. I know that; I just thought, okay they came to me; 
and I mean okay that was perfectly a perfectly fine publisher so…I'll go in 
that direction. 
 
Nigel*’s book, similarly, emerged from the dialogue with a publisher’s agent:  
 
…and the colleague from [publisher] stuck around for a little bit of coffee 
together and we got chatting, and to be absolutely frank I rather rashly 
promised the book. They published another {of} my book{s}. So publisher 
came and we spoke about the series, and as sometimes happens, the question 
well what about you as editor, have you got anything? So I said well as a 
matter of fact yes I do. 
 
JB: What made you rashly promise it? 
 
N: Because I felt I wanted to write it and I've got on very well with colleague 
from [that press]. And so he said 'it's a great book you've got there, it all 
sounds really interesting, what's it about? And I kind of made it up there and 
then, saying a bit of chapter on this, a bit of chapter on that and so on.  
 
Publishers seem to take quite a proactive role in bringing about interventions. 
Fred*, for instance, had good connections in the publishing world, and had served 
as editor for a number of book series: 
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So we had good relations with people at that publisher. Because of being the 
sort of connected in those ways then publishers are interested to chat about 
who have you spotted amongst your colleagues, who we should be 
approaching for books. 
 
The phrase ‘the sort of connected’ reflects the social capital involved in being able 
to place interventions ‘out there’. This underscores the importance of belonging to 
the same social networks as publishers and editors.  
 
Of course, not all participants – at least not initially – had contacts in the publishing 
world. Some publishers are less accessible – the London Review of Books, for 
instance, has a reputation for publishing only commissioned pieces – while others 
are more open to unsolicited contributions. Some participants placed their 
interventions in smaller outlets, or ran personal blogs, before being taken up by a 
major publisher. This is how Paul* described his initial foray into higher education 
writing:  
 
I guess the first editor who was looking around for someone to work with 
asked me -- I just knew him, so it was accidental somewhat that I became 
focused on writing on higher education.  
 
It is not very difficult to infer from this a class affinity between the world of literary 
and media editors and that of academics. As Halsey noted, this is also a feature of 
the specific dynamic and direction of growth of both sectors (1992). It is interesting 
to ask, however, why these factors do not merit even a passing mention. Of course, 
the fact participants described interventions almost as if happening ‘by accident’ 
can be read as an artefact of modesty or perhaps a particularly English tendency to 
speak of oneself in a deprecating tone14. Yet, quite a few – if not all – were familiar 
with theories of social reproduction, making frequent references to factors such as 
class, gender, or background in other parts of interviews. This means it would be 
reasonable to expect participants to make at least a passing reference to their social 
 
14 It warrants mentioning that while all participants live and work in the UK, not all of them are 
English. Even if they were, the validity of inference on the basis of a ‘national character’ is truly 
doubtful.  
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status. This did not happen; what they did talk about was how a particular 
institutional position or context shaped their interventions.   
 
Some participants’ initial foray into higher education as a topic of intellectual 
inquiry was shaped by their experience in administration or management. Ellen*, 
for instance, became head of her department at the time of the introduction of 
research assessment. This is how she describes the experience:   
 
I split myself down the middle and also made it very clear to [my staff] that 
I was unhappy and had a lot of critical problems with the research assessment 
exercise. And to make that good I thought I should take on what was 
happening as a research topic and try to understand it intellectually, and 
become interested in it so to speak, that research will do [what] research 
always does, which is get one involved and interested. 
 
Fred*, who took on the position of social science dean, reflected on how demands 
of managing time shaped his interest in the topic:  
 
…it is very difficult to manage doing research and being a dean, unless you 
make being a dean part of your research. So I became interested to see…all 
the background of it, I had to be interested in higher education policy.  
 
For Paul*, researching higher education became a way to reconcile managerial and 
academic logic:  
 
And then research of course. We would get research contracts. After a while 
I became a Pro Vice-Chancellor, it was a part-time role at that point – half-
time; so I would have sort of 9–5 job in the administration and [teaching] a 
three-hour class in the evening.  
 
JB: Did you have any qualms about accepting the Pro-VC position? 
 
P: No. Because I think it was quite a different context at the time, these were 
rotating posts, it was a very traditional model of academic governance. I 
mean it was changing quite rapidly at this point. Previous PVC had no 
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management responsibilities, didn't have to do performance management, 
any of that. But just before I came they changed it, so that was quite...but in 
a way it was interesting because if you study education it’s all like very 
extended fieldwork, being a higher education manager [my emphasis].  
 
Interventions emerge from a particular situational tension, that between being an 
academic, and being a manager or administrator – which, for some participants, 
meant they would necessarily be taking part in exactly the sort of activities that 
critique of neoliberalism denounces. Trying to apprehend an object or practice 
intellectually thus becomes a strategy for managing the experience of simultaneous 
(or sequential) occupation of conflicting roles. This could be a variation on framing 
interventions as a strategy for dealing with negative feelings such as anger or 
frustration; in this case, however, the feelings in question were more ambiguous.  
 
Translating ambiguity about occupying a position that is simultaneously ‘Us’ 
(academic) and ‘Them’ (manager) into an intellectual interest, thus, can also be a 
way to justify involvement with ‘dirty’ elements of higher education, such as 
management, power, or finance. Research, in this sense, can simultaneously be a 
technique of cognitive-affective management, and a technique of signaling: I’m 
not in this for power/money, this is all like extended fieldwork to me.   
 
This is particularly interesting as some participants were quick to disavow any 
claim to expertise in the traditional sense. Anne*, describing her work as “in a 
sense a conceptual answer to what I was searching for, which was some kind of 
framework within which to start putting my own comments”, added: 
 
[When] I say research – I mean, I didn’t do any respectable first-hand sort of 
science research, you know, I read a bit and thought a bit and wrote some 
ironic essays. 
 
George* mentioned his longer-standing interest in the history of universities, but 
hastened to add: 
 
I didn't believe anything I was saying was very original. I thought I was – not 
recent work, but I really only rearticulated in a moment what's going on. 
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Rearticulating a relatively familiar conception, I thought that was what I was 
doing then. 
 
While downplaying their own expertise can again be attributed to modesty or 
perhaps even to the interview situation (some of my own work included what could 
be dubbed ‘respectable first-hand research’), the weight of this admission becomes 
clearer when seen in the context of interventions. As noted in the preceding chapter, 
most authors assume an authoritative voice, often without qualms about 
extrapolating their experience to the universal level, or at least that of their 
audience. In this sense, how participants construct their position as speaking for 
other academics warrants particular attention.  
 
Speaking for the people: universalism of the particular?  
 
Interventions present the state of higher education as it is, rather than as it appears 
to them; references to the specificity of one’s epistemic position are rare, if not 
entirely absent. In other words, authority in interventions is performed through 
appeals to universality, rather than positionality. Through interviews, however, it 
became obvious that participants often based validity and/or veracity of their 
arguments on assumed agreement and recognition coming other academics.  
 
George*, for instance, talked about his surprise at the volume of reactions:   
 
What I remember is the extraordinary postbag that I got, that is to say a 
response from people so – I mean I'd written occasional things which were 
went beyond the specialist audience but {this went} far beyond it, I got letters 
from all kinds of people, academics principally, not only, but dozens. Oh they 
were just immensely grateful that someone was saying it, and {they were} 
expressing their agreement. 
 
Ellen*’s early experience of talking about developments at UK universities abroad 
played a decisive role in framing her interest:  
 
On the way I stopped at […]. They wanted me to give a paper and I thought, 
well, I’ll give them something really exotic, I’ll talk about what’s happening 
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in British universities, you know, this will blow their minds, you know – 
unheard of. But everybody turned around to me and said ‘this is happening 
here’. Okay. So that sort of shook the braincells a bit.   
 
Obviously, who the audience is (or is imagined to be) is not irrelevant in this 
context. While most participants talk about ‘the public’ in general, interviews 
suggest they see their audience as primarily composed of other academics. This 
audience is assumed to share the predicament and thus at least tacit agreement with 
authors of interventions. In this sense, intellectuals interviewed here construct their 
role as speaking for, or on behalf of other academics. Early in the interviews, 
George*’s remark caught my attention: 
 
The interesting thing you stick your head above the parapet is everybody 
comes along and congratulates you on doing it, but nobody else will do it. 
It's a lonely place up there. 
 
This would suggest participants do not think themselves particularly exceptional 
in terms of intervening, it’s just that somebody has to do it. This calls to mind 
Gramsci’s ‘organic’ intellectuals, who act as representatives of their class. Yet, this 
raises two questions: if participants are not ‘experts’ in higher education in the 
strict sense of the term – and we saw they do not claim epistemic privilege on the 
basis of scientific justifications of authority – what makes them better suited or 
positioned to talk about it than any of their colleagues? Furthermore, if they speak 
for other academics, what does this imply about claims to ‘universality’, especially 
those deployed in the ontological mode of justification?   
 
Sociological accounts of intellectual interventions rarely focus on what makes 
authors achieve a position from which they feel they can intervene. In part, this is 
an epistemological consequence of the past tendency to treat ‘intellectuals’ as a 
relatively coherent social group: from this point of view, anyone with an academic 
position (or disposition) and an opinion about a particular topic has equal 
possibility (if not capacity) to contribute to public discussions. In accounts that 
emphasise individual or biographical factors, actual success or effects of 
intellectual interventions flow from a combination of personal inclination and 
social circumstances: this, for instance, is the case with Gross’ (2002) biography 
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of Richard Rorty, and Boschetti’s (1988) analysis of Sartre (see also Baert, 2015). 
Those that put an emphasis on social or structural factors tend to frame 
interventions as outcomes of a fortuitous coupling between specific configurations 
of ‘markets’ for intellectual interventions (including editors, publishers, presses, 
and the media), intellectuals’ work or domain of expertise, and the political and 
historical salience of a particular topic – as, for instance, in Baert’s account of the 
rise of Sartre and the popularity of existentialism in the aftermath of WWII. What 
these accounts do not delve on, however, is what makes intellectuals feel they have 
the right to intervene. In other words, where does this ‘intervention imperative’ 
stem from?   
 
This is quite relevant given that, at any given point in time, the number of people 
who could intervene on particular topics is greater than the number of interventions 
that eventually become articles, books, etc. While self-selection certainly plays a 
role, it would be a bit naïve to assume this is the only or even decisive factor. For 
instance, being recognized as able to make an authoritative public intervention 
depends on gender, race, age and seniority (Evans, 2009; Solnit, 2014; Penny, 
2014; Spivak, 2003; McKinnon, 2016), as well as different intersections between 
these categories (Hill Collins, 2009). Similarly, it makes sense to assume that the 
perception of relative security of one’s own position plays a role in interventions, 
though not necessarily in straightforward ways. While a detailed study of the 
relationship between these factors and interventions merits a treatise on its own, it 
was interesting to see if participants reflected on how these factors shaped – that 
is, enabled and constrained – their own interventions.  
 
One interpretation my participants offered is that other academics were simply 
unaware of, or uninterested in, changes going on in the sector. Describing his initial 
involvement in writing on higher education, Jake* remarked: 
 
I was surprised at how little critique these developments were attracting in 
the 1980s, and I think particularly because most academics really just seem 
rather unaware of them. 
 
Nigel*, however, offered a more nuanced account: 
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There's a kind of huge debate I think in the academic community at the 
moment over the fundamental issues of academic freedom; [but] for many 
many colleagues, there is no issue over academic freedom. They never think 
about it, they've no concerns about it, they just do their stuff. By contrast at 
the other extreme there are some colleagues who fear that anything they [do] 
-- touch the keyboard or open their mouth, they are jeopardizing their careers. 
In this latter group, is the group obviously that is critical of the tendencies 
and directions of travel of higher education generally and that it can be 
locally, in a particular institution, nationally within the UK, internationally, 
worldwide and so on. It tends to be people who are taking an interest not just 
in the work that they do but the conditions under which that work is made 
possible or made difficult.  
 
This opens the more complex question of the relationship between the perception 
of risk stemming from ‘speaking out’ and one’s own career. In other words, it 
brings in the question of position from which intellectuals think it is possible to 
intervene, as well as ways in which one’s position within the academia can enable 
or, alternatively, limit this form of engagement. This situates interventions more 
clearly within the context of academic structures and, consequently, power 
relations. Fred* remarked: 
 
Very few academics have really spoken out, I think. How audit functions is 
that it creates a rank order, and it creates people who are successful and 
people who are not, and those who are successful aren't willing to criticise 
the mechanism that produces their success. 
 
Joseph* delivered a similarly, if not more, damning account of academic 
resistance: 
 
A significant minority of academics are completely gone and internalized 
[current trends]. I don't think academics feel particularly brave at the moment 
in terms of staying against the spring, because particularly in America, you 
do get clobbered, you know. But so what? So there's a kind of conformist 
element and I think that at the end of the day sort of most academics would 
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just rather have an easy life. I mean, we're not living in an age of rebellion at 
the moment in terms of strong, important intellectual causes.  
 
For Fred*, this amounts to willful ignorance: 
 
I'm saying UCU hasn't noticed that casualisation benefits some senior 
academics who also benefited by the way the REF operates. But that's the 
mechanism by which academics are being kept, you know, the rewards, every 
professor is in the 10 percent or possibly the top five percent [of earners]. So 
if you say well what's happening to universities, is what's happening to wider 
inequality – you're not innocent of that.  I think too many academics are sort 
of quasi neoliberals, whilst being protected from that sort of realization. 
 
This is a much more differentiated view of agency than the one implied by the “fat 
cats and evil Thatcherites vs. good academics” in interventions. Interestingly, 
Fred* also belongs to the top five to ten percent of earners; yet, he obviously does 
not count himself as one of “quasi-neoliberals”.  
 
This serves to highlight the role of interventions as a form of mediating structural 
contradictions. It is almost as if participants think that critique can ‘purify’ them of 
implication in the sort of structure that they are describing. In turn, this brings in a 
more ambiguous view of power relations within and outside of the university.  
 
 
 
 The ambivalent institution 
 
During one of the interviews, Laura* criticized at length research assessment 
system that rewards the greatest number of published journal articles. Given that 
she had recently published a book – a publication that, while counting towards the 
institution’s research assessment score, was not a journal article – I half-jokingly 
asked whether publishing a monograph was a performative statement against the 
‘overproduction’ of scientific publications. Laura* paused for a moment, and 
responded very seriously: 
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It was a performative statement {inasmuch as} by that time I was a professor 
and I was well-established myself, and I thought, okay, I have this position, 
and nobody is going to not promote me or, you know, tell me that I’ve got to 
get a load of research money. I can do it. So I’ll occupy that space. 
 
Beatrice* similarly reflected on the way her disciplinary position and success in 
obtaining research grants created a space from which she felt she could speak out 
without fear of being either seen as self-interested, or risking censure.   
 
I am one of the few people who, I regard myself as in the sciences…I feel I 
should speak out because it looks paradoxical to be a successful scientist 
[who] published a lot, you get occasionally a big grant, so I thought that it 
doesn't look like -- I can actually say I think that this system sucks and I've 
been very lucky because I've been funded by a charity. I haven't been 
dependent on the university system to sort of keep it going, I've been going 
on a parallel stream. 
 
The paradox, obviously, is that participants recognize their part-dependence on the 
academic rewards and promotions system that sustains their capacity to criticize 
that very system (or, at least, its newer manifestations). The position of relative 
safety that gives my participants the security to engage in interventions is, after all, 
the effect of awards accrued through channels that form part of the broader 
‘ecosystem’ of research funding: if not universities, then charities and research 
councils. While – at least in this participant’s view – being framed as alternatives, 
or counterweights, they are effects of precisely the processes that forms the object 
of their critique.  
 
Charities, for instance, have stepped into higher education and research funding in 
part in order to fill the gap created by the restructuring of state expenditure, 
particularly in the field of basic research. While some charitable bodies – for 
instance, the Wellcome Trust – have a longer history of funding research, the 
introduction of performance-based research funding made these organisations 
more central to financing research in public universities. Public engagement and 
impact agenda within REF, in particular, incentivised the involvement of partner 
organisations from industry, charities, or the public sector. Last, but not least, the 
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very expansion of the charitable sector, and especially its extension into R&D 
activities, can be seen as part of state withdrawal from financing research and/or 
replacing direct funding of research with public-private partnerships (e.g. Birch, 
Tyfield, and Chiapetta, 2018). Even without delving into layers of political 
economy of research in the UK, however, there is a more obvious sense in which 
participants are dependent precisely on their object of critique: namely, most forms 
of research funding require recipients to be affiliated with a public higher education 
institution. 
 
This means interventions entail a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, 
participants depend on universities not only for their livelihoods, but also for the 
position from which they can apply for alternative sources of income – such as 
research grants – which, in turn, can provide a degree of independence from the 
institution. This degree of independence is, at the same time, what allows them to 
be critical, including, in some cases, of the institution itself. As Luke* framed it, 
succinctly: 
 
I think I feel the privilege of being at this university quite highly in the sense 
that its entire, you know, brand – is the sort of critical public intellectual, and 
if you work within that kind of spirit I don't think anyone can really criticise 
you ever. You could say something outrageous, but I think they couldn't 
criticise the intentions of trying to contribute to that kind of debate.  
 
Obviously, not all institutions are equally tolerant of their staff vocally engaging 
incritique. As the case of Thomas Docherty suggests, being perceived as too critical 
of one’s own institution can bring serious repercussions. In practice, participants 
often frame their interventions in a way that avoids targeting their home institution. 
Reflecting on possible consequences, Richard* said: 
 
Actually it's interesting that the Daily Mail and co. and the Telegraph have 
really gone for the Russell Group. I think that they're looking for bigger 
scalps in a way than this university, that's the way I would see it. But I didn't 
want to get the university in any trouble. 
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Beatrice* described how the Head of Department approached something she had 
written: 
 
I think I almost fell out of rank with [HoD] at one time because we got a 
circular around saying that we should pick up four papers with an impact 
factor to put in for the REF, and I went ballistic and I didn't just respond to 
him, I did a circular for the whole department and he was really nice. And 
subsequently when he read my blog he said, he just came to me: ‘I'm not 
going to stop you doing this but if you're going to write this again, could you 
please first let me know?’, and some thought because -- I think what had 
happened is I had been careful not to name names too much. But he was the 
chair of the panel [for the discipline] as well so it was really difficult, but he 
was a very nice man basically at pains to tell me I was free to say what I 
wanted.  
 
JB: Did you warn him next time? 
 
B: Yeah.  
 
JB: Did that change anything? 
 
B: Not really {laughs}, he said ‘thank you, it's nice to know it's coming’. 
 
George* said: 
 
There have been people especially those who've been involved in some 
senior position in universities – who have either said to me directly or it's 
been reported to me that it is their view that this is potentially 
counterproductive and troublemaking, that governments and officials don't 
like this kind of criticism, and that it's important for universities to get on 
well with the Department of Business and its officials and so this really is 
very ill-advised. So there's been a little bit of that. But from colleagues in the 
immediate sense, I've only just encountered support. 
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This brings us closer to the source of ambivalence in participants’ interventions. 
On the one hand, the capacity to engage in interventions, including critique of 
higher education policies, is dependent on their position within the academia. At 
the same time, the university management has the power not only to reprimand but 
also, in some cases, seriously limit staff’s freedom to teach and research (during 
suspension, for instance, Docherty was forbidden from having any contact with 
students). In this, universities are framed as fundamentally ambiguous institutions: 
they are simultaneously sites of protection and enablement and of potential 
punishment and constraint (cf. Bacevic, 2018). This fundamental ambiguity helps 
explain some of the ways in which participants relate to different actors, or 
elements, in their context.  
 
Boundary subjects 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, interventions tend to position sources of 
neoliberalism on ‘the outside’. ‘Outside’ denotes social space beyond the 
university, but also forces, or values, that are inimical or dangerous to it. There are 
two main categories of actors associated with the introduction of neoliberalism to 
universities: politicians and policymakers on the one hand; and managers and 
administrators on the other. What distinguishes these two groups is precisely the 
degree of proximity to the university: politicians and policymakers are, at least on 
average, properly ‘on the outside’. Managers and university administrators, 
however, are ‘inside-outsiders’, that is, conveyors of neoliberal ideology within the 
university. This leads to a rather interesting difference in how they are treated in 
participants’ narratives.  
 
Laura*, for instance, described initial reactions to the Jarratt report as 
 
[I felt] we were judged by the people who had no experience of universities 
(…) I mean just the sheer absence of any fundamental understanding of what 
academics are supposed to be doing. And the way secondly what was 
expressed, a nonsense language, aims and objectives, etc. etc.  
 
Or, as Luke* put it:  
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It's been clear that since Thatcher [that] governments have been trying to find 
ways of shrinking autonomy of universities and of academics in various 
ways…like, you know -- to represent what goes on in universities in as either 
purely financial, which is one part of it, or as some sort of politically correct 
form of resentment or something is just, you know, who are these 
people?...And don't dump that shit on the universities. 
 
“Who are these people?” is a succinct summary of participants’ attitude towards 
policies for higher education and research – or, at least, those who make them. This 
is where we encounter bankers and Thatcherite politicians of intellectual 
interventions in a different guise: people who had no experience of universities, or, 
in other words, people who are not ‘One of us’.  
 
Joseph* recounted his first experience of being assessed: 
 
I remember because the year my son was born we had our first ever quality 
assurance inspector. I was chief examiner at that time. And I just remember 
being horrified by this guy coming into my class and talking to him 
afterwards. I said ‘Well, what do you think?’. And he basically had no clue. 
And he said to me he wasn't interested in the content of my lecture, but was 
interested in whether I ticked the right box, with process and everything, you 
know, that I was aware of all the different skills or outcomes…and I basically 
said I couldn't give a flying fuck. 
 
The perceived lack of competence is also a salient topic for Luke*:  
 
I don't think that any of these wankers writing about universities out there, or 
in their 50s, have a clue what it's like to be a student right now. But I suppose 
I felt like…how dare you say how you going to measure teaching when you 
clearly have no idea what teaching is actually like?...Like someone pitched 
up and said ‘you know, there's now this sort of new way of evaluating 
architecture’ and yet they knew nothing about buildings or design. 
 
The question of knowledge, or epistemic position, re-emerges in participants’ 
feeling of indignation: policies for higher education and research are being made 
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by people who have neither the requisite experience nor knowledge to make those 
judgments. Here we can see the main elements of the ‘war’ as portrayed in 
interventions analysed in the preceding chapter: language (or discourse) that seems 
at odds with what participants think universities should be about; the tying of 
education and research to economic outcomes; the introduction of measurement 
(audit and surveillance) mechanisms to ensure universities conform to these 
objectives; and, last but not least, the sense of disempowerment compounded by 
the fact that academics felt they no longer had a say in how universities are run, 
and that those who do have a say do not necessarily know a lot about universities. 
In this sense, who are these people? reflects both the outrage at the changes 
introduced in higher education and research that academics presumably have no 
influence on, and, not less importantly, the feeling that people who do have an 
influence have no place, or do not belong, in universities in the same way that 
academics do.  
 
Consider, for instance, Joan*’s reflection on possible causes of Margaret 
Thatcher’s animosity towards higher education: 
 
I mean…it's just the snobbery of Oxford that she met. She had a funny accent, 
you know, she went to Oxford at the point where there was a generation of 
women who had the place to themselves during the war, an incredible 
generation of women philosophers in Oxford in particular who really 
dominated philosophy in the post-war period…I think that really the culture, 
certainly in women's colleges, and with senior members of those colleges 
where there was a sense of 'we know who we are and this is the way in which 
we operate in the world'. And this rather prissy young woman would have 
been absolute anathema to that view of the world and that kind of 
presentation of self...and I think you could see it so powerfully in those 
women that for Margaret Thatcher – you know, Margaret Thatcher was just 
something which they had no liking of.  
 
Joan* is hardly a great admirer of Margaret Thatcher; having experienced the 
effects of Conservative policies on teaching and research, she criticized Thatcher 
at length in other parts of our conversation. Yet, this does not prevent her from 
admitting that universities can be alienating and exclusionary places; in the same 
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vein, she discusses the role of class dynamics – the snobbery of intellectual elites, 
and the strange way in which gender, coded as a specific idea of (alternative) 
standards of femininity among post-war women philosophers at Oxford – could 
have played a role in Thatcher’s alienation. In effect, she reconstructs the process 
by which Thatcher was positioned as not ‘one of Us’.  
 
The question of knowledge and experience also emerges in Anne*’s reflections 
about Jo Johnson, Secretary of State for Universities at the time of the interview. 
While this participant is way less ‘understanding’ of Johnson’s position than Joan* 
is of Thatcher’s, she bases her critique precisely on the idea that Johnson has no 
direct knowledge of universities; that, in fact, his policies are based on hearsay – 
more precisely, on bad experiences recounted to him by his constituents: 
 
Because [politicians] make me terribly cross when they do say stupid things 
or – I mean I get incredibly cross with Jo Johnson because I think he 
deliberately distorts things to make it look as if we're all lazy bastards and so 
kicking around it a bit. But, at the same time, if it was possible to talk to him 
and explain what was wrong about TEF I would like to try and do that. The 
problem is that everybody agrees that he is particularly impervious to 
anybody else's point of view, determined to push this path (…) I think he 
must have talked to voters who have as kids {had} bad experiences, that 
{they offered} this sort of anecdote 'I had a constituent whose son had such 
and such tutor’ attitude. He is rather sort of rampaging in and he always starts 
his speeches, as they all do, by saying British universities are the envy the 
world but then he starts talking about ways of tearing them apart, basically. 
 
The value of knowing what one is talking becomes particularly pronounced when 
this sort of narrative is contrasted with the way participants talk about David 
Willetts. Quite a few of my participants had the opportunity to interact with 
Willetts, and while it would probably be fair to say most disagree with him 
politically, there is a clear sense of a different attitude: 
 
I have often put two or three times been on some kind of panel or event with 
him and although clearly we have different views, he was always very civil, 
he's really a clever sophisticated man. 
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Beatrice* described a panel in which another academic (also a participant in the 
study) was sharing the floor with Willetts, saying: 
 
You know here is another lefty person who's all sort of conspiracy and 
paranoia ‘everybody in power is bad’ and I do find myself thinking ‘no, that's 
not the way to go with Willetts’. You know the way to go with Willetts [is] 
to sort of recognize by his own lights I think he's an honest man who's doing 
his best in trying to come up with ideas, you know, he's a crafty bugger but 
at the same time, you know, I think if you were him you would have to be 
very pragmatic and say what would you put in its place or you how would 
you prove you're accountable, you've got to engage and -- always with 
politicians, one thing we've always been told even with scientific 
communication you can't just sort of put something on a problem, but you 
have to give an answer, you have to give your own solution, and it can't be 
‘overthrow the Tory party’. 
 
Apparent incongruity between the former Minister’s manners and his ideology, for 
instance, was a source of bafflement for Laura*: 
 
We've been on panels together and he's actually, he's very well mannered, he 
is quite articulate and he is not unresponsive. So you wouldn't just meet him 
and think ‘oh why am I here’, you know, ‘what am I doing’. There's 
something there which is thoughtful but it's such an incoherent – I mean 
perhaps we all are – that you know you can see the mix, you know, [of] this 
wish to be thought a civilized person genuinely interested in education with, 
on the other hand, absolute commitment to the market and the market 
resolving all difficulties and the market resolving higher education. 
 
What takes place is an interesting differentiation in the ways in which participants 
interpret and narrate motives of other people. Namely, there is no reason to assume 
Willetts’ commitment to market ideology is different or less sincere than that of 
any other politician. Yet, in his case, participants are quick to emphasise his good 
manners and readiness to enter into reasonable argument; his belief in the power 
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of the market is seen to be somehow misguided, representing a source of 
bafflement.  
 
Contrast this with the way participants judge and narrate the actions of university 
managers and administrators. Paul* explained: 
 
I think most senior managers have adopted a kind of managerialist ideology, 
very broadly defined. I think it's… what their personal convictions are I think 
is often different from their public stances have to be…I think a lot of VCs 
are quite politically naïve, they thought that they would get high tuition fees 
this would increase their income. But actually otherwise the world wouldn't 
change than much. They didn't realise this was a bargain.  
 
JB: A bargain in exchange for what?  
 
P: Well in the sense that once you once you adopt you know people will there 
will be extra demands for value for money...it will encourage students to take 
a very instrumental view of what they are buying. And then also bring in the 
state as the regulator to protect the 'best interest' of the students. 
 
Richard* said: 
 
Vice chancellors seem so scared of saying anything, and maybe they’re 
appropriately cautious, maybe if they did start stirring things up they would 
just have their funds cut back even more…That's what it seems to come down 
to, they're afraid to criticise government because it will put them in a difficult 
position. But I mean I think if they got together…they could make a strong 
case, but I think the problem is that people [who] got into positions of being 
VCs are either already coming from businesses or else they seem to get 
completely corrupted by being in that position, no longer remembering what 
academic life is, what the intention of it is.  
 
Here we encounter again the critique of managers as ‘inverted’, corrupted, no-
longer-academics. Of course, Vice Chancellors’ ‘corruption’ by business interests 
can also be seen as a reflection of the ‘fat cats’ narrative in the media. Yet, the fact 
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participants’ narratives equalise the pursuit of economic ‘self-interest’ (implied by 
VCs’ high salaries) with the pursuit of financial or economic interest of the 
university as an organization suggests that this particular form of justification 
serves to lump everything dedicated to the pursuit of economic ends as ‘Other’. In 
this sense, situating managers in the ‘market world’ also serves to distinguish them 
from other academics. 
 
This is particularly interesting since economic rewards for working in higher 
education, obviously, are not uniquely distributed to the managerial profession. 
While they perhaps could not aspire to the astronomical sums offered to the Bath 
Vice-Chancellor, none of my participants work for free; in addition to their regular 
income, they benefit from book royalties, speaking fees, as well as, for some, 
consulting work – including in the private sector.  Yet, they are adamant about 
maintaining the boundary between the type of ‘self-interest’ that could be identified 
with academic values – presumably non-economic – and the type of self-interest 
ascribed to Vice-Chancellors, politicians, and other people ‘not like us’.  
 
This is why the moral status of actors has to be relatively fixed: they are either 
‘good’ (on ‘our’ side, that is, defending public higher education), or ‘evil’ – that is, 
corrupted or led astray by financial or economic interests. Their politics – their 
agency – is assumed to flow more-or-less unproblematically from these 
foundations. Unsurprisingly, this moral ontology does not deal well with 
ambiguity; actors that seem to ‘cross’ boundaries – e.g. David Willetts – are seen 
as a source of bafflement. While some participants allow for a degree of 
‘uncoruptness’ among, for instance, administrators, as a whole this group is placed 
in the moral-ontological category of the Other: foreign, abject, reprehensible.  
 
This is particularly pronounced in contrast with the accounts of the relationship 
with university administration before the introduction of techniques of audit and 
management. Ellen* reflected on this: 
 
There was a very interesting moment in 1992 in this university. There was 
an audit of administration, survey of administration and the results of the 
survey were, well, this university must be quite a good place, well it was 
doing quite good things, but we don't we can't see how it works. Now instead 
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of asking or thinking – ah, maybe there's something between it being quite a 
good place and not knowing how it works, maybe there's a connection -- but 
OK, that's not of course what happened. What happened was 'oh, they can't 
see how it works!' and that was the point [at] which the university began 
building up its huge managerial machinery. I mean up to that point one of the 
things why things worked because you know you trusted people, because you 
only know a few people to trust. I mean it the administrators were basically 
sort of semi-academics, just a handful of them and then after that of course 
we have the present huge administrative structure, it's quite different. 
 
Basically, what Ellen* is protesting is not just the subsumption of knowledge to a 
system of measurement; it is the fact that it was being valued by someone other 
than ‘Us’. This form of positioning thus entails defining one’s position in relation 
to ‘Others’ who are trying to occupy, or shape, the same space. Positioning is 
performed not only through the assertion of cognitive (or experiental) superiority 
of the speaker, but also through the assertion of moral (non-)equivalence. Framing 
neoliberalism as something foreign to universities thus serves to distinguish 
between those on the inside who benefit from these changes, and those on the inside 
who are adversely impacted by them.  
 
‘War on universities’, thus, is both topological and ontological: it serves to 
delineate political space in which interventions happen, and to define actors and 
other entities within it. In this context, practices of delineation and positioning are 
mutually dependent and reinforcing: the positioning of actors at the same time 
serves to validate the construction of social space in which positioning can be 
performed.       
 
 Knowledge and (human) interests 
 
For Ellen*, current conflicts are a reflection of a longer, and deeper, societal 
division:  
 
I think there is something that we're seeing all over again, its effects under 
the present review, which is the drive of utilitarianism just doesn't give up. 
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The measurement of things, I mean, however you dress it up you know…This 
utilitarianism shows itself in various ways one of which is drawing down 
elites, attacking elites. And that's very pervasive, and higher education – I 
guess if you were in soccer or rugby is would be a little bit different, but in 
higher education expertise and achievement is, you know, elitist; universities 
are open to the charges of elitism and then that becomes looks like a question 
of self-interest. In fact it would be very interesting for you to plot what is and 
is not valued as self-interest because self-interest in these Brexiteers we were 
talking about (is), an alignment of self-interest, that's good; academic self-
interest in the promotion of science, that's baaad.  
 
The relationship between knowledge (or critique) and self-interest, of course, is a 
central concern for both social theory (Habermas, 1972) and sociology of 
knowledge/science. In this context, however, it seems participants equate ‘interest’ 
with particularity, that is, loss of position from which it is possible to claim a 
general or universal ‘outlook’. In other words, ‘interests’ are equated with 
professional interests, that is, the idea that academics no longer ‘speak for the 
whole’. As Luke* noted, 
 
I mean I'm an academic so I have a personal interest in this and I suppose I 
feel quite defensive of my students in a way… So there was a slight sense of 
just general professional 'back off, fuck you' aspect to it.  
 
This also brings back the tension between ‘public’ good as defined by authors of 
interventions, and possible other definitions of ‘public’. Unsurprisingly, it is most 
pronounced when it comes to questions of Brexit. As noted in Chapter 2, while 
there had been a point at which I considered reorienting the whole research project 
towards intellectual positioning in relation to Brexit, I had not, in fact, planned to 
discuss it with research participants. However, given the timing of the research 
project, it was possibly inevitable it would come up.  
 
The tensions between universality, particularity, and universities’ stance on Brexit 
emerged very clearly in Richard*’s narrative:  
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I mean there is something quite provincial about universities saying we don't 
like Brexit as a – parochial in the sense of self-serving, in the sense that 
universities have an axe to grind, you know for all sorts of obvious sort of 
fiscal and sort of cultural reasons and so on.  
 
So I think Brexit in this sort of populist moment does throw academia to a 
very strange position but it's not really familiar with, where, on the one hand 
kind of you know dating back to the origins of sort of Western thought, a 
kind of a vocation to try and kind of speak for the whole in some way, while 
also having to be very very aware that actually we do not speak for the whole, 
and that we are now the enemy in some respects.  
 
The current political situation, therefore, is framed as a moment of reckoning, 
where universities are pitted against the forces of both markets and nationalism. 
The difficulty Richard* identifies with finding the position from which universities 
can ‘speak for the whole’ stems from the erosion of the social and political 
foundations of epistemic authority of institutions of knowledge production. This 
erosion, reflected in part in diagnoses of social trends such as ‘post-truth’ and the 
crisis of expertise, is not, however, reducible to the consequences of a specific set 
of policies. As he notes, it concerns the very foundations of Western thought, 
including the question how universities – as institutions that deal both with 
knowledge production and social reproduction – relate to society ‘as a whole’.  
 
This, at the same time, brings us closer to the theoretical inquiry at the heart of this 
thesis: how do we conceive of the relationship between institutions and practices 
of knowledge production and ‘the social’? In other words, how do my participants 
think about the relationship between universities and the society? 
 
Fred* mused:  
 
I think you know we're in a moment of incredible danger in relation to Brexit, 
we've got fragmented politics, the interest in higher education and interest in 
the universities is an expression of democratic knowledge. Yet the impact 
agenda is now behind that. We've got, you know, the university as a 
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{maiden} sort of space to look at populism, and there is going to be a 
scapegoat when Brexit fails, and that scapegoat is going to be... the scapegoat 
is going to be the ethnic minorities. 
 
Jake* said: 
 
I think it is clearly the case that universities do not encourage nationalism. 
Any more than banks encourage nationalism, I mean, universities are as 
much about trying to sort of erode national borders just as much as finance 
or free trade does, you know that. And I think that {universities} are for 
internationalism and quite rightly so.  
 
From the crisis of the university, to the crisis of the economy, to the crisis of 
society: the war on universities, it seems, concerns much more than three- or four-
star publications. These narratives suggest participants see the crisis of the 
university as at least a reflection, if not straightforward equivalent, of the political 
– and, further, of the crisis of the society as a whole. The tension between 
‘universal’, democratic participation, and national, exclusionary political agendas 
associated with populism and the Brexit vote, is transposed onto universities as the 
struggle for defending the right of academics to assert and define standards of 
reasonable argument. The way in which participants perceive conflicts over who 
gets to be (and who gets to be heard) at universities, therefore, becomes 
indistinguishable from the question of who gets to be (and speak for) the society 
as a whole.  
 
For some participants this brings up the question of ‘self-interest’: what motivates 
interventions or, more precisely, what position are they made from. Chapter 4 
showed how this framing of position is performed in, and through, intellectual 
interventions. There, objects are assigned qualities that serve to anchor them within 
a set domain, or ‘world’. For example, saying ‘knowledge is not for sale’ serves to 
position knowledge outside the spheres of the economy or the market. Interviews, 
on the other hand, offer an insight into how participants reflect on this space and, 
equally importantly, how their views on this space influence their practice, from 
the decision to engage in interventions to day-to-day navigation of the political and 
social environment of the academia; as well as, in turn, the degree to which they 
 196 
think this environment is coextensive with the space of interventions. At the end, 
then, it makes sense to turn to how they perceive the effects of their own 
interventions on this space.   
 
Writing is fighting? Limits of interventions 
 
What about the future? I chose this question for the closing part of interviews, in 
part as a way of shifting the conversation out of the slightly depressing tone it took 
at times (given the topic, this was not surprising), but in part also to see how 
participants thought about their own capability to influence the development of 
higher education. The answers I got were highly illustrative, both in their 
resignation (to the state of affairs) and in their commitment (to continue engaging 
in interventions), so a selection from transcripts and interview notes is reproduced 
below without comment. 
 
5/05/2017 
F*: So, for me, we have failed to defend higher education. It's a very real 
failure so that shows and… You know you couldn't say well we will at some 
point start again and do it. So that's somebody else's task now.  
 
JB [notes]: ‘defence’ (twice underlined) 
 
3/05/2017 
N*: I dislike what was referred to as unearned authority, otherwise known as 
brute crude power…And I've always challenged it and I will continue to 
challenge it.  
 
JB: How do you go about doing that? 
 
N*: Well I continue to write, I mean there's this other book coming out, and 
I may write a memoir about the events. 
 
JB [notes]: ‘Nevertheless we persisted??’ 
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5/05/2017 
F*: There is this quote – I can't remember who it comes from, since I think 
it comes from somebody really weird like TS Eliot…-- ‘the reason why we 
fight for a lost cause is not to lose but so that others may be reminded that 
these are causes and then they may win’. So this has been a fight for a lost 
cause; there are other causes to fight for. Yeah. The university one may come 
back. There's not enough of us. Numbers, and willingness to -- I mean, 
actually just academics are timid. That's just the truth.  
 
JB: Do you mean like reluctant to speak in venues that are not strictly 
academic? 
 
F*: Just timid. 
 
JB: Do you think social media could change that? 
 
F*: In the absence of political organising and so people doing stuff, you 
know, social media – social media is just politics of recognition.  
 
23/01/2017 
E*: I'm not a political person by temperament. I normally don't put my head 
above the parapet, a bit of a coward, I did think in what I was doing here that 
I was speaking out to a degree I needed to and I wanted to but I felt I did so 
from and using privilege in another sense; I did so from the privilege of being 
part of the system I was criticising. But here I was an insider and I felt {that} 
really allowed me to be a critic. 
 
5/04/2017 
R*: I have never been able to find this so it may just be something I've made 
up: ‘All academics are librarians’. That is faced with the need to do 
something, ‘well I've got a lot an article to write’; ‘tell you what, I'll write an 
article about it’. So that's [where] academics prefer to be - in the library rather 
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than in the street. That's true and there are moments when that's right. Not 
when they're dismantling your life. 
 
JB [notes]: ‘Walzer’. 
 
The last note refers to Michael Walzer’s quote in The Company of Critics: “In the 
battles of the intellect, as in every other battle, one can win, finally, only on the 
ground.” (2002, p. 180). A few months after I concluded the last interview, UK 
higher education staff engaged in industrial action on a scale that had not been seen 
previously in the sector (e.g. Grove, 2018). The ‘USS strikes’, as they became 
known, revolved around a projected increase in employee contributions to a 
pension scheme that staff at most ‘pre-1992’ universities were part of.  
 
In the context of present study, three things are notable about the strikes. As if 
heeding Walzer’s envoi, they included ‘fighting on the ground’ in the form of daily 
picket lines, occupations, and a series of protest marches/walks in London and 
around campuses. Secondly, they engaged high numbers of early career and 
precarious staff; a great deal of mobilization, in fact, took place via Twitter and 
other social media. Thirdly, they almost instantly generated an industry of ‘meta’-
commentary, or rather intellectual interventions that sought to explain, situate, and 
in different ways position “the Great University Strike”. The vocabulary of these 
interventions represented a curious mix: some were framed in the well-exercised 
‘evil neoliberalism’, ‘(return of) academic freedom’, or even ‘defence of 
Enlightenment’ tropes, but others engaged in more detail with, at times highly 
technical, actuarial detail of the calculation of pensions ‘risk’.  
 
Does this suggest that the critique my participants engaged in has finally found its 
political expression? Those who believe in the power of ideas to guide political 
action would likely suggest so. However, on second look, USS strikes were in 
many ways a surprisingly conservative form of political mobilization. To begin 
with, they revolved around a pension scheme, probably one of rare points of shared 
interest for older and younger academic staff. As noted in Chapter 4, while the 
strike raised broader issues in higher education such as precarity or gender pay gap, 
these were not sufficient to galvanise a similar level of support. Secondly, social 
media aside, the strikes, at the end of the day, employed the most traditional union 
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strategy available: withdrawal of labour. It is possible that this alone (buttressed by 
the threat of ‘fees strike’, that is, possibility students would expect universities to 
pay them back tuition for teaching missed during the strike) was sufficient to 
convince heads of universities and Universities UK, their representative, to 
negotiate with UCU. Last, but not least, a decisive political moment in the strike 
was the revelation of the disproportionate role that constituent colleges of the 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge played in the drive to ‘de-risk’ the scheme. 
This, in turn, was a reminder of both exceptional power of Britain’s two oldest 
universities, and the durable importance of elite networks.   
 
Regardless of whether we interpret USS strikes as the victory of intellectual 
critique of neoliberalism, or as an illustration of its limitations, it is clear that most 
participants know they are not the same thing. Differently put, hardly anyone 
among my participants can be said to be unaware of the fact that ‘preserving a 
vocabulary’ of critique is not the same as mounting barricades. From this 
perspective, it becomes even more interesting to find out what kind of assumptions 
about the nature and role of critique support the decision to continue engaging in 
interventions.  
 
Conclusions: navigating ambiguity 
 
Intellectual interventions and participants’ narratives both organize and ‘order’ the 
world. They identify and position different ‘entities’ – politicians, civil servants, 
managers, other academics – and organize them in specific domains, whose most 
salient feature is the way in which they further define the boundary between 
universities and the ‘outside’.  The configuration of this space that emerged through 
interviews, however, is less well-defined than in intellectual interventions. On one 
level, this is hardly surprising – intellectual interventions are stylized (and edited) 
speech-acts that adhere to conventions and utilize specific tropes and rules of the 
genre. They portray contexts, actors, and objects in relatively unambiguous terms, 
sometimes intentionally overstating particular characteristics to emphasise their 
point. The everyday ‘world’ my participants navigate, however, is inhabited by less 
clear-cut entities. In this sense, it is not surprising their narratives are marked by 
ambiguity. 
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As Berliner (2016) notes, ambiguity can be seen as, in part, just how the world ‘is’. 
Examples such as the environmentalist who flies around the world lecturing on the 
dangers of climate change or the doctor who smokes (Berliner even uses the 
example of ‘critic who nonetheless participates in the academic rat race’) are, in 
this sense, typical of late modernity. This is consistent with both Marx’s view of 
capitalism as inevitably generating contradictions, and Weber’s view that 
capitalism requires rationalization or justification. Lambek (2016) reminds us of 
Bourdieu’s (1977) and Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) warning against imputing ‘etic’ 
contradictions: ‘neoliberal’ side of interventions is not in contradiction with its 
critical content if participants see no such contradiction. Leaving the question of 
the source of contradictions temporarily aside, what we need to ask is what kind of 
effects are produced by navigating them.  
 
Differently put, we must consider not why participants engage in action they think 
produces no tangible results, but what effects are produced by their engagement. 
The objective is not to ‘catch out’ inconsistencies by pointing out to participants 
that their actions violate their verbal commitments (‘how can you criticize 
neoliberal academia and yet reap profit from your books?’). It is, rather, to ask if 
(and how) participants justify continuing to do that, and what kind of belief in the 
power of critique (or speech-acts in general) this entails; whether that means they 
do not ‘know’ what happens; and, last but not least, what kind of role critique plays 
in this process.  
 
What unites my participants is the feeling of being compelled to intervene, thus 
translating a form of vague (or not-so-vague) dissatisfaction with a particular 
setting, or situation, into words – and, further, into a concrete intellectual product. 
For many participants, this feeling of dissatisfaction arises from occupying an 
ambiguous position: for instance, “Ellen”, who got engaged in critique of higher 
education while implementing the Research Assessment Exercise, or “Paul”, who 
developed his interest in higher education as an object of research while accepting 
the position of Pro-VC.  
 
However, ambiguity does not stem only from temporary occupation of potentially 
incommensurable roles. To begin with, most participants seem aware of the fact 
that being in the academia, in itself, constitutes a form of privilege. While not all 
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came from a privileged social background, their job, status, and, not least of all, 
access to publication platforms means most of my participants belong to the elite, 
certainly in terms of social and cultural, if not necessarily (visible) economic 
capital.  
 
The second source of ambiguity, thus, is the fact many participants are aware their 
influence derives from the structures and institutions that are the object of their 
interventions. Being at a university, in combination with the networks they have 
access to (often also by the virtue of having studied at a particular university), puts 
them in a position from which they can make an authoritative intervention. 
Navigating this landscape, therefore, places participants in a slightly awkward spot 
from which they have to ‘defend’ universities without, at the same time, seeming 
as if they are endorsing institutional and personal privilege.  
 
This leads some of them to the complicated question of interest and self-interest. 
This question finds expressions on different scales: what (and who) do universities 
stand for, for instance, when it comes to Brexit? Who do academics speak for when 
they criticise research assessment? Last, but not least, who do my participants 
speak for – what gives them the right to speak for academics (or universities) as a 
whole? In this, they position themselves in relation to other academics, whom they 
frame as either afraid to speak out, or as ‘silent neoliberals’, actually benefitting 
from changes to higher education and research. In the first case, positing a ‘silent 
majority’ serves to justify participants’ interventions: they are, in this sense, 
speaking ‘for the people’. In the other case, it serves as a way to distance 
themselves from ‘silent neoliberals’, in part because, as we could see from “Fred”’s 
case, purely demographic criteria do not lend themselves easily to this distinction.  
After all, in some ways, my participants have also ‘benefited’ from neoliberalism, 
if ‘benefiting’ means being able to continue teaching and researching, not to 
mention receive public attention that comes with interventions.  
 
Interventions, in this sense, can be seen as a way of justifying continued 
participation in institutions of higher education, as ambiguous and ambivalent as 
they may be. This is in line with Boltanski and Thévenot’s observation that 
justifications proliferate under conditions of ambiguity; it makes sense to assume 
that, when participants feel ‘under attack’ but they do not want to leave, they will 
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come up with different explanations for this particular contradiction. This helps 
illuminate the third and crucial ‘contradiction’, the fact that participants said they 
were committed to continue engaging in interventions despite feeling that the “war 
on universities” had been lost. Obviously, it is appealing to see continued 
engagement as a heroic act, perhaps, with the participant who quoted TS Eliot, 
heroic precisely for its futility. Yet, this would be ‘passing the buck’ too early: 
what, after all, are interventions if they have no – at least not a tangible political – 
effect?  
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Chapter 6: Synthesis  
 
Introduction 
 
Preceding three chapters presented intellectual interventions from three angles: 
through the lens of politics and policy, that is, ‘antecedent conditions’ they speak 
to and about; as forms of discourse and situated speech-acts, that is, utterances that 
engage in a specific form of positioning (situating objects and persons) in specific 
domains (‘worlds’) and in justification of corresponding normative implications; 
and as personal strategies, that is, reflections on why these speech-acts take the 
form that they do, what kind of role they play in participants’ lives, and how they 
relate to their (life)world. This chapter will bring these three ‘worlds’ together, in 
the sense in which it will examine the implications of their – overlapping as well 
as diverging – ontologies for how we think about critique and its relationship with 
‘the social’.  
 
The method applied in synthesising these elements can be classified as a 
reinterpretation or ‘redescription’ (e.g. Rorty, 1979, 1982; Thompson, 1990, p. 22). 
This does not necessarily mean endorsing the view according to which – at least as 
far as the social world is concerned – there is no such thing as a better explanation: 
all we have are competing (or parallel) descriptions. This can lend itself to 
inference about different and hence incommensurable descriptions as amounting 
to different and hence incommensurable realities. While the ‘multiple worlds’ 
hypothesis is taken up in some variants of the ‘ontological turn’ (see discussion in 
Graeber, 2015) – not least because seemingly congruent with, if not necessarily 
deducible from, quantum physics – we need to be very careful about inferring a 
multiplicity of worlds from a multiplicity of descriptions. This is particularly 
relevant as it can be taken to be an implication of the ontological framework in On 
Justification. After all, the inherent assumption in most (if not all) versions of this 
argument is that multiple worlds can, at least under the right set of circumstances, 
coexist relatively comfortably. As the concluding chapter will argue, it is 
particularly in situations of conflict, dispute, or, as interventions frame it, ‘war’ – 
that the limits of this framing become visible. 
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Setting the stage 
 
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, the setting of the ‘war on universities’ should be seen 
in terms of historical constitution of the relationship between universities and the 
state. While Oxford and Cambridge initially developed as self-governing, semi-
autonomous communities, frequently with clerical underpinnings, the expansion of 
universities in the 19th century was driven by the needs of the British Empire. The 
task of universities was to provide cadres capable of managing both the ‘technical’ 
(engineering, trade, medicine, transport), and ‘finer’, social side (philosophy, 
anthropology, history, economics, diplomacy) of this growing complexity. In this 
sense, Victorian universities were intermediary institutions between ‘the state’ and 
‘the society’, or, more precisely, between the governing and the governed.  
 
Universities’ special status derived from two main factors. One was their 
credentialising role (Abbott, 1988; Collins, 1979; Weber, 1956): universities were 
essential not only to educating but also certifying the professions (it bears 
remembering the University of London was initially set up as an examining, rather 
than a teaching institution). The other was the proximity between the professoriate 
and the governing stratum, especially in cases of Oxford and Cambridge. Unlike 
in France, where Napoléon established specialized institutions (Grandes écoles) to 
provide cadres for the civil service, or in Prussia/Germany, where general 
(Universität) and technical (Fachhochschulen) higher education were 
institutionally separate, this gave universities in the UK virtual monopoly on 
production and certification of technical, higher, and complex knowledge.  
 
In this sense, British universities indeed possessed a higher degree of independence 
than many of their continental European counterparts. The ivory tower metaphor, 
however, is both revealing and misleading. Misleading because universities were 
not separate from society: they were both responsible to the state, and dependent 
– financially and infrastructurally – on support and funding from the remaining 
landed gentry and the burgeoning middle class, both through endowments and 
through tuition paid to educate their sons (and occasional daughter). However, the 
ivory tower provided an elevated view, which meant they could lay claim to a 
better, more holistic insight into the needs of the polity. The assertion of epistemic 
privilege, in this sense, co-developed with the solidification of the university as an 
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institution, and the institutionalization and standardization of criteria for what 
counts as rational knowledge. Academic authority, more specifically, was 
predicated on the claim of having access to knowledge ‘for its own sake’. This, 
however, did not mean unconnected to economic interests: commonwealth was 
equated with the state’s economic (and, obviously, military) well-being. All it 
meant was that universities were institutions specialized in the production of 
knowledge, where scholars and students were immersed (theoretically, at least) 
primarily in that pursuit, and in exchange comparatively free from other concerns.  
 
At the same time, universities were invested with the capacity to evaluate, order, 
rank and choose future political and social elites. In British sociology, this is often 
framed as the question of ‘access’ or ‘social mobility’, but both are a bit of a 
category error: universities were not the cause of social inequalities, and while 
admissions to undergraduate programmes certainly depended on class as well as 
cultural capital, the effect of previous education (especially difference between 
private and state schools) was stronger (Friedman and Laurison, 2019). However, 
universities provided certification of this status, not to mention a context for 
building social networks among members of the professional stratum. Last, but not 
least, universities also had the power to select those who will be doing the selection 
– that is, their own staff (Halsey, 1992).  
 
Institutionalised scholarship in the UK developed in a politically and 
infrastructurally ambiguous space that simultaneously was and was not part of the 
society and was and was not part of the public sphere. Political and funding 
arrangements at the end of the 19th and the start of the 20th century reflected this 
distribution of power. University Grants Committee, the first official body 
established to channel state funding for universities, mediated between the 
universities and the Treasury. Universities, in this sense, were recognized as 
autonomous – and powerful – political actors, on par possibly only with the Church 
of England. Unlike in Germany, where professors are civil servants and thus 
employed (and confirmed) by the state, British universities had an almost exclusive 
control over the production, transmission, and certification of knowledge as well 
as the selection of those who would be doing all three. So unquestionable was the 
idea that universities were overlapping while not completely coextensive with the 
society that they commanded separate seats in Parliament (the custom originated 
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in Scotland and was transported to the Parliament of England and then Great 
Britain; in addition to Scottish universities, Oxford, Cambridge and London held 
separate seats until 1918, and until 1950 as the constituency of Combined English 
Universities). 
 
While there is value in emphasising the historical distinctiveness of the British 
version of skhōle its relevance lies less in the concrete institutional arrangements 
and more in the way in which these lent legitimacy to specific forms of valuation 
and justification. ‘Knowledge for its own sake’, in this context, is primarily an 
argument for knowledge on its own terms – ‘its’, obviously, meaning judged by 
other academics. While the proportion of total population going into higher 
education was small, and while shared backgrounds and dispositions of politicians 
and academics enabled the UGC to keep relations between the two social groups 
smooth, this order was maintained without much friction. Yet, with massification 
in the aftermath of World War II, justifications for the ‘special status’ of 
universities were rapidly shrinking. As student numbers rose, universities were 
becoming more coextensive with the society; as technology progressed, it was clear 
the state was going to need ever greater numbers of educated individuals. This 
alone would have probably sufficed to make universities a matter of ‘public 
interest’, as reflected in their increasing presence in the media – and, much more 
importantly, the increasing drive to manage and monitor public expenditure on 
higher education. However, in the second half of the 20th century, another 
challenge to their status emerged: the economy.  
 
With the establishment of the international system of monetary exchange, the 
growing influence of international organisations such as the OECD or the World 
Bank, and the gathering of large-scale datasets comparable across national 
contexts, the ‘state of the nation’, and, aggregated, ‘the state of the world’ become 
inferable from a relatively small, standardized set of numbers. Of course, 
‘ordinalisation’ (Fourcade, 2016) –development of numerical techniques and 
instruments, from standardisation of measures to double-entry bookkeeping – was 
vital to the development of capitalism as a whole (e.g. Weber, 1956; Carrothers 
and Espeland, 1991). Yet, with the intensification of global trade, this type of 
measurement became increasingly relevant (Slobodian, 2018). Rather than 
requiring stewardship of the ‘public sphere’, policymaking was thus able to move 
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away from deliberating on the meaning of ‘greatest good of the greatest number’ 
and rely on indicators: certain numbers go up – good, certain numbers go down – 
bad.  
 
In this sense, economy – or, more precisely, markets – no longer provided just an 
accurate reflection of the state of the world. Increasingly, markets were becoming 
a model that can simulate ‘real-world’ interaction, including in domains that were 
previously treated as separate from the economic – such as politics (e.g. public 
choice theory), or personal relationships (e.g. ‘marriage markets’). In this sense, 
markets are inserted as a proxy for the polity, marking the supremacy of self-
interested, utility-maximising individual as the model of rational agent (Brown, 
2015; Amadae, 2015).  
 
The importance of markets for the way the state ‘sees’ (Scott, 1998), ‘knows’ (e.g. 
Davies and McGoey, 2012) and ‘governs’ its subjects (Foucault, 2008) is, of 
course, a central topic in scholarship on ‘economization’ or ‘marketization’ (e.g. 
Çalişkan and Callon, 2010, 2009; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu, eds., 2007). Yet, 
the rise of economics as a ‘language of reality’ goes beyond challenging the role 
of universities in the certification, reproduction, and dissemination of expert 
knowledge; it threatens to displace it entirely.  
 
Lave, Mirowski, and Randalls argued that 
 
(…)At an even more fundamental level, neoliberalism reifies the primary 
function of an ideal economy as a ‘marketplace of ideas’. The fundamental 
role of the market is not, according to neoliberalism, the mere exchange of 
things, but rather the processing and conveyance of knowledge or 
information. No human being (and no state) can ever measure up to the 
ability of the abstract marketplace to convey existing ideas and to summon 
forth further innovation. Hence the novelty of neoliberalism is to alter the 
ontology of the market, and consequently, to revise the very conception of 
society. By its very definition, the market processes information in ways that 
no human mind can encompass or predict (2010, p. 662).  
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There is an underlying ‘elective affinity’ between neoliberalism and the production 
of knowledge. Initially, markets were designed to solve the problem of 
coordination under conditions of epistemic inequality, that is, differences in access 
to knowledge. Hayek’s essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945), for 
instance, is at heart a critique of epistemic monopoly produced by 
institutionalization of expertise. William Davies provides an account of its 
implications for institutionalised knowledge: 
 
The argument that the Austrian economists had made in favour of the free 
market was never simply that it would produce the most wealth or the best 
products…The more transformative and disconcerting claim was that it could 
reduce the need for public, centralized experts as such. One might go further 
still and say that they reduced the need for truth…As long as markets were 
relatively unimpaired by government intervention, they could become the 
organizing principle of an otherwise disorganized, unplanned, even ignorant 
society. As long as there was a way of coordinating people peacefully, in real 
time, why the need for experts or facts at all? (Davies, 2018, p. 166, my 
emphasis). 
 
Obviously, we should be wary of retrospectively overstating the influence of early 
philosophers of neoliberalism on the rise of economics. Epistemic authority of 
economics, in principle, relies on the same ontological foundations as other forms 
of institutionalised knowledge. Yet, as Slobodian argues, nimbleness, combined 
with speed and promise of neutrality, provided economic knowledge with an ‘edge’ 
over other forms of insight:   
 
Mises and Hayek made a case for the centrality of the economist in the 
conduct of the modern state. Economic knowledge was a central fixture of 
modernity. A state unequipped with economic research was doomed to fall 
behind in the race of nations. Because taking the pulse of the nation put the 
economist in the position of the scientist or medical doctor, on this view, the 
economist was entitled privileged access to the internal workings of private 
business (Slobodian, 2018, p. 68). 
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With the acceleration of rate of production interwoven with optic fibre transmission 
of information, ‘just-in-time’ knowledge became increasingly important. Markets, 
in this sense, are meant to function as an ‘instant truth device’; prices provide clear 
insight into the state of the world, unimpeded by time, power, or political influence: 
 
(…) The market is a type of mass sensory device, that exists to detect 
sentiment and changes in public mood. It’s like a constant opinion-polling 
device or survey, only with the advantage that it responds in real time and 
reflects things as they are now. When something happens, such as a policy 
announcement or natural disaster, one can immediately check how the 
markets have responded. Rumours of impending shortages or regulatory 
changes can be met with instant reactions from the markets (Davies, 2018, p. 
167, original emphasis).  
 
Rather than just truth-telling devices, therefore, markets function as an evaluative 
mechanism, both in the literal sense – prices reflect the value of things – and in the 
moral sense: they signal whether developments are good or bad (Fourcade and 
Healy, 2007). In both senses, but particularly in the latter, markets offer an 
alternative to the slow process of ‘deliberation’ in the public sphere, which, at least 
from the point of view of Hayek and Mises, is inevitably impacted by epistemic 
inequalities, favouring certain groups over others. Obviously, from the standpoint 
of Hayek and Mises, this was meant to act as a safeguard against the ‘stacking’ of 
institutional control over knowledge, especially in totalitarian regimes. Yet it 
clearly posed challenges for the epistemic authority of institutions that had 
exercised historical monopoly on the certification of knowledge – universities 
foremost among them. Popper’s principle of falsificationism, for instance, can be 
seen as an attempt to justify the epistemic supremacy of scientific knowledge by 
making it subject to a concerted effort to undermine one’s own epistemic privilege. 
Yet, he had fewer good things to say about modes of inference in what he dubbed 
‘historical’ sciences, including Marxism.  
 
This is why contemporary critique tends to focus on economics as a particularly 
important element of the ‘production’ of neoliberal order. Economists, especially 
of the ‘neoclassical’ bent, are taken to have committed ‘epistemic hijacking’, not 
only in the sense of having managed to assert their views over the nature of reality, 
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but also for managing to position themselves as possessors of privileged access to 
that reality. Arguably, in the past decade, ‘Big Data’ have been framed as an 
analogous challenge to epistemic authority of academics and, in particular, 
traditionally conceived social sciences (e.g. Bartlett et al., 2018), in the sense in 
which they offer a promise of instantaneous insight into a range of characteristics 
and behaviours much wider, varied, and fine-grained than those covered by the 
standard meaning of ‘economic’.  
 
Much like in the case of markets, this form of ‘knowledge’ is, of course, not 
unmediated: it just requires a different set of intermediaries. Rather than a conflict 
over ideologies, the critique of ‘economisation’ reveals a deep-seated rivalry over 
primacy of epistemic access. The ‘war’ interventions refer to, in other words, is 
both ontological and epistemological: what is at stake is not just a more accurate 
picture of the world, but also the right to exercise authority over what counts as a 
more valid view of ‘the whatness of what is’. This struggle is particularly 
demanding for disciplines who cannot claim a privileged insight into ‘numbers’ (or 
strings of numbers), such as most social sciences and humanities. Zygmunt 
Bauman might have argued that intellectuals’ change of status came with the loss 
of privileged claim to legislate (1987); in this context, however, ‘interpreters’ are 
also becoming increasingly obsolete.  
 
This is one of the reasons interventions are invested in asserting epistemic authority 
via ontological justification, in other words, why they engage in definitional 
struggles. This argument, obviously, cannot be built only on the basis of traditional, 
or charismatic authority; therefore, intellectuals need to claim better insight into 
the true nature, and, by extension, value of things. In this sense, Andrew 
McGettigan’s ‘admission’ in the preface of The Great University Gamble that he 
knew nothing about political economy of higher education should be read in two 
registers. One is, of course, an element of epistemic modesty (obviously tempered 
by the fact he will go on to develop an argument about precisely the political 
economy of higher education in the book), but the other serves to position him 
opposite groups who normally deal with economics and finance: in other words, as 
not one of ‘Them’.  
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This is what provided the ‘setting’ for forms of positioning analysed in this thesis. 
The separation between ‘worlds’ of economics/markets and 
knowledge/universities, therefore, is a performative redrawing of boundaries 
between different epistemic communities, or, perhaps more broadly, rationalities 
and practices. The next section will consider the strategies and forms of 
establishment of worth interventions use in order to ‘secure’ these borders.  
 
(B)orders of worth 
 
Forms of critique analysed here posit that there are things (goods) that cannot be 
measured, whose value cannot be expressed in numerical terms, and certainly not 
in terms of their contribution to the economy. Knowledge is one such thing. The 
argument that knowledge cannot be reduced to economic value has both an 
ontological and a political, or, differently put, diagnostic and normative side. The 
first concerns the nature of knowledge; the second the implications for ownership, 
control, and distribution.  
 
The weaker form of the argument does not necessarily dispute the existence of 
economic value of knowledge, but asserts that evaluating it on grounds of 
contribution to economic growth only fails to recognize its nature. Represented in, 
for instance, Campaign for the Public University’s Alternative White Paper, this 
argument asserts that the evaluation of knowledge based on ‘metrics’ – essentially, 
any form of quantification – cannot adequately capture ‘intangible’ or immaterial 
outcomes such as democratic culture, or social cohesion. This line of critique 
challenges the ‘metric’ – whether it measures what it claims to measure – without, 
necessarily, challenging the ‘test’ itself. This form of critique is primarily 
corrective (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p. 33): its role is to lead to the revision 
of the mode of evaluation15. This allows for a compromise between different 
‘worlds’, or logics of evaluation, as long as there is a shared political framework 
where these competing justifications can be placed.  
 
 
15 Lamont distinguishes between practices of valuation, that entail giving worth or value, and 
those of evaluation (assessing how an entity attains a certain type of worth) (2012, p. 21.5). While 
the two are often conflated in literature and intertwined in practice, we could take valuation to 
primarily apply to the realm of objects, and evaluation to standardised human practices of 
expressing value of those objects. 
 213 
The stronger form of the argument asserts knowledge should not be measured at 
all, as it is beyond the order of value that allows it to be ‘counted’. This argument 
is reflected in McGettigan’s contrasting of higher education with gas or electricity, 
as well as in Collini’s assertion that universities are more like the BBC than like 
private companies. This form of justification pits quantitative forms of assessment 
more strongly against the qualitative; they no longer represent different forms of 
evaluation, but ‘coins of different realms’. All attempts to instill a ‘conversion rate’ 
or order of equivalence between the two – in other words, to express the value of 
knowledge in terms of economic utility – are framed as violent, inimical to the 
nature of knowledge.  
 
In this view, knowledge that is marketized gains certain qualities, but loses others. 
For instance, it becomes instrumental, but stops being emancipatory; or, it becomes 
comparable (e.g. through modularization, units, or contact hours), but stops being 
transformative (as, for instance, in the critique of the effects of ‘trigger warnings’). 
This type of knowledge also changes those who come into contact with it. So, for 
instance, students start behaving like consumers – or, in the case of ‘free speech’ 
controversies, like spoiled, coddled children. The argument, in essence, is that the 
increase in quantity leads to a decrease in quality, something akin to 
impoverishment16. This reasoning is reflected in the critique of the ‘decline of 
standards’ (Furedi, 2017, 2004), but also Collini’s assertion that measuring 
knowledge will create “a lot of Ryanairs” (Collini, 2011).  
 
Consequently, the problem with economization of knowledge is not just that it aims 
to subsume the evaluative logic of universities to the evaluative logic of the market. 
If it were, it would primarily be an issue of incommensurability between different 
orders of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, p. 368 et passim). This would be 
equivalent to, say, judging a fish by its capacity to ride a bicycle – misplaced or 
ludicrous, deserving of the mocking critique of its obsolete and cumbersome 
language, but not in itself dangerous. However, if subsumption under the order of 
the market has the capacity to permanently change the nature of knowledge – to 
the degree to which it constitutes destruction – then it should be exempt from, or 
 
16 While regrettably the limited space and timeframe of this thesis did not allow for the 
elaboration of this discussion, it would be interesting to contrast this with Boltanski’s recent work 
with Arnaud Esquerre on the processes of ‘enrichment’ (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2016, 2017).  
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positioned outside of, sphere of valuation. Precisely because it is so special (or 
valuable), it should be protected from valuing.  
 
It is not very difficult to infer from this that the process of justification engaged in 
critique requires an evaluative procedure that seeks to ‘protect’ the university from 
incursions of entities from the ‘market world’. The status of entities is derived from 
their position: politics and economics = bad; academia = good. Those that ‘breach’ 
these boundaries must be either removed or recategorised. If this is not possible, 
then knowledge must be summarily exempt not only from processes of valuation 
(economy), but also from the sphere where discussions about what gets included 
in it can be had (politics).  
 
This argument can be read as an assertion of academic sovereignty, not only over 
matters of university governance, but also over certification and credentialization. 
It is a way to (re)claim monopoly over principles of equivalence: universities – and 
this, of course, means academics, not ‘evil’ ‘fat cat’ managers – should be free to 
decide what counts as a degree, what counts as good research, who should be 
employed to teach and so on. Boltanski argued that the role of institutions, in 
conditions of political plurality, is to reduce uncertainty by furnishing a principle 
of equivalence, that is, a framework for commensuration between different forms 
of valuation (2011, pp. 50—83). In this sense, this argument also presents a way to 
re-assert the primacy of the university as the institution for the valuation of 
knowledge, in contrast (and against) ‘quantifying’ institutions such as funding 
agencies, student loan companies, and research councils.   
 
On another level, however, this argument is literally a demand for exemption from 
valuation. Knowledge, in this sense, is not just sui generis, irreducible or 
incommensurable with other ‘goods’, be they tangible/material (such as food, or 
shelter) or intangible/immaterial (health); it should be outside of the possibility of 
even being considered as such. What Bourdieu (1984) referred to as the 
‘consecration’ of knowledge, in this case, takes the form of literally being rendered 
sacred: positioned outside of the sphere of material, mundane, measurable 
‘reality’.  
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This moral economy (Thompson, 1971, 1964) thus rests on a specific political 
ontology (Bacevic and Muellerleile, 2018). This ontology includes not just the 
nature of knowledge and the university as an institution, but also the status or 
‘worth’ of those who are in any sort of relation to it. However, there is only one 
kind of political actor can institute that level of exception: the sovereign (Agamben, 
1998). It is possible to claim something akin to this existed at the time Oxford and 
Cambridge were established; yet, the less exclusive universities became, the less 
they were treated as an exception both by the Crown (the actual Sovereign) and the 
Parliament (who rules in the Sovereign’s name).  
 
If there is no particular political actor that can perform this operation of exemption 
of knowledge from the order of valuation, what is the purpose of voicing it 
publicly? Beyond and above differing (including incommensurable) orders of 
worth, critique – at least in the sense in which it is understood in the context of 
pragmatic sociology of critique – requires the existence of a political space where 
claims can be made. This brings us to the question of positioning in relation to the 
multiplicity of fields. 
 
Fields of sense  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, intellectual interventions can most easily be situated in the 
field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993). The field of cultural production 
encompasses not only audiences and producers of intellectual interventions, but 
also art and literature (in the narrow sense of belles-lettres), and scholarship. The 
‘worth’ of individual interventions in these fields, Bourdieu argued, is determined 
by the application of a principle that seems to be the exact inversion of economic 
logic; that is, indifference towards monetary awards and ‘utility’ in the economic 
sense. The more useless the product, the better it will fare in the field of cultural 
production; the more dismissive of economic rewards the author, the higher they 
will be positioned. This is particularly accentuated in academic knowledge 
production. Bourdieu summarises this ‘logic of the field’ in the following way: 
 
Entry into a scholastic universe presupposes a suspension of the 
presuppositions of common sense and a paradoxal commitment to a more or 
less radically new set of presuppositions, linked to the discovery of stakes 
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and demands neither known nor understood by ordinary experience. Each 
field is characterized by the pursuit of a specific goal, tending to favour no 
less absolute investments by all (and only) those who possess the required 
dispositions (for example, libido sciendi). Taking part in the illusio – 
scientific, literary, philosophical or other – means taking seriously 
(sometimes to the point of making them questions of life and death) stakes 
which, arising from the logic of the game itself, establish its 'seriousness', 
even if they may escape or appear 'disinterested' or 'gratuitous' to those who 
are sometimes called 'lay people' or those who are engaged in other fields 
(since the independence of the different fields entails a form of 
non-communicability between them) (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 11). 
 
On this account, interventions need not have effects beyond the academic field at 
all. Recognition and value are drawn from the sense of resonance interventions 
generate between the author and their audiences, composed primarily of other 
academics or a similarly disposed educated readership. In this sense, intellectual 
interventions can be said to resemble Randall Collins’ ‘interaction rituals’, forms 
of exchange that structure scholarly production (Collins, 1998). Not only do they 
rely on the participation of other people (conversation); it is this very interaction 
that represents their currency. Public events feature ‘shared consumption’ of a 
particular intellectual product – like book launches, panels, or public talks – offer 
an opportunity for the generation of emotional energy that is supposed to furnish 
and sustain the production of this genre.  
 
There are two problems with this assumption of the autonomy of the academic 
field, however. One concerns spaces between fields (Eyal, 2013). As noted in 
Chapters 1 and 4, most interventions are not ‘classical’ academic products. They 
are clearly intended for a broad educated readership, rather than a specialist 
audience of peer-reviewed academic journals or university presses (we will recall 
that David Willetts positions his product precisely as the “only” take on the 
transformation of higher education research that underwent peer review). Last, but 
not least, authors of interventions do not really talk to each other. While quite a 
few are mutually acquainted, and have been on panels together, there is hardly 
anything like a sustained ‘conversation’ developing. While the Willetts-Collini 
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‘encounter’ can be treated like an exception, second reading suggested it had to do 
more with Willetts’ personal positioning than with any particular logic of the field.  
 
One way of solving this problem is to interpret interventions as travelling objects, 
that is, products intended to generate effects in a number of fields. So, for instance, 
publishing a book about universities could have effects in the general market for 
intellectual products, while also serving to boost the author’s academic standing. 
While Bourdieu’s and Collins’ respective accounts are similar in the sense of 
asserting the relative autonomy and isolation of fields, they disagree on the 
possibility of converting capitals. Bourdieu claims that conversion is possible: 
paradigmatic example would be a lucrative book deal an author can obtain on the 
basis of their engagement in the field of politics; or, in the opposite direction, being 
offered an advisory or even executive position in a political organization on the 
basis of one’s intellectual capital (Yannis Varoufakis, for instance, managed to 
perform both movements – using his academic capital as an economist to attain a 
position in the Syriza government, and then converting political capital back into 
book deals). Collins, importantly, insists on the incommensurability of forms of 
valuation between the economic and the cultural field: that is, an intellectual 
product has to be valued and evaluated according to the logic of ‘its own’ field. 
This would mean, for instance, that ‘selling well’ would not aid the recognition of 
an author’s high literary or diagnostic quality.  
 
While there is value in both readings, they have limited purchase when brought to 
bear on empirical material presented here. From Bourdieu’s perspective, we should 
expect to see participants financially benefiting from books, or using their articles 
in the ‘popular’ press as evidence of public engagement or even impact (many 
academics in the US, for instance, do precisely that: to be quoted or invited to 
comment in newspapers or television is a sign of prestige). This does not happen. 
Clearly, interviews and data collection provide a very limited insight into the total 
state of participants’ finances, but while many do get royalties from publishers, this 
is certainly not at the level sufficient to constitute an independent motivation. The 
issue of financial rewards, in fact, was almost completely circumvented: while 
some interviews provided openings for this kind of conversation (for instance, 
discussing the risks implied in ‘intervening’ for one’s career and thus long-term 
financial security), most participants insisted it played no role at all. Similarly, most 
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participants did not even consider ‘converting’ their interventions into evidence of 
public engagement (though, in some cases, it could certainly count as such).  
 
From Collins’ perspective, given the impossibility of conversion, it would make 
sense to expect a neater alignment between interventions and participants’ ‘day 
jobs’ – for instance, historians writing about the history of universities – as it would 
otherwise presumably be rather costly to maintain engagement in both fields. 
While in some cases participants did this – for instance, the participant who used 
their experience from working in university management to start writing 
interventions pertaining to higher education policy – most participants were 
seemingly willing to write or engage in interventions in their free time. Similarly, 
while their academic capital (and networks) certainly helped both their epistemic 
positioning and sales of their books, the only person who ever tried explicitly 
positioning his intervention as an ‘academic’ product is Willetts – who, despite 
being a ‘boundary subject’, is in many ways the least academic of all authors.  
 
Secondly and more importantly, interventions are not isolated from economic 
logic. Successful interventions are the outcome of the work of a network of editors, 
publishing houses, and the media, what Eyal and Bucholz refer to as the market for 
intellectual interventions. As noted in Chapter 5, quite a few interventions came as 
consequence of prompts from publishers, or their agents. More specifically, they 
were the outcome of a ‘fortuitous coupling’ between proactive content seekers, and 
the elements reflected on in interviews – a particular “structure of feeling” that 
authors experienced in relation to the institutional and political environment of 
higher education and research, their position in social structure, and capacity to 
invest time and (often ‘free’) labour into the production of interventions. As much 
as this confluence may seem accidental to authors, it is anything but: it is, in fact, 
produced through series of relations that merge logics associated with different 
‘fields’.   
 
Especially when it comes to smaller presses, editors, publishers and agents are 
more likely to offer contracts to authors whose works they believe will generate 
sales. Interventions that engage with politics of higher education, while hardly Fifty 
Shades of Grey, are not a bad investment: ever-growing numbers of university 
graduates suggest the size of potential audience for this type of content is unlikely 
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to shrink. The relationships formed in this way can go on for quite a while. 
Publishers will contact previously successful authors to see if they are working on 
anything new (Thompson, 2005); magazine or journal editors will maintain a 
‘favourite’ commentator from whom to solicit contributions on a particular range 
of topics. In the case of online newspapers, journals or blogs, they seek those that 
are likely to elicit reactions from audiences, including provocative or 
‘controversial’ pieces. Given that most online platforms are financed through 
advertising revenue, hits-per-page are an important indicator of the attractiveness 
of the outlet to potential advertisers. This is one of the reasons why editors like to 
have a range of ‘favourite’ commentators or writers they can turn to. In this sense, 
the politics of particular platforms are sometimes less important than the capacity 
of a particular author (or piece) to garner reactions from the audience; the political 
economy of platforms does not necessarily operate on flows of economic capital 
alone.  
 
This, of course, does not mean publishers, editors, and other mediators are ‘naked’ 
profit- (or rent-) seekers. Some operate at a loss – the London Review of Books is 
one example. Many are motivated by an independent desire to steer, or curate, 
public debate: in some cases, the production costs of publications can be covered 
from the sales of ‘bestsellers’ in academic or trade press. Equally, ‘attention 
economy’ is not a new feature of intellectual life. Relative prestige and influence 
of intellectuals, in the sense of their capacity to draw attention to their 
interventions, was arguably instrumental in the ‘making of’ public intellectuals 
such as Foucault and Sartre (Baert, 2015). However, it is possible that the 
abundance of both platforms and academics looking to contribute to public 
discussions makes the possibility of attracting the attention of a well-positioned 
editor all the more important for the success of both: in the era when anyone can 
make their opinions known on Twitter, being able to publish in The Guardian or 
Times Higher Education acts as an additional indicator of prestige. At the same 
time, being able to secure a relatively steady input from authors whose work is 
likely to attract readers works towards the sustainability of the platform. In sum, 
what distinguishes contemporary ‘attention spaces’ from the historical generation 
of Collins’ analysis is that ‘attention’ and ‘monetary’ economies have fused, almost 
perfectly.  
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The ‘positioning chain’, in this sense, involves more than just authors and their 
intended audience. It includes a number of ‘mediators’ (Latour, 2005): from 
situated contexts where intellectuals can begin writing (or translating an idea, or a 
set of feelings, into a diagnosis), to public events, such as literary festivals and 
book launches, to online platforms (interactions on social media, blogs, reviews). 
Each of these elements presents ‘moments of valuation’: increasing or decreasing 
the visibility, attractiveness, and (current or future) economic worth of the author 
and product. However, contrary to both Bourdieu and Collins, this market is 
contiguous with, rather than separated from, other markets. The decision to invest 
in intellectual products is also driven by the logic of profit. As much as 
interventions may criticise the application of economic logic to the domain of 
knowledge production, they owe their existence, at least in part, to precisely the 
same logic.  
 
In this sense, the critique of ‘the market’ in itself relies on a market, as much as it 
may be the market for intellectual products. This is not to ‘reveal’, even less 
‘denounce’, the economic side of intellectual production. After all, other accounts 
of intellectual interventions have also pointed out the vitality of the relationship 
between editors, publishers, and other ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘their’ authors. It is more 
to emphasise two points. One is that interventions cannot be situated in a single 
field. As Eyal observed, 
 
All of these practices, wherein money is involved, have a double meaning, 
or a ‘twofold truth’ as Bourdieu puts it: they can be seen as economic (i.e., 
interested, egoistic, calculable) or they can be seen as moral or social (i.e., 
altruistic, disinterested, nonquantifiable). It all depends, as Callon says, on 
the framing, particularly the temporal frame within which they are viewed. 
It follows, therefore, that there is no easy, clear-cut, self-evident criteria by 
which the various fields could be distinguished in terms of the content of the 
activity that takes place within them. Nothing is economic or scientific or 
artistic by itself (Eyal, 2013, p. 159) 
 
The other is to ask, if we accept this interpretation, what it means that this side 
never comes up – neither in interventions, nor in participants’ narratives. This is 
particularly interesting given that publishers, editors and agents are market träger: 
 221 
their job is literally to repackage knowledge produced by academics into something 
that can be sold, or converted into another form of capital (intellectual, social). 
This, technically, makes them as much ‘agents of neoliberalism’ as reviled 
university managers.  
 
However, there is one important difference. With the (partial) exception of 
university presses – where, as we could see, none of the interventions critical of 
the market were published – publishers, presses and platforms are, on the whole, 
located outside of the university. In fact, we could even say that the position of 
publishers and agents as mediators fits within the same ‘world’, as they keep 
‘economic logic’ away from intellectuals. This brings us back to the question why 
interventions insist on delineating the academia from other ‘worlds’ to the degree 
that anything associated with economy, politics, or other spheres of ‘interest’ has 
to be either ignored or performatively purged. Turning the question around, it is to 
ask why the world of interventions must be constituted as if it were the exact 
opposite of the worlds of economy and politics.  
 
Reflexivity, positioning and self-knowledge 
 
“How can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself?”, asks Sartre 
(2003 [1958], p. 76). Are intellectual interventions an artefact of ‘bad faith’? The 
fact that they seem to deny (or at least to ignore) conditions of their own possibility 
suggests this may be a fitting diagnosis. Yet, in line with questions outlined in 
Chapter 1, this opens, rather than closes, the problem of reflexivity. If this is indeed 
the case, why is it so, and what are the effects of this systematic denial of critique’s 
own conditions of existence? 
 
In Pascalian Meditations Bourdieu approaches the question of particular ‘myopia’ 
afforded by the academic stance. He imports the Greek skhōle for this academic 
outlook, signalling the proximity between leisure – that is, absence of need for 
occupying oneself with the vagaries of daily existence – and the disposition to 
study, that is, learn to observe things at a distance:  
 
There is nothing that ‘pure’ thought finds it harder to think than skhōle, the 
first and most determinant of all the social conditions of possibility of ‘pure’ 
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thought, and also the scholastic disposition which inclines its possessors to 
suspend the demands of the situation, the constraints of economic and social 
necessity, and the urgencies it imposes or the ends it proposes. In Sense and 
Sensibilia J. L. Austin refers in passing to the ‘scholastic view’, giving as an 
example the fact of enumerating or examining all the possible senses of a 
word, without any reference to the immediate context, instead of simply 
observing or using the sense of the word which is directly compatible with 
the situation. Developing what is implied in Austin's example, one could say 
that the ‘as if’ posture – very close to the ‘let’s pretend’ mode of play which 
enables children to open imaginary worlds – is…what makes possible all 
intellectual speculations, scientific hypotheses, ‘thought experiments’ (2000, 
p. 12). 
 
This ‘as if’ disposition, Bourdieu claims, is a product of a specific socio-historical 
arrangement, one that allowed intellectuals (or thinkers as a discrete social 
category) to withdraw from the world. From this point of view, the positioning of 
‘neoliberalism’ and its associated worlds of politics and economics as inimical to 
and outside of the realm of ‘the university’, allows them to deny the degree to 
which ‘their’ world is already intermeshed with elements – objects, persons, and 
relations – associated with the ‘outside’. Differently put, it allows to go on 
engaging in interventions while ‘forgetting’ that the position from which they can 
do that is itself a product of specific, historically accrued relations. 
 
Others have also recounted this story. Arendt (1989, 1981), tells it as the historical 
disjunction between ‘contemplation’ and ‘action’, vita contemplativa and vita 
activa, whose origins she also situates in the Greek polis. Sloterdijk recounts the 
history of philosophy through the constitution of the position of ‘pure observer’. 
Bios theoretikós, the reflective life, is, in his view, created through a systematic 
practice of ‘suspended animation’, where the thinking person has to be a “kind of 
dead person on holiday…not dead according to undertakers, but philosophically 
dead who cast of their bodies and apparently become pure intellects or impersonal 
thinking souls” (Sloterdijk, 2012, p. 3). Last, but not least feminist scholars and 
philosophers of science (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1991; Alcoff and Potter eds., 
1993) have told it from the perspective of historical exclusion of the ‘feminine’, 
material, and bodily from the realm – and institutions – of thinking.  
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Yet, with the exception of Bourdieu, few scholars have explicitly engaged with the 
question of the implications and limits of the ‘scholarly gaze’. Bourdieu eventually 
capitulated to the supremacy of scholarly disposition, developing the concept of 
sociological reflexivity in hope of ‘catching out’ (though he was aware that this 
was an unfinished process) its epistemic pitfalls. This is particularly important 
because both methodological and theoretical attempts at engaging with this 
question have – even if unwittingly – have predominantly gone in the direction of 
‘resolving’ it, in the sense in which even the ‘unruly’ or ‘impure’ parts of the 
observer (or the epistemic subject) could somehow be harnessed towards 
legitimating the scholarly enterprise (Sloterdijk, 2012, pp. 85–95).  
 
What happens when, instead of a trying to find a practical response – that is, 
looking for ways to identify and ‘correct’ this apparent myopia – we offer a 
sociological account of the very attempt? Critique, in this sense, is an example of 
what Sloterdijk elsewhere referred to as ‘anthropotechnics’ (2013), organised form 
of practice aimed at individual and collective self-transformation: 
 
We could likewise trace the development of the practices and exercises that 
enabled scholarship, and thus narrate a history of self-conquest that allows 
people who have used pretheoretical ‘normal language’ so far to enter the 
confederation of theoretical thought. This type of distancing characterizes 
the task of the historical study of asceticism (Sloterdijk, 2012, p. 9). 
 
Bringing this focus to bear on the present, we could ask what is it about the practice 
of distancing that makes critique incapable of thinking its own foundations? Where 
does this ‘inability’, if indeed inability it is, come from? Are intellectuals really 
like Sartre’s waiter, suspended in ‘webs’ of self-justification that compel them to 
forget the contingency of the social order that supposedly provides the framework 
for their role? Or is something else at play, and, probably most confusing of all, 
what is this ‘else’?  
 
As this thesis has aimed to demonstrate, this is a fundamental question for the 
sociology of critique. It is fundamental both in the sense in which it is already 
implied in its ontological postulates, and in the sense in which any attempt at 
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justification and legitimation of its products or practices will inevitably ‘bounce 
off’ it. Therefore, rather than noting our partial myopia and shrugging it off, or 
proceeding to do sociology of knowledge in a manner that makes a virtue out of 
necessity, we could ask how this particular stance remains implied in and 
reproduced through precisely the practice designed to ‘catch it out’: critique.  
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Conclusions 
 
Concluding summary 
 
This thesis presented a sociological account of critique through an analysis of 
vocabularies of justification employed in intellectual interventions and in the 
narratives of their authors. The ‘conflict’ that the critique of neoliberalism 
postulates – the ‘war’ on universities, denoting the transformation of governance 
and funding mechanisms, changing conditions of teaching and research, and other 
changes to the ‘social contract’ between universities and the society – was framed 
as part of the longer process of transformation of the role and status of knowledge 
in society. This process, in contemporary parlance usually dubbed ‘the crisis of 
expertise’ or the ‘post-truth’ epistemic condition, is one of the constitutive 
questions in late modernity: it concerns concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘reason’, and 
sources of social authority that question the legacy of the Enlightenment as a 
whole.  
 
The starting assertion of this thesis was that arguments or ‘sides’ in discussions 
concerning the role and status of knowledge cannot be understood outside of their 
social, historical and political context. This context includes (1) universities as 
historically and politically constituted institutions of knowledge production; (2) 
academics – or academic intellectuals – as socially situated individuals with a 
specific position from which to ‘intervene’ in societal debates; (3) the social space 
(‘field’) within which these interventions are possible; (4) ideas (concepts, 
reflections) of different actors in this field concerning the properties – form, effects, 
and consequences – of these interventions. In order to understand how (1), (2), (3) 
and (4) are related, the thesis developed a theoretical synthesis of the sociology of 
critique of Boltanski et al., Bourdieu’s field theory, and the theory of intellectual 
interventions (Baert, 2012, 2015, Eyal & Bucholz, 2010). The theoretical parts of 
the thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) engaged with the construction and elaboration of this 
synthesis and its application to the ‘war on universities’. The empirical parts of the 
thesis (Chapters 3, 4, 5) presented a detailed analysis of the ‘space’ of 
interventions: their historical and political background, their content and context, 
and reflections and narratives of selected authors. The interpretative synthesis in 
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Chapter 6 demonstrated how the production of critique entails a set of rarely 
explicit, socially and historically contingent, but, ultimately, ontological 
assumptions – about this space.  
 
The second assertion of this thesis is that the configuration of this space – the place 
where interventions are possible – cannot be explained without recourse to the 
ideas their authors have about the field they are intervening in, their own agency, 
and, not least, the relationship between the two. This reflexive component of 
interventions rests on the construction of what Boltanski dubbed ‘complex 
exteriority’: an epistemic position that enables the production of knowledge about 
a given context from within that context. While, of course, this position is neither 
unique to sociology (anthropology, for instance, has a history of grappling with it) 
nor to the social sciences (as reflected in the vast literature on ‘observer effects’ 
and ‘anthropic bias’ – e.g. Bostrom, 2010), it creates a particular form of tension 
when it comes to the justification and legitimation of academic authority – 
incidentally, exactly what is at stake in the ‘war on universities’.   
 
The third major assertion of the thesis, then, is that critique – as both a form of 
knowledge of the world and engagement with the world – has to be understood not 
only as a form of knowledge, but also as a form of ignorance. Rather than just 
looking at what people know, we must also ask what they do not – and, possibly, 
cannot – know when it comes to ‘their’ object. The study of the social production 
of ignorance has been steadily gaining ground in social epistemology and sociology 
of knowledge. Sociologists of knowledge have argued that absence of knowledge 
is as much a product of social processes as knowledge itself (McGoey, 2012 a,b; 
Croissant, 2014). What is perceived as ‘ignorance’ can be an outcome of a number 
of factors, from actual absence of knowledge to strategic evasion of specific lines 
of inquiry. While most of this research centres on scientific ‘controversies’ and 
other institutional forms of knowledge production, this thesis, by contrast, aimed 
to demonstrate how ignorance is an inevitable component of any process of 
production of knowledge, even when that knowledge aims to be reflexive – and, 
possibly, even more so.  
 
Given that critique is a social process, the conceptualization of these factors equally 
influences the type of knowledge or diagnosis that it can give rise to. While more 
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specific in scope, this account is consistent with those presented by major theorists 
of reflexivity, such as Archer, Giddens, Lash, or Beck. Reflexivity arises from the 
need to explain, justify, or unify different possible accounts of reality, in order to 
make ‘sense’ or everyday existence. In this sense, precisely because life is 
fluctuating, risky, and full of contradictions, actors are constantly compelled to 
engage in narratives, techniques and practices that smooth or ‘even out’ the 
meaning and value of events, persons and things. Examples such as the 
environmentalist who flies around the world or the critic of academic neoliberalism 
who nonetheless participates in the academic ‘rat race’ serve to remind us of the 
impossibility of ‘extracting’ oneself from the networks of interdependence forged 
by contemporary capitalism. Reflexivity, or, more precisely, self-reflexivity, on 
this account, occurs as a byproduct of negotiation or grappling with the 
ambivalence of everyday experience.  
 
From this perspective, positioning can be interpreted as a practice of ontological 
‘fixing’ of subjects (and objects) that form participants’ social worlds. Precisely 
because their value is not ‘stable’ – meaning they are, or can be, multiple things at 
the same time – they need to be, even if temporarily, framed as monovalent: that 
is, reduced to a fixed, unitary meaning. Given that the general political (or moral-
ontological) framework of liberal democracies (as opposed to some earlier modes 
of governance) forbids fixing the value/ontological status of persons ‘for all time’, 
the agency of human beings has to be justified through references to their position. 
Thus, politicians are evil, but managers are ‘perverted’, having ‘bought into’ (the 
language is telling) the ideology of neoliberalism.  
 
This extends not only to subjects (or persons), but to entire domains (or ‘worlds’), 
like politics or the economy. Anything that seems overtly associated with either is 
framed as foreign, polluting (‘toxic’), and dangerous to ‘the University’. In the first 
step, this is a gesture of ontological non-reductionism: drawing boundaries 
between these domains is meant to signal that ‘objects’ or values belonging to one 
cannot be reduced to, and thus neither measured according to, criteria developed 
for the other (e.g., knowledge cannot be measured by the principles of utility). In 
the other, it presents a veritable ontological splitting: it establishes a line of division 
between the two domains that serves to fracture reality into ‘worlds’ (cf. Gabriel, 
2015). Assigning a moral-ontological value to these domains, in turn, serves to 
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position them as adversarial, to the point of being mutually exclusive: academia 
cannot coexist with either the ‘world’ of politics nor the ‘world’ of economy. The 
conflict, indeed, is one of mutual destruction: a war. 
 
This is how interventions proceed from a ‘war of words’ to ‘a war of worlds’. In 
this reframing, intellectuals position themselves as, at the same time, ‘soldiers’ in 
the conflict – defending the cause of The University – and as (engaged) observers: 
that is, someone who is capable of surveying ‘the field’ from above, positioning 
(or, more specifically, geolocating) the most relevant players, and pronouncing a 
moral and ontological stance on the present and the future of the conflict. Epistemic 
authority is derived from this position that is simultaneously within and above: 
‘within’ gives intellectuals the authority to speak for other academics; ‘above’ 
affords them the capacity to ‘see’ (or, rather, situate) ‘both sides’ – that is, the world 
of the academia and worlds that are pitted against it. In the language of positioning, 
this fixing constitutes a spatial vantage point; in other words, it is the establishment 
of the original position from which (political) space can be constituted.  
 
In pragmatic sociology of critique, the need for this temporary fixing is the 
generative context of critique (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006, pp. 23–45, 127–
148). In a situation in which the legitimacy of critique as practice is itself at stake 
– and changes in the political economy of knowledge production certainly merit 
this diagnosis – it is not a surprise that the production of the position of ‘complex 
exteriority’ will inevitably invoke the justification of precisely the means through 
which the group in question ‘orders’, or relates to, reality.  
 
As Simone Weil framed it, 
 
Every professional group manufactures a morality for itself in virtue of which 
the exercise of the profession, so long as it conforms to the rules, is quite 
outside the reach of evil. This is an almost vital need, for the stress of work . 
. . is in itself so great that it would be unbearable if accompanied by anxious 
concern about good and evil (1943, p. 172). 
 
This, in the end, is why critique is fundamentally reliant on instruments of 
‘sociological totalisation’: these instruments provide both a means of 
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categorisation and a ‘viewing platform’ from which an order of equivalence 
(commensuration) can be established. These instruments, at the same time, cannot 
be utilized in a way that would undermine the very possibility of interventions. In 
other words, given that they are predicated on the epistemic procedure of 
objectifying one’s own epistemic subjecthood, they have to retain both the 
possibility of objectivation – achieved through instruments of sociological 
totalization – and the claim to epistemic privilege through which the existence of 
subjecthood is confirmed.  
 
This can explain why participants are reluctant to reflect on the broader context 
that makes their own interventions possible. As Martijn Konings argued, 
 
The modern subject often employs its reflexive capacities not to transform 
its own relation to the iconic sign but to build up a fantasy of a corrupted 
other that prevents the sign from operating in the proper way and delivering 
on its redemptive promises.  (…) In other words, idolatry critique becomes a 
technique of narcissism, which may be understood as the emblematic 
character problem of the modern subject: it denotes the logic of what Brown 
(1995, 52) calls “wounded attachments,” the paradoxical way in which 
moderns use their reflexive capacities to sustain forces that injure them 
(2015, p. 7).  
 
Reflecting on these conditions would require acknowledging different ‘logics’ that 
allow interventions to happen. It would also include recognizing, and naming, 
paradoxical – in Wendy Brown’s words, ‘wounded’ – attachments that sustain 
critique as a form of practice. Some of these include profit motives driving book 
publishing, and advertising revenues driving newspapers and other media outlets. 
Precisely because ‘the social’ is not a discrete realm, certainly not separated from 
‘the economic’ and ‘the political’, the position from which interventions can be 
made has to be justified through ‘fixing’ the ontological status of different objects 
that appear in it. This is why interventions cannot but postulate a political space 
where an exchange of arguments, a pooling of different forms of justification, is 
not only possible, but also makes sense: it is the only universe in which 
interventions matter.  
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This hopefully clarifies why this thesis avoided postulating pre-existing ‘fields’. 
Despite many (including overstated) differences, what Boltanski and Bourdieu 
have in common is a determination to take actors seriously (Susen, 2014b). 
Admittedly, Bourdieu does this in order to reintroduce epistemic, and Boltanski 
ontological, skepticism; however, from the perspective of this thesis, it suffices to 
take it as a methodological caveat. In other words, the fact intellectuals feel 
compelled to create an ontological rupture between academia and other ‘worlds’ is 
something that needs to be explained, rather than taken as a pre-defined feature of 
the space for interventions.  
 
Contra Bourdieu, then, sociological reflexivity is ultimately limited – at least in 
the case of critique of neoliberalism – by precisely the same instruments that are 
used to construct the ‘totalising’ view Boltanski identifies as the main source of 
contradiction implied in the critical stance. While critique can engage with forms 
of oppression its own instruments have ‘uncovered’ – class, ‘race’, gender – it 
encounters decisive problems when it comes to turning these instruments towards 
constitutive categories of its own epistemic foundations. These problems are 
exacerbated under conditions of uncertainty: historically, social sciences and 
humanities were most likely to question these foundations when they seemed most 
secure institutionally, such in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
Today, if anything, critique is used to totalize the sociological toolbox even further: 
by expanding and coopting perspectives from gender, queer, and postcolonial 
studies, by developing graduate programmes in critical theory, by attaching the 
epithet ‘critical’ to academic fields from Accounting to Zoology, including the 
recent field of ‘critical university studies’, which engages critically with just about 
anything but the concept of university itself. Presenters at academic conferences 
regularly cite Lorde’s dictum “master’s tools can’t dismantle the master’s house” 
without pausing for a moment to consider the performative contradiction implied 
in this act. What takes place is a kind of inverse ‘scholastic fallacy’. Rather than 
academics projecting onto external reality characteristics of the scholarly gaze, in 
this case, the assumption is that bringing elements of ‘the real world’ inside 
academic contexts suffices to ‘undo’ their scholasticity17. This is what makes the 
 
17 Bourdieu’s depiction of the raison scolastique is also applicable in this context: “The social and 
mental separation is, paradoxically, never clearer than in the attempts – often pathetic and 
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epistemic apparatus of critique sharpest when addressed to ‘the world’; and, 
conversely, bluntest when applied to itself.  
 
Hannah Arendt, Pierre Bourdieu, and Peter Sloterdijk situated the genesis  of this 
‘knowledge ignorant of itself’ in the Ancient Greek polis and the distinction 
between reflection and action, this thesis focused on the way in which this 
particular form of epistemic relationship was constituted in and through political 
and social processes that shaped the institutionalisation of, first, academic 
knowledge, and, second, critique within it, in the British Isles. The remainder of 
this chapter will discuss the theoretical and epistemological implications for the 
role of critique in the (‘Western’) academia, its relationship with sociology and 
other social sciences, and, in particular, for how we will go about ‘knowing’ 
neoliberalism.   
 
 
 
The justification of justification 
 
 
In the second half of the 20th century it became increasingly obvious that many of 
the foundations of the modern ‘Western’ world no longer held. This extended to 
the ‘social contract’ between institutions of knowledge production, such as 
universities, and institutions of political power, like the state. World War II 
collapsed the assumption that the line dividing rationality from irrationality was 
coextensive with the line separating ‘barbarism’ and civilization; acts of 
unspeakable barbarity could be committed in the name of civilization, and, as 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) observed, by supremely ‘rational’ means. The 
decisive blow of the Holocaust to European rationality was also the funeral march 
for Enlightenment’s core idea: that reason alone can dispel prejudice, and incline 
humans towards a kinder, better life.  
 
Western thought in the rest of the 20th century, to a great degree, represents an 
attempt to come to terms with the impossibility of reconciling cultivated reason 
 
ephemeral – to rejoin the real world, particularly through political commitments (Stalinism, 
Maoism, etc.) whose irresponsible utopianism and unrealistic radicality bear witness that they are 
still a way of denying the realities of the social world” (2000, p. 41). 
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with mass violence. Adorno famously quipped: “the premier demand on all 
education is that Auschwitz not happen again” (1998 [1969]). Arendt, carrying 
forth the legacy of both Jaspers and (albeit in a different way) Heidegger, argued 
that the problem lay precisely in the absence of thinking: the problem with 
Eichmann, for instance, was that he was not thinking (Arendt, 1963).  
 
Any present context in which thinking is pitted against non-thinking, regardless of 
whether the latter is dubbed ‘nationalism’, ‘populism’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, 
or ‘neoliberalism’, has to be seen in the light of this legacy. This legacy calls for 
the identification and calling out of all forms of exclusion and oppression, 
especially those that seem like they may be inclined to repeat the political 
technologies of World War II. At the same time, it calls for the justification of the 
calling out itself; in other words, a promissory mechanism that links critique – the 
formulation of grievances, especially in its theoretically-infused diagnostic form – 
with a progressive cause and thus a better future.  
 
This puts critique, especially the kind practiced through Western institutions of 
knowledge production and mediated through networks of influence that build on 
European colonial history, in a particularly tricky spot. On the one hand, it has to 
rely on performative apparatuses of rationality and objectivity (Boltanski’s 
‘instruments of sociological totalisation’) in order to construct an authoritative 
picture of reality. At the same time, it has to demonstrate either casual disregard 
for or constant epistemic vigilance towards the capacity of precisely these 
instruments to extend their ‘totalising’ potential towards forms of objectification 
of other beings that eventually slip from epistemic to ontological (as, for instance, 
in the case of eugenics). Therefore, those who practice critique have to justify their 
own access to and use of these instruments whilst making sure they are isolated 
from those who may wish to apply the same instruments – instruments that, at 
bottom, allow for the identification, comparison, and ordering of entities – for 
political technologies associated with totalitarian modes of governance. 
 
An obvious solution for this, of course, is the institutional separation between 
knowledge of beings and governance of beings, in most contemporary democracies 
enacted as the separation between universities and the state. Yet, as the political 
history of universities in the UK presented in this thesis demonstrates, not only is 
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this boundary difficult to maintain in political contexts where the governance of 
populations is almost completely overlapping with the knowledge of these 
populations (which, in Foucault’s terms, would be any modern society); the 
boundary was virtually always tenuous. One side of this has to do with forms of 
social stratification characteristic of industrial and post-industrial societies, where 
intellectuals and politicians were typically recruited from the same class; in the 
UK, in particular, elite institutions such as Oxford and Cambridge provided a 
context for the solidification of personal connections and shared interests. The 
other side, however, is that universities and the state co-evolved in the same 
political context, and thus negotiation of the boundary between the two was a vital 
component for the constitution of both, rather than a principle ‘fixed’ or enacted 
for good at any particular point in time. 
 
Institutions of knowledge production, in this sense, were always what Latour 
(1993) referred to as ‘hybrids’. They were hybridized not only with their physical 
environment, but also with domains such as ‘politics’ or ‘the economy’, both of 
which, of course, were also hybrids. While it is possible to claim this hybridity of 
universities was somewhat less evident until the 20th century, in its second half it 
became virtually impossible to ignore. EP Thompson’s Warwick University, Ltd. 
presented a stark portrayal of the degree to which universities were ‘entangled’ 
with ‘worlds’ of industry, capital, and by extension military and political power.  
 
This presented problems for critique: how to continue benefiting from institutions 
of knowledge production without, at the same time, becoming ‘complicit’ in these 
processes? This was a particular challenge for forms of critique deeply reliant on 
these institutions for its intellectual as well as political legitimation, as Chapter 4 
argued was the case with British cultural studies. It was clearly part of a wider 
problem of foundations of social sciences: how can one continue being part of 
while not thinking as part of? In other words, how is it possible to produce 
knowledge from institutions deeply implicated in capitalism without that 
knowledge simultaneously being of capitalism, but not primarily (and possibly at 
all) in the sense of about?  
 
Sociology of knowledge presents one type of solution to this problem, in the sense 
in which it makes the relationship between the ‘social’ (including the elements 
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identified as most directly relevant to capitalism, be they material – as in Marx, or 
ideal – as in Weber) and knowledge its primary object. In Berger and Luckmann’s 
constructivist paradigm (1967), this takes the direction of asserting the ontological 
primacy of knowledge over any version of reality. Sociology of scientific 
knowledge of the Edinburgh school, as well as ANT and STS, take this paradigm 
to its logical limits. Postmodernism takes a slightly different approach by rejecting 
any claim to foundationalism; yet, this leads either to absolute nihilism, or, 
alternatively, to an ironic stance that, as some of Rorty’s critics have argued, is best 
(and possibly only) exercised from a tenured position in Ivy League universities 
(Haack, 2016).      
 
This, obviously, is the impasse Boltanski eventually reaches with the problem of 
‘complex exteriority’ in On Critique. At this point, sociology of critique converges 
with the critique of rationality of the early Frankfurt School (Basaure, 2014). Yet 
it does not follow either the route of postmodernism, into anti-foundationalism, or 
the route of sociology of knowledge, into the focus on correlationism. Neither does 
it follow Bourdieu’s critical sociology into developing sociological reflexivity as a 
particular form of discipline (or sport) of sparring with epistemic biases. This, 
however, leaves it a bit stranded: it has to remain consigned to the level of 
anthropological epistemology, by inferring the underlying rationality of modes of 
justification. Boltanski goes back to ‘the people’ and their forms of judgment as 
the generative and reproductive mechanism of the social; in this sense, he uses 
justification as a justification for posing the question of justification in the first 
place.  
 
This allows sociology of critique to zig-zag through questions of ontology 
relatively unscathed. However, it also brings it dangerously close to forms of 
‘epochal’ theorizing: it also uses a diagnosis of the present to justify its approach 
to diagnosing the present. In this sense, it is not entirely clear whether it can avoid 
the last-minute failure of nerve that characterised Bourdieu’s sociological 
reflexivity. This thesis, however, suggested to drop one level down ‘the rabbit hole’ 
(Muniesa, 2016) and ask: what must actors assume reality is like for critique to be 
possible? 
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The ‘proliferation’ of critique can be seen precisely as a reaction to an increasing 
realisation of the impossibility of distinguishing its constitutive conditions from 
what it aims to grasp as its object. In the first instance, it takes the form of 
performative distancing from the immediacy of ‘reality’, what Boltanski, following 
Sartre, frames as the ‘viscosity of the real’. This distancing has both material and 
discursive elements. Traditionally, the material took shape through spatial and 
infrastructural separation of sites for the production of knowledge and critique from 
their environment. This is reflected in the metaphor of Town vs. Gown and, in 
many campus-based universities, is still the case. Even universities that are more 
‘embedded’ in their surroundings often have strong private security and controlled 
access to many, if not all, buildings. Similarly, ‘events’ where critique takes place 
– for instance, book launches, panels and debates – are clearly demarcated from 
the flow of ‘everyday existence’. They are usually highly ritualized, with a specific 
focus, order of speakers, rules of participation and interaction.  
 
As suggested in Chapter 4, such instances can be seen as ‘truth tests’, which serve 
to affirm both the truth of the diagnosis (critique), and the authority of the speaker 
(and other participants). They are also sites of economic exchange: in addition to 
the rituals of book sales and signing, increasingly they feature the possibility of 
obtaining drinks (or even snacks), related publications, and so on. Yet it is this 
‘other’ side that is never picked up, never remarked on, never commented upon. In 
this sense, David Willetts can ostensibly ‘breach’18 by launching an open critique 
of Stefan Collini in his role as discussant during Collini’s book launch and still 
remain (though controversially so) part of the same social milieu. However, it is 
far less conceivable that a discussant (or anyone else) would, for instance, launch 
into a diatribe on the pricing of the book, the fact it’s being sold, or, say, raise the 
question of author’s royalties. When and if such things occur, offending individuals 
are either quickly removed or ignored.  
 
The discursive element includes the construction of justifications that frame these 
two worlds, or ‘sides’, as mutually exclusive to the point of annihilation. This takes 
the form of ‘ontological purification’: that is, identification of different ‘beings’, 
 
18 ‘Breaching’ experiments were commonly used in ethnomethodological research to render 
observable implicit social rules and mores (see Garfinkel, 1991; Goffman, 1971). In this context it 
is particularly interesting to observe which forms of ‘breaching’ are admissible, and which are 
not.  
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establishment of their moral worth, and reassignment of those that appear 
ambiguous. These gestures of discursive boundary-keeping proceed through 
positioning different actors within ‘worlds’, and the ascription of properties in 
accordance with this. For instance, managers and vice-chancellors are identified as 
evil or ‘unthinking’, while academics are identified as good, unsuspecting victims 
of neoliberal ideologues. This form of positioning, obviously, has to ignore both 
distinctions among university managers – particularly difficult to sustain in cases 
when authors themselves occupied managerial positions – and those among 
academics. This, for instance, is why the question of precarious labour and other 
forms of unequal power relations among university staff, as well as between staff 
and students, plays a relatively minor role. Alternatively, critique takes as its object 
the alleged reversal of these relationships, as, for instance, in the ‘free speech’ 
arguments surrounding both instances of no-platforming and universities’ ‘pro-
European bias’. Critique is, in this sense, a fundamentally modern practice: it seeks 
to circumscribe different domains, maintaining separate spheres of exchange and 
rules for each.  
 
This enables critique to continue as if ‘economy’ and ‘knowledge’ (or, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, ‘culture’) really constituted separate fields. It is this ‘double 
truth’ (in Eyal’s terms) of intellectual interventions – that they are neither 
‘economic’ nor ‘scientific’ by themselves – that provides the conditions for critique 
to act as a practice of performative delineation of the two. This is also the 
mechanism that gives critique of neoliberalism its double meaning: the fact it is 
both ‘of’ neoliberalism as part, and ‘of’ neoliberalism as about – or, as framed in 
the Introduction, its object is simultaneously the generative condition of its 
epistemic subject.  
 
We were never modern…but we keep trying 
 
Latour (1993) identified the tendency to draw boundaries around objects and 
domains as quintessentially modern. In other words, it is precisely because the 
‘world’ is deeply intertwined, links and connections are always being made (and 
remade), objects fashioned and refashioned, that ‘the moderns’ – meaning more-
or-less inhabitants of the developed world – are busy trying to ‘disentangle’ them. 
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There is probably no institution more ‘modern’ than the university19. British 
universities played a pivotal role in both industrial development and colonial 
expansion; they were intertwined with formal and informal administrative, literary, 
and commercial networks, many of which spun far beyond the territory of the 
British Isles (Perraton, 2014). This was not so much a specificity of the institution, 
as a reflection of the fact universities were vital to the development of the modern 
nation-state. In the Westphalian world, universities were granted autonomy 
precisely because they were not, in any substantial sense of the term, autonomous. 
Their separation from ‘everyday’ affairs, including those of the political 
community, the separation Weber was so keen to uphold, was predicated on a 
sophisticated tradeoff between the technical, administrative, and other forms of 
expertise, and protection from overt political interference. In line with liberal 
concept of the duality of positive and negative rights, protection of and protection 
from the state were two sides of the same coin, itself reliant on the same political 
actor: the state.  
 
This co-determination is one of the reasons why critique of neoliberalism is so 
invested in the ‘defence’ of the university. ‘The University’, in this context, 
represents less any concrete institution or arrangement as the metaphor for 
knowledge protected from the incursions of the ‘outside’ world, regardless of 
whether it is coded in economic, political, or simply physical terms. This love/hate 
relationship between intellectuals as spokespersons for institutions of knowledge 
production and forms of political power provides ample material for critique. 
Simultaneously coded as the provider of protection and as conduit of harm, The 
State is, in this framing, itself a symbol for the impossibility of separation between 
different ‘spheres’.  
 
Critique, in this sense, can be seen as a practice of resolving, or dealing with, 
ambiguity. The more ambivalent institutions (people, objects, etc.) are, the more 
important it becomes to ‘fix’ them, to assign stable (ontological) value: X counts 
as Y in C. This is why interventions invest so much in positional struggles around 
the ‘nature’ of universities: ‘contributors to economy’, ‘guardians of knowledge 
for its own sake’, ‘essential elements in building a knowledge society’, ‘spaces for 
 
19 Which, of course, is not to negate the pre-modern history of universities, engaged with in some 
detail in Chapter 3. 
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the preservation of critical thought’, ‘protectors of free speech’, ‘enemies of Brexit’ 
or ‘targets of frustration of nationalist elites’. This is where the full extent, or 
meaning, of the metaphor becomes clear. In the Westphalian order, ‘war’ usually 
requires at least one side to be a state actor. Wars concern questions of boundaries 
(and, obviously, conflicts over resources); the more coextensive the warring 
entities, the more effort is required to delineate them.   
 
The choice of metaphor is thus not accidental. Tropes such as war, ruin, death, or 
destruction in the contemporary critique of neoliberalism in higher education 
convey that the constitutive institution for the order of discourse is under attack. If 
anything, wars are the exact opposite of skholè: the erasure of leisure, at least in 
the common sense of the term20, and the eruption of the material, everyday, and 
mundane. Last, but not least, wars are exceedingly corporeal: even with the shift 
towards drone warfare, they still include a lot of physicality, not to mention death.  
 
What the metaphor also does, then, when employed in intellectual interventions, is 
provide an exit from the viscerality of this impression by furnishing an 
interpretative or diagnostic framework with which to comprehend it: what is this a 
case of. In Boltanski and Thévenot’s terms, it provides an order of generality: a 
diagnosis that is universal if by no other means, then by the mere fact it is framed 
in the language of critique. This order of generality furnishes the possibility of 
asserting equivalence: X counts as Y in C. Policies count as ‘gibberish’, REF 
counts as surveillance, university managers count as ‘fat cats’. In this sense, 
intellectual interventions are a kind of assembly device that translates relatively 
specific feelings of dissatisfaction, of being oppressed, or being under attack, into 
a particular product – an intellectual intervention – through the aid of networks of 
mediators and intermediaries, from editors and publishers, to platforms, to 
audiences.  
 
In this way, wars also represent instruments of ontological simplification. These 
forms of ontological simplification, further, serve not only to position the author as 
well as (real or imaginary) opponents, but also, more fundamentally, to affirm the 
validity of the act of positioning. Searle’s ‘institutional’ facts thus hinge on the 
 
20 Reportedly trench warfare included periods of exceeding boredom, but it is questionable 
whether anyone would be likely to describe them as ‘pleasant’. 
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belief of speech to institute – literally, produce – effects. Speech-acts are, in this 
sense, their own justification, through which the performance of speech is, at the 
same time, supposed to act as the extradiscursive source of validity – and efficacy 
– of the act itself.  
 
How to do (no) things with words 
 
The admonition to “choose sides” in the blurb for Docherty’s Universities at War 
cited in Chapter 1 can thus be read in two registers. One is that two positions – ‘for’ 
and ‘against’ universities – are mutually exclusive, and that no middle ground is 
possible. The other is that the (potential) reader has already chosen sides; that is, 
that the act of reading itself – as well as, obviously, writing – constitutes a political 
choice. In this sense, the process of production and consumption of intellectual 
products and its attendant practices (book launches, panels, discussions on social 
media) become equated with political action. Engaging in interventions thus 
becomes the external guarantee of the effectiveness of interventions. This is 
consistent with Butler’s account of performativity. Foucault, however, recognised 
the need for discourse to be grounded in something other than itself: power, in his 
view, is historically prior to discourse.  
 
This is a good time to revisit the ontological foundations of Austin’s concept of 
speech-acts. What takes place in critique, especially the kind practiced through 
intellectual interventions, is a ‘forgetting’ of the hyphen; the conditions under 
specific forms of ‘speech’ – utterances – become effective. This goes beyond well 
beyond ‘intended’ and ‘unintended’ consequences, as well as the question of 
situational conditions (perlocution): it concerns the very idea that speech has 
effects, or, simply put, that to speak is to act.    
 
While sociology of critique does not infer a (meta)normative order from the 
plurality of existing modes of justification, it implicitly draws a boundary around 
forms of engagement. In that account, even orders of violence, love, or familiarity 
are ultimately bound by the need to justify or offer causes (reasons) for action. This 
is predicated on the assumption that life in a society requires its members to make 
their action understandable or legible to others, even if this does not lead to 
agreement. In this sense, the existence of multiple orders of worth as well as 
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‘worlds’, as noted in Chapter 6, nonetheless presupposes the possibility of 
coexistence. This, in Boltanski and Chiapello’s words, explains the inherent 
ambiguity of critique:  
 
(E)ven in the case of the most radical movements, it shares 'something' with 
what it seeks to criticize. This stems from the simple fact that the normative 
references on which it is based are themselves in part inscribed in the world 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p. 40).  
 
Power, in this sense, is ultimately constrained by the need to justify. In New Spirit 
of Capitalism, this is precisely what makes capitalism resilient: it is capable of 
appropriating forms of critique, integrating its discourse, and turning it into a form 
of justification. In this sense, capitalism works through the subsumption of critique 
and displacement of exploitation.  
 
Neoliberalism, however, is the only form of political order that does not have to 
conform to requests for justification. This may seem counterintuitive: after all, 
analyses of neoliberalism over the past 30 years have overwhelmingly focused on 
the constructions of neoliberal reason (Peck, 2010; Amadae, 2015), neoliberal 
rationality (Brown, 2015), neoliberal ideology (Harvey), to say nothing of the 
scholarship on Mont Pelerin ‘thought collective’ (Stedman Jones, 2012; Mirowski, 
2009). Yet, as noted at the beginning, there is an inherent danger of 
overcognitivizing neoliberalism, seeing its appeal or successes as purely (or 
primarily) intellectual, while ignoring the affective (Konings, 2015; Davies, 2018). 
This intellectualizing tendency is nothing other than Bourdieu’s scholastic fallacy: 
at the end of the day, a self-affirming assumption that words and concepts – such 
as those used in critique – matter.  
 
Neoliberalism no longer requires justification not because it is a ‘policy orthodoxy’ 
(orthodoxies call for careful policing of canon and prosecution of heresy) nor 
because it is an ‘ideology’ in the sense in which the majority of people are ‘blind’ 
to it (if they were, the ‘iconoclastic’ practices of critique of the sort analysed in this 
thesis would have a sufficient mobilizing effect, akin to the ‘consciousness-raising’ 
strategies of early Marxists). One reason, which is quite obvious, is that there is a 
dearth of other options. Nostalgic dreams of communism and throwbacks to 
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welfare state aside, few people have a clear idea of what an alternative system 
would look like. More problematically, most people’s lives are so intertwined with 
neoliberal institutions (banks, transport systems) that imagining the level of 
comfort to which most affluent ‘Westerners’ are accustomed to outside these 
institutions seems almost impossible.  
 
The other reason is that there is nothing about critique that renders it challenging 
or subversive to ‘the system’ as a whole. If anything, critique channels tendencies 
and feelings that may be harmful – dissatisfaction, frustration, anger – into 
relatively safe confines of speech-acts. People who read the London Review of 
Books may feel that their frustrations about their son’s tuition fees are recognized 
and meaningful, nod, talk about it with their partner over dinner, ‘like’ and ‘share’ 
critical articles on Facebook, perhaps even order one of the books. But they still 
pay tuition fees, order their dinner through Deliveroo, generate revenue for 
Facebook’s ad partners, and probably get the book delivered by Amazon. Unlike 
in Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, where late stages of capitalism integrate or 
subsume ‘artistic’ critique of the 1960s, neoliberalism – at least inasmuch as it is a 
diagnosis for the current order – can not only happily coexist with various sorts of 
discursive critical practices, but even encourage them. Like the University, its 
constitutive fantasy, critique can become an organised practice of ‘exiting’ the 
vagaries of everyday existence whilst remaining deeply, and inextricably, attached 
to them. 
  
Postscript: dream of detachment  
 
The possibility of detachment, of course, is a constitutive dream of Western 
modernity, and as such the constitutive condition for its epistemic gaze. This “view 
from nowhere” (Haraway, 1991) is not only characteristic of liberal, Anglophone, 
objectivist discourses. Theories that privilege social and cultural determination of 
knowledge nonetheless assume that mechanisms by which this determination 
occurs are, give and take all, knowable. The institution of ‘the University’, thus, 
becomes a stand-in for the dream of knowledge unbound from material, economic, 
and political spheres, and thus also from the ‘stickiness’ of the real. Critique, which 
exists to render one both a subject and an object of observation, cannot achieve this 
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point of view without tacitly accepting the values on which the practice of 
‘detached observation’ was built.  
 
The dream (or ambition) of an exit from ‘this’ world whilst retaining observational 
capacities, according to Sloterdijk (2012), is a dream about life after death. The 
idea of the ‘pure observer’, suspended in thought and thus exempted from the 
vagaries of worldly existence while perfectly positioned to pronounce on it, is itself 
predicated on the idea of severance, of the possibility of mind, thought, or language 
to finally find a way out of the sticky flow of existence. This ‘stickiness’, which 
Sartre associated with the (human) subject’s implicit awareness of the impossibility 
of detaching oneself from ‘objects’ – that is, the impossibility of constructing the 
standpoint of the ‘pure’ observer, the fully autonomous subject – is the driving 
force for the constitution of ‘complex exteriority’. Exit from the ‘viscosity of the 
real’, in other words, presupposes there already is an outside. This outside is the 
constitutive condition of, and for, critique as a whole.  
 
In present circumstances, however, it is highly doubtful whether it makes any sense 
to pursue the “politics of the outside” (Johnson, ed., 2013). If nothing else, 
planetary boundaries are rapidly making even ‘moderns’ realise that the dream of 
infinite expansion has run its course – and it is quite possible this realisation has 
arrived too late (Latour, 2013). The constitutive ‘outside’ of both capitalism and 
critique, in this sense, is long gone. No-one is sure as yet what may (or may not) 
be there to replace it. As Hamlet wonders: “For in that sleep of death what dreams 
may come/When we have shuffled off this mortal coil?” (Shakespeare, cca. 1602). 
This also means there is no vantage point from which critique – or, for that matter, 
any mode of knowing reality – can capture the conditions of its existence and 
escape them at the same time.  
 
In The Ends of the World, Deborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 
engage with the problem of stepping out of the “narcissistic circle of correlation” 
(2017, p. 73), that is, the fixation on the relationship between the self and the world 
they argue characterizes Western modes of engaging with both space and time. 
They find it the words of Davi Kopenawa, Yanomami shaman. Yanomamö, of 
course, are paradigmatic ‘anti-Moderns’, not only in the sense of being constructed 
as the ‘Other’, but also because of their legendary violence: from a Western 
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perspective, the Yanomamö represent the binary opposite of discourse ethics. In a 
book co-authored with the anthropologist Bruce Albert, Kopenawa connects 
‘Westerners’’ obsession with commodities with the desire to ignore death. In this 
context, he offers a good answer to Hamlet’s question, and a potent critique of its 
epistemic foundations: 
 
Whites only treats us as ignorant because we are different from them. But 
their thought is short and obscure; it cannot go far and elevate itself, because 
they want to ignore death (…) Whites do not dream far like we do. They 
sleep a lot, but they only dream about themselves (Kopenawa and Albert, 
2013, p. 411–12).  
  
The future of critique will probably involve learning how to dream about 
something other than ourselves.  
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To be returned to Odette Rogers at the Department of Sociology Office 
BEFORE UNDERTAKING YOUR FIELDWORK. 
 
FIELDWORK CAN COMMENCE ONLY AFTER APPROVAL IS 
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If you will be undertaking any sociological research that involves gathering 
information or data from human participants, or involves working away from 
Cambridge, you must discuss the ethical implications and risks of the 
research with your supervisor (psychological research has its own parallel 
ethical approval procedures).   
 
The first part of this form, ‘ETHICS’, should be completed for all research 
involving human participants, or if the research raises other ethical issues. 
The second part of this form, ‘RISK’, should be completed by all 
researchers. 
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PART A: ETHICS 
 
 
Both the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and the British 
Sociological Association (BSA), publish guidelines for research with human 
participants. You may find it useful to consult these guidelines, which can be found 
at the following webpages (accurate as of 5 May 2016). 
 
ESRC Framework for Research Ethics 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/files/funding/guidance-for-applicants/esrc-framework-for-
research-ethics-2015/ 
 
British Sociological Association: Equality and Diversity 
http://www.britsoc.co.uk/equality/  
 
You can check whether your research requires approval from the NHS (National 
Health Service) Research Ethics Committee on the following webpage (accurate 
as of 5 May 2016). 
 
NHS Research Ethics Committee Approval 
http://www.hra-decisiontools.org.uk/ethics/ 
 
Ethical approval is first of all considered by the Sociology Ethics Committee, who 
will either approve a proposal or refer it to a University Ethics Committee for further 
consideration. 
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Title of research: 
 
War on universities? Neoliberalism, 
knowledge production, and intellectual 
positioning in the UK 
 
Date (DD/MM/YYYY):  
 
                
          14/11/2016 
 
Status (please circle one or delete 
inapplicable): 
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Summary of your research 
Please outline the main research questions you intend to address, the research 
design you propose to use, and details of all research instruments and 
procedures to be deployed. Please attach any relevant documents, such as 
questionnaires. 
 
My research is concerned with forms of intellectual positioning in relation to 
Governmental policies for knowledge production (higher education and 
research) in the UK. In particular, I will be focusing on reactions to the 
consequences that the referendum on leaving the European Union held on 24 
June 2016 (‘Brexit’) will have for universities.  
 
My fieldwork will comprise interviews with selected intellectuals at UK 
universities who have publicly taken a position on these issues (through articles 
in newspapers, blogs, or public speeches), as well as participant observation in 
events and fora that engage with the implications of contemporary political and 
social processes for the sector. The objective of these forms of research is to 
gather information on how individuals position themselves, negotiate, and 
reflect on the boundaries between the field of politics and the field of knowledge 
production, as well as how they frame the relationship between their intellectual 
projects and their environment.  
 
Fieldwork will primarily consist of open/unstructured interviewing, combined 
with ethnographic observation. The total number of interviews is projected to be 
between 15 and 20; the duration of each should be between 45 and 90 minutes, 
depending on the interviewees’ availability; interviews will be recorded, pending 
interviewees’ consent. Participant observation will feature extensive note-
taking, and, where permitted, possible photography and/or video recording. 
Participants will be made aware that the notes and other material will be only 
used in the thesis. In both cases, the identity of interviewees will be protected, 
including, when necessary, obscuring their institutional affiliation.    
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PLEASE ALSO SUBMIT A COPY OF THE INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
YOU MAY BE ASKING YOUR PARTICIPANTS TO COMPLETE (a sample 
form is included at the end of this document). 
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PART B: RISK 
 
 
THIS PART OF THE FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE YOU 
UNDERTAKE ANY FIELDWORK. 
 
Before undertaking fieldwork, researchers should consider carefully (1) what 
hazards the researcher and participants may face during the research; (2) the risks 
posed by these hazards; and (3) what steps can be taken to minimise these risks. 
 
Of course, research cannot be risk-free, and it is important that researchers 
consider what hazards might arise in the course of their fieldwork, and their 
likelihood (both for their own safety, and for the safety of their participants), and 
then consider what sensible and proportionate steps can be taken to reduce the 
risks posed by these hazards. 
 
An example of a risk involved in research would be increased vulnerability to 
attack during fieldwork. Because there are particular risks associated with doing 
fieldwork alone, a typical measure to minimise such risks would be to work in pairs, 
or to leave a travel itinerary and interviewing schedule with a colleague and to 
phone in at pre-arranged times. 
 
A useful discussion of fieldwork safety can be found at the website of the Social 
Research Association, at the following webpage (accurate as of 5 May 2016). You 
should read this document before completing the rest of this form. 
 
Social Research Association – Code of Safety for Social Researchers 
http://the-sra.org.uk/sra_resources/safety-code/ 
 
This part of the form asks you to list any hazards that you may encounter during 
your proposed fieldwork, and the reasonable steps that can be taken to minimise 
the risks posed by these hazards.  You will then have to estimate both the 
likelihood and severity of these hazards, on scales of 1-5, to produce risk ratings 
for each of the identified hazards you may encounter in your fieldwork. When the 
risk ratings for all of the identified hazards have been calculated, the highest risk 
rating is taken as the overall risk rating for your fieldwork. 
 
 
PLEASE PROVIDE THE PROPOSED START AND END DATES OF YOUR 
FIELDWORK: 
 
 
Proposed start date of fieldwork: 1 February 2017 
 
 
Proposed end date of fieldwork: 30 May 2017 
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Definitions 
 
Hazard  
The potential for harm. 
 
Risk  
A function of the probability (or likelihood) of that harm actually occurring and the 
severity of its consequences. 
 
Risk assessment    
The process of deciding on actions to be taken to reduce risk to an acceptable 
level, preferably ‘low’ or ‘very low’, through the implementation of control 
measures. 
 
 
 
PART B, Section 1: Hazards  
PLEASE GIVE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF WHAT YOU PERCEIVE TO 
BE POSSIBLE HAZARDS TO YOURSELF OR OTHERS THAT MIGHT 
ARISE DURING YOUR FIELDWORK. 
 
 
 
There are no to very few hazards related to my fieldwork. During 
fieldwork, I will be resident in London, with occasional overnight trips to 
other university towns in the UK (such as Nottingham, Coventry, 
Lincoln, etc., as well as Cambridge for supervision), and thus the only 
foreseeable hazards relate to possible incidents concerning residence 
and transport. In all cases, I will make sure to stay/reside in safe areas 
and use reliable means of transport, minimizing any risks related to this 
aspect.  
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PLEASE LIST IN THE TABLE BELOW THE POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND 
PERSONS AT RISK IDENTIFIED ABOVE: 
 
 
Potential hazards:  
 
 
Hazard 1: Delays related to possible cancellation of 
transport / rerouting / changes to travelling schedule 
Hazard 2: 
Hazard 3: 
Hazard 4: 
Hazard 5: 
Add as appropriate... 
 
 
Persons at risk: 
 
Myself 
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PART B, Section 2: Risk Assessment 
 
FOR EACH OF THE HAZARDS IDENTIFIED, PLEASE ASSESS ITS 
LIKELIHOOD, AND ITS SEVERITY WERE IT TO OCCUR, ON SCALES OF 1-5, 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH TABLES A AND B: 
 
 
Table A: Likelihood of hazard (chance of hazard occurring during 
fieldwork) 
   
Likelihood 
category 
Description (% probabilities are guiding estimates) Score 
   
Highly unlikely Event highly improbable, though possible (<0.1% 
chance of occurring) 
1 
Unlikely Event improbable, but can reasonably be expected to 
occur (≥0.1% – 5% chance of occurring) 
2 
Moderately likely Event moderately likely to occur (>5% – 25% chance of 
occurring) 
3 
Likely Event probable (>25% – 75% chance of occurring) 4 
Highly likely Event has high potential, or is certain, to occur (>75% 
– 100%) 
5 
   
 
 
Table B: Severity of hazard (estimated harm of hazard if it occurs) 
   
Severity 
category 
Description Score 
   
Very low For example: lost time or effort, boredom, mental 
fatigue, minor embarrassment or frustration or the 
expectation of these, minor property damage, 
minor or moderate physical discomfort, or the 
anticipation of suffering these, minor invasion of 
privacy, etc. 
1 
Low For example: minor physical pain or the expectation of 
minor physical pain, moderate psychological distress 
(embarrassment, shame, etc.), minor reputational 
damage, cause of offence, moderate property damage, 
moderate invasion of privacy, increased exposure to 
everyday risks (traffic, air pollution, etc.), etc. 
2 
Moderate For example: moderate physical pain or anticipation of 
suffering moderate physical pain, recalling of traumatic 
events, unhappy rumination, moderate to high intensity 
stress or anxiety, etc. 
3 
High For example: severe physical or psychological pain or 
damage  
4 
Very high For example: substantial destruction, serious injury, 
medium to long-term disability, death, etc. 
5 
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PLEASE PROVIDE IN THE BOX BELOW THE RISK RATING OF EACH 
HAZARD: 
 
 
Risk rating of hazards (likelihood x severity)  
The risk rating of each hazard is given by its likelihood score multiplied by its 
severity score and will be between 1 and 25.  
 
Risk rating of hazard 1 = 1 
Risk rating of hazard 2 =  
Risk rating of hazard 3 =  
Risk rating of hazard 4 =  
Risk rating of hazard 5 =  
Add as appropriate... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk of each hazard: guiding categories 
  
Risk rating range Risk category of hazard 
  
1-6  Low risk 
8-10 Medium risk 
12-25 High risk 
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PART B, Section 3: Control Measures 
PLEASE INDICATE IN THIS BOX WHAT PRECAUTIONS YOU WILL 
TAKE TO MINIMISE THE IDENTIFIED RISKS.  
 
You must provide a written 'Safe System of Work' (SSW) for activities 
which carry a risk rating of medium or high according to the risk 
categories above. Advice on writing an SSW is available from the Health, 
Safety and Environmental Office (continue on a separate sheet if 
necessary). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE FILL IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE: 
 
 
 
Signature of student:    
 
 
 
Date 
(DD/MM/YYYY):  
15/11/2016 
 
 
(if appropriate) 
Signature of staff member/supervisor: 
 
 
Date 
(DD/MM/YYYY):  
15/11/2016 
 
 
Date for review (DD/MM/YYYY): 
(If a review will not be required please explain why, e.g., short duration 
of project, one-off nature, etc.) 
 
 
SIGNATURES ARE TO INDICATE WHO CARRIED OUT, AND/OR WHO 
APPROVED, THE ASSESSMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEPARTMENT. 
SIGNING THIS FORM CANNOT TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE 
UNIVERSITY TO THE SIGNATORY.  HOWEVER, REASONABLE CARE 
MUST BE USED BY ALL INVOLVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSESSMENT. 
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THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM MUST BE PASSED TO MS ODETTE 
ROGERS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OFFICE. 
Department of Sociology 
SAMPLE INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Title of Project: War on universities? Neoliberalism, knowledge 
production, and intellectual positioning in the UK 
 
Name of Researcher: Jana Bacevic 
 
The interview you are about to take part in is part of my PhD research at the 
University of Cambridge, on intellectual positioning in relation to transformations 
of higher education and research in the UK. You will be asked questions about 
your opinion on the relationship between intellectuals, universities, and their 
social and political environment. The interview may involve questions 
concerning your public engagement, and the way it relates to your professional 
and personal biography. You are free not to answer specific questions or 
withdraw from the interview at any point. Your identity will remain concealed, 
and your answers anonymous and used only for the purposes of academic 
research.  
 
The interview will take between 45 and 90 minutes. 
 
If you are interested in receiving further information about this project, please 
write your e-mail address on the extra sheet. 
 
       Please tick box 
 
1. I confirm that I have understood these instructions and have had the  
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
 
 
3. I understand that my responses will be anonymised and only used for                     
academic research.  
 
4. I understand that my interview may be recorded. 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above project. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
____________________                   _____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
____________________ ____________________ 
Name of Researcher Date Signature 
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